



International Seminar

A NEW WORLD POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE

Bosco Marengo, 27-28 October 2006

Workshops

Friday, 27 October

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New Grammar of International Relations: Authority of International Law, Questions of Sovereignty, Use of Force, Diffuse Violence and Society Action

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New Grammar of International Relations: Authority of International Law, Questions of Sovereignty, Use of Force, Diffuse Violence and Society Action

Chairperson: **Piero Bassetti**, *Former Member of the Italian Parliament, President of Globus et Locus, Italy*

You all know the term of reference of our workshop, which is “New Grammar of International Relations: Authority of International Law, Questions of Sovereignty, Use of Force, Diffuse Violence and Society Action”. So we have quite a broad argument to discuss and I would suggest in a short introduction, to try a line of reference starting from the consideration that when you say ‘new grammar’, generally a grammar is connected with a choice of a language and a language of a discourse. So my suggestion is that we must spend some time making clear what the discourse we are referring to actually is, because the things that are mentioned here, basically, are tools to organise; let’s call it ‘a New Order’.

So from this point of view I think that when the word globalisation is used, some clarification of its meaning has to be made, because, for instance, this morning, globalisation was assumed as if it were a result of political choices; these might be Perestroika or Bush father or son choices. And in connection with this choice, the fact that there might be more or less globalisation, bad or good globalisation. Frankly, we in Globus et Locus, on this point, strongly disagree, because we think that globalisation has not been only a production of politics. Politics has been involved, but globalisation is a feature and is a process which is mainly driven by technological changes. To be synthetic, the fact that technology has reduced time and space to zero. Whenever the categories of time and space change, the world changes, therefore globalisation is, in effect, connected with forces that are not conditioned by politics, or not only by politics. And I will say, and only a little by politics, that have been conditioned by technological advances which are irrevocable with which the only thing we can do is to get acquainted, to accept them because they are absolutely irrevocable.

Therefore, I think that another point has to be raised regarding the word ‘globalisation’. Our work in Globus et Locus is only a part of the discussion because the real problem is ‘glocalisation’ –the fact that due to globalisation, the relationship between the global feature and the local feature has strongly changed and that is what has determined, basically, the changes in the nation state: because of globalisation the state has been voided upward and downward and new relationships between global things and *loci* have been established. In such a society I fully agree with Sigmund Boyman’s celebrated metaphor “We live in a liquid world, which the traditional forces, first and foremost states and international organisations, the masters of the pre-global era, find a place where they find it more and more difficult to reduce effectively and legitimately to a more stable, recognisable form”. This is, in my opinion, a very important point; the fact that the nature of civil society has changed and the relationship between civil society and organisation of power has changed. The type of power which was typical of the political institution, basically a monopoly of legitimate violence, is not, any more, the power conditioning history. History is conditioned by different powers.

Size and technology is one, demography is another, and therefore to try to find out a new order basing this research on a research of a new order of typical political institution is nonsense, because the sources of power really ruling the history of a globalised society

are by far different and I think so, not only of science and technology, but also of concentration of power as with, for instance, multinationals.

The functional agencies, this morning agency had been advocated, because as a matter of fact, they rule functional processes which are not anymore territorial. The basis of the force, the relevance of the state, was the control of territory. You don't control society anymore controlling territory, because in a globalised world society is characterised by mobility, think of migrations for instance. You do not have borders anymore. Frontiers don't mean anything any more. Therefore, all the powers that were based and finalised to controlling territory have lost relevance. In a sense, I would say that political power, the one we have been discussing along the centuries, has somehow evaporated, if not at all at least partially, and new powers have come up with which we have to deal and trade.

If what I have said makes some sense, then the problem of the architecture of a New Order has to refer to completely different materials for the building that has to be designed or built because we cannot build a new political order with the materials that were the tools of the old order. So, the terms of reference have to be broadened, the United Nations Organisation, the problem is not of a meta-state, the problem is of reorganising the relationship between civil society and power and then the question of rights, of humanity's security, as it has been discussed this morning has to be referred to the question of efficacy, because power requires efficacy and politics require a discourse with powers that have their own efficacy. The reason I did this introduction is that if we want to serve the World Political Forum's intention, following along the line that Mr. Gorbachev mentioned this morning, of helping a resurgence from the political power of a new behaviour as such to contribute, to guarantee peace, order, non violence, human security, we have to contribute an analysis which might be a correct analysis and not a confused one, because if we work with a confused analysis we don't go anywhere. So I'll be delighted to have your contributions in a very informal way.

Lord Robert Skidelsky, *Member of the House of Lords and Professor of Economic History at Warwick University, UK*

I'm very pleased that you mentioned twice the word power in your presentation, because I think that it lies at the heart of the question of a new political architecture. I think one's got to find, one's got to accept that power will play a part and therefore it's a question of what power is legitimate and how power is going to be exercised. Now, let me give you a very concrete example. The United Nations has proclaimed a duty to protect the innocent –and by the way, Mr. Etzioni was completely wrong to say this was invented by someone, a Sudanese, in 1995. It goes back to St. Augustine and the whole just war tradition of Roman Catholicism and no doubt other religions. The duty to protect the innocent has always been one of the criteria for a just war and we accept that, everyone accepts that and that can require non-consensual intervention. If you want to protect the innocent and the innocent are being massacred, in large numbers, it may require that you intervene, in military force, against the wishes of the government that is actually carrying out the massacre or is allowing the massacre to take place. But no one accepts the principle of non consensual intervention, so the United Nations is faced with a complete contradiction. On the one hand it accepts the duty to protect the innocent, while on the other hand it will not intervene unless it is invited to intervene. The reason why it will not intervene unless invited, is because the whole of Europe faces guilt about colonialism. You only have to raise the question of colonialism and everyone is panic stricken. 'Oh, this might be a colonial expedition', therefore it's not allowed. That means that you don't intervene. That means that hundreds of thousands of people might be killed and so, what is the answer to that? Well, the answer is you have to accept that some exercise of power, which will have a quasi colonial character, is necessary if you are going to exercise your duty to protect the innocent. You can call it ethical imperialism, you can call it trusteeship, you can devise any kinds of euphemisms for it, but you have to face that question. Regarding Troy Davis' idea that you can't intervene until democratic legitimacy is established for the United Nations, that everyone has a role in the United Nations, that it becomes a democratic assembly and therefore votes on this matter: that is simply, if you believe that, you are consigning millions of people to be murdered without wanting to do anything or being able to do anything about it. So I regard that as a wonderful ideal and I hope it will come to pass, eventually, but how do you act now? That is my basic question.

People then say 'well, what about Iraq? Iraq shows that when you have intervention that isn't supported by the people things can go very seriously wrong'. I'd like to point out two things about Iraq. The intervention in Iraq was not designed to save any particular group from genocide. It was not designed for that purpose. Those people, who actually favoured intervention in Iraq, were the Kurds, and the Kurds wanted the Americans to stay on after 1991, because the allies were a protection against Saddam Hussein. To go back even further, the people who wanted the British Mandate to continue in Iraq were the Kurds and the Shias. Britain promised independence and those two groups said 'we want the British to stay, because they're our only guarantee against being massacred by the Sunnis'. So wherever there is a case of a minority that's threatened by genocide, there will always be some support for coercive intervention. My only point is, we have not faced the issue and we are simply being hypocritical about it. We are trying to defend two completely contradictory principles: 1) The right to protect the innocent; 2) The duty of non intervention unless we're actually asked to intervene by the people who are very often conducting the massacres. Until we can make some progress on that, it's all hot air really and it's not even worth talking about. So I hope we can face this problem in some way and face it honestly.

Edoardo Greppi, *Professor of International Law at Turin University, Italy*

Some points have been raised both by Piero Bassetti and Robert Skidelsky, which deal with the use of force and legitimacy. At its very origin, the United Nations had been conceived as a kind of way to solve one of the major problems which is the lack in the international community of a monopoly of the use of force which has probably been provided for by national constitutions, which is typical of the evolution of the modern state in the last five hundred years. Being the international community an inorganic entity, the solution was looked for in an institutionalisation of mechanisms which did not exist before. So what was the core of the solution? The effort to combine two different and contradictory elements. One was democracy. I think that the position of the United States since the First World War, which was very much concerned with democracy, one state, one vote and so on and the legacy of the League of Nations on the one side. On the other side, the international community was being given a kind of oligarchic principle. States are all equal, (Article II, Paragraph I of the Charter.) The United Nations has been conceived as being built around the principle of equal sovereignty of states and on the other hand, some states are more equal than others. And so the democratic principle was to be combined with an oligarchic one. The point is now that legitimacy seems to be right in the middle of the two elements; oligarchy on one side, democracy on the other one. So it is all a matter of how you decide and who decides and who provides legitimacy, gives legitimacy to decision making.

Robert Skidelsky was completely right when he said if we have to combine the non-intervention principle with a duty to intervene, then you enter a *cul-de-sac* from which you do not come out without solving the problems of legitimacy. So this is the heart of our matter. I remember that beautiful seminar Lord Skidelsky and the World Political Forum organised in London a couple of years ago on the just war principle and the limits of just war today, and the technical, legal limits to the use of force.

Mary Kaldor, *Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance and Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, UK*

I want to say that I agree with Hannah Arendt that power depends on legitimacy. I agree with Hannah Arendt, in whose wonderful essay, 'Reflections on Violence', she states that power depends on legitimacy and not on violence, and that violence never produces power if by power you mean persuading people to do things. So that's the first thing. Having said that, I don't agree that legitimacy depends on elected governments. That's, if you like, 'legality'. It contributes to legitimacy but legitimacy is really about whether people trust their institutions and although it doesn't depend on force it does, I think, depend on security. If people feel they can depend on their institutions and they make them feel safe, then they trust their institutions and those institutions have legitimacy, even if they're not elected and that in a way was true in the Soviet Union. I mean the Soviet Union did use force, but the sort of period of terror didn't last that long and after that it managed on the basis of a certain degree of legitimacy. So I think there is a link between security and legitimacy and I think one of the deep problems today is the loss of that link. Our Chairman said that power no longer rests on the monopoly of legitimate violence and sometimes I think we make a lot of emphasis on what globalisation has done to the nation state, but I actually think what has really happened is the end of inter-state war. That, for most European states, they emerged through war and they built up their armed forces and it was the idea that the state protected you against an enemy which was at the heart of the legitimacy of the state. So we in Britain- there's a wonderful book by Linda Colley saying we forged the idea of being British in wars against the French. I think what happened after the end of the Second World War is that the only countries that still had a capacity to fight wars unilaterally were the United States and the Soviet Union. The rest of us lost it and we had to find legitimacy based on something else. I think nowadays the big problem is for a while we subsisted with the Cold War and the idea that our states were protecting us against the Soviet Union. But I think the big problem today is that there's a deep sense of insecurity and a deep lack of trust in our institutions to provide that security and so then I come back to Troy Davis' point about the United Nations. I mean, I actually think this is a chicken and egg thing, because unless the United Nations is capable of doing something to help people feel safer it will never acquire the kind of legitimacy you need to create citizen assemblies, and if it did have citizens assemblies, I think if it wasn't able to act, it wouldn't, you know. I'm not saying that I'm against those things, I'm for them but I just think that the source of legitimacy that an institution like the United Nations or the European Union will come very much from what it succeeds in doing and whether it does provide security.

Now as to Robert Skidelsky's point about the responsibility to protect: actually, we could go at great length into the story of the history of this term but, I mean, the contradiction between non-intervention, the whole idea that was behind the Evans Sahnoun Commission was to resolve that contradiction. Because at the moment the only conditions under which you can break the non-intervention rule is if the Security Council agrees under Chapter VII. So their idea was that by specifying a responsibility to protect, which would be accepted by the General Assembly, there would be conditions under which the responsibility to protect could overcome the non-intervention rule, and that's the whole thing that Gareth Evans has been pushing for so energetically over the last two years. What my concern is about is a slightly different one, I don't think it's that different from yours: I think that if we're concerned about real protection as opposed to imperialism, that has a lot to do with the methods that are used.

I think there are two things. I think there is a difference between, as it were benign imperialism and the actions of the United Nations within a framework of international law. I think that's what stands between multilateralism and imperialism is the notion that this is not unilateral action that it is within the framework of law. So there is something different between a legally authorised intervention and a unilateral intervention of the Iraq kind. But if the responsibility to protect were to operate in the Iraq case there were certain criteria, none of which were fulfilled in the Iraq case. I mean there are three key criteria under the responsibility to protect. There has to be an impending humanitarian catastrophe. There wasn't that in Iraq. There has to be a duty to protect, in other words, protecting civilians comes before winning the war and there has to be a reasonable chance of success in a long term strategy. I can't remember, I haven't got the exact criteria with me, but what I'm concerned about, and I think Brahimi said the same thing in his talk, is that no one has really given enough thought to the practicalities of it. What do you do in this situation to protect civilians that is different from simply invading a country, which is what the United States did and I think that's a central issue which the United Nations has to try and solve.

Piero Bassetti, *Former Member of the Italian Parliament, President of Globus et Locus, Italy*

This is a question of law. Legitimacy has always been connected with the formality of the law and that is another issue that has evaporated and brings us back to a crude relationship between power and security. So we are looking for legitimacy in this crude relationship, where once we were looking for legitimacy in the form of law.

Troy Davis, *President of the Association de soutien à l'Ecole de la Démocratie, France*

About the grammar of international relations. Humanity today is in danger, not because it does not know how to solve the problem it faces, but because it has been brainwashed into believing that the only legitimate way to solve these problems is by using the grammar, quote, of international relations invented by Sumerian kings five thousand years ago. This grammar, by definition, was a human invention and not a law of nature. It is based on two methods, commonly known as diplomacy and war. Its principles are that, number one: only states are legitimate international actors, humans have no international standing and number two: it makes no difference to a states legitimacy if it mistreats, tortures or kills people. The existing world political architecture is based, still, on fundamentally anti-human principles. Principles that deny human freedom, deny human dignity and deny humanity itself, principles which emerge under absolute monarchy and would still define the world machine. The present global rules are the outgrowth of fundamentally unjust initial conditions which emerge historically in the pre-democratic age and the world order is pre-democratic, feudal and militaristic. To change this destructive world architecture we must understand that it is a paradigm, which I call the old paradigm. Not just a set of more or less benign rules that could be adjusted on a case by case basis. In reality it is the old paradigm which killed eight thousand men in Srebrenica, which killed 800,000 people in Rwanda, which is killing hundreds of thousands of people today in Darfur. It permits the killing under our noses because we believe schizophrenically, that though it is normal to prevent the mayor of a city from killing its people and we have laws against it, it is abnormal or nearly impolite to prevent the president of a state from killing its people. This demonstrates the vice like mental grip of the old paradigm which says that states are more important than humans, that states have an inherent legitimacy to do what they want. Those states are human inventions, not the other way around. The old paradigm thus shapes our beliefs about what can be done and prevents us from applying to global problems, the concepts we accept in modern times as central to human progress. What are these new concepts that contradict that old paradigm? Concepts we universally recognise today, normatively, though we don't apply them often and if so only nationally. These 'new concepts' emerged 2,500 years ago in Athens, though only for some of its people and are based on the subversive notion that people matter, that humans have innate dignity. A precedent was set and these principles gave rise to new paradigm defined by freedom, democracy, accountability, justice, the rule of law, transparency, consent, checks and balances, civilian power, constitutions, parliaments etc. In short, the idea that political sovereignty belongs to the people, a people composed of individuals with equal dignity and that right makes might. In comparison the old paradigm is based on fear, force, coercion, military power, secrecy spying, arbitrariness, on the rule of men, and the cult of kings, heroes, messiahs and other strong men who will save us in exchange for unchecked power. The old paradigm is based on sovereignty, on the idea that sovereignty comes from above and is mediated by one man, an elite and that might makes right. By nature this structurally allows, even invites, abuses of power, which is why it cannot be reformed. Because of its arbitrariness the old paradigm is inherently immoral while the new paradigm, based on human freedom and dignity, is inherently moral. In methodological or religious terms you could say the old paradigm is one of darkness and evil and the new paradigm is one of light and good.

Using the prism of these paradigms we see history as an epic struggle and we see that human civilisation progressed most when elements of the new defeated elements of the old. The rapid developments of the last two hundred years bear witness to the new paradigm's powers, reborn in the American and French revolutions. This is when the old

paradigm started dying in national, in national only, political architecture, ultimately freeing billions of minds from feudal shackles. The ethical case for replacing the old paradigm with the new paradigm is clear but there is also a pragmatic case today. Before the coexistence of pockets of tyranny, inner freedom did not endanger humanity as such but because of globalisation and the shrinking of the planet to a village, if we do not consciously kill off the old paradigm it will kill us, including its own proponents who are now blinded by ignorance and arrogance. If it does not kill us, it may lead to a nightmarish global regime based on fear, arbitrariness, war and the cult of personality. We must also kill the old paradigm because it is actively corroding the new paradigm, which is still fragile nationally. Global feudalism and national democracy cannot coexist for long. How could national democracy die? In an easy two steps process. First, the structural injustice of the old paradigm feeds terrorism and wars instead of preventing them and its logic forces national democracies to create a control and surveillance infrastructure because of international chaos which it itself maintains. The next step is a catastrophe which governments use as an excuse to flip the switch and turn on the control infrastructure formerly constrained by flimsy safeguards, thus legally turning former democracies into police states. This is how democracy could die, killed by the old paradigm and why we must replace it before it destroys the new paradigm, even nationally.

Halfway here I wish to state my conclusion so that the explanation of how we get there is easier to follow. I believe that for humanity to preserve its freedom and to survive at all we must consciously design and invent a global social contract in the classical political sense of John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau based on human dignity and a global ethos. Such a process should be open, broad based, iterative and itself be a part of creating our contract in a global feedback loop. What we need to do is to switch off the existing world machine and replace it with another one based on the principle of human dignity. Many global problems cannot be solved in the short term and demand intra-generational deals. Scientific discoveries confirm what we know empirically, that humans are not rational, that they discount the future even against their own interests. This has crucial implications for the survival of our species. It means that we need to find ways to counteract the tendency to think short term. This problem has always existed and in the past it was solved by autocratic governance. If there was an enlightened ruler or dictator he could take the wiser, longer term view against popular will. In some cases benign dictatorship was better but it is not sustainable because it inevitably degenerates. Today with democracy expanding and ordinary people gaining influence, this seems good but it could be bad for long term thinking. An example, what if for the world to achieve ecological equilibrium, consumers need to reduce their consumption? Can this be done if consumers are also voters who refuse to act rationally today even if it's to reduce a real global risk? So this is where the concept of a global social contract comes in and it's useful not just politically but crucially symbolically and psychologically. It helps to explain, conceptualise and rationalise the need for commitment today for reward tomorrow as a contract between peoples and generations. It thus helps to educate the citizens of the world why there is a need to behave well today in a certain way as part of a reciprocal deal. It follows the insights of evolutionary biology which teach us that humans have a very keen sense of reciprocity and fairness, which are the main pillars of contracts and ethics itself. It's a simple, obvious and basic notion that no serious politician could oppose and it is a notion known by and supported by major religions, especially those seeking justice.

The idea of a general global social contract is needed because many problems are inter-related and even if they are not, since some countries would gain and some would loose from a global deal, a global contract provides the overall win-win framework. There always was an implied social contract, it was not explicit and it was not negotiated consciously by the people. Our collective mind is trapped in a way of thinking, which prevents us from

solving the big issues and therefore as the world system continues to produce misery. We keep on trying to alleviate the symptoms but we don't have the strategic vision to stop the haemorrhaging. Standing in our way is the mistaken belief that the values we accept nationally are not valid internationally. Most do-gooder organisations do not address the fundamental systemic issues that cause the problems which is the inherent, unjust structure of the global political architecture and so our world machine produces misery and injustice on a massive scale every day with industrial efficiency. Unless we redesign and rethink the existing global framework, which is only a very slightly improved law of the jungle, then people everywhere will continue to believe deep down that the world really cannot be changed, that there always has been and always will be misery and war and that therefore what is the purpose of fighting for a better world if only marginal improvements are possible. This leads to large scale existential despair, alienation, depression, diseases and selfish, wasteful or amoral behaviour. The fact that there is no global social contract based on human dignity also means that the view that the world is intrinsically evil is comforted, which leads millions of people to reject science, embrace superstition and sects, further reducing the chances of a just world and increasing the risk that our end will be precipitated voluntarily by fanatics.

The conclusion is simple: without a global social contract the chances for future global dictatorship that will rule the world with an iron fist under the pretext of saving humanity is much larger. Environmental devastation could bring chaos and then authoritarian government. This could bring wars and millions could die until global tyranny is established by a powerful elite that in the worst case will enslave humanity with computers, nanotechnology, genetic engineering, drugs and other social controls and other more subtle controls. Already people are suggesting that millions of poor Mexican immigrants be marked like cattle with radio activated microchips, RFID microchips. So what should today's heroes, the elder statesmen, do, in general and those here today? I think the right and the moral thing for them to do is to use their courage, wisdom and intelligence to extend the human centred paradigm to the global realm and bury once and for all the old paradigm. In so doing they may save humankind from extinction or global tyranny and will be remembered for ever more. They should give the impetus for humankind to consciously build and negotiate a global social contract with several components.

The most obvious one is a basic document stating the fundamental principles of the planetary rules of conduct. It should be based on universal principles and its core should be that global rules be based on human dignity and human freedom. Another component is mythological; to survive and to convince humans everywhere to cooperate we need to develop the sense of belonging and solidarity to one human race on one planet, to deepen the idea that we are all world citizens. Nationally this was done throughout history by the invention of national creation myths that tell the mythical story of a nation usually forged in blood and sweat against some enemy, like the British fighting the French. That was the myth. Today we need to create a global creation myth that tells the story of the birth of the nation of humanity. Not one based on an enemy, but based on the scientific fact that humanity is one species living on one small planet. Today there is no outside anymore, there is only one big inside. So my appeal to elder statesmen, if you only allow yourself to be recycled in 'do-gooder organisations' your conscience will be soothed but this will perpetuate the old paradigm by giving the impression that only big men have the authority and charisma to broker deals, like Gareth Evans, make peace etc. But these successes will be temporary and illusory if you do not use your authority and charisma to change the system itself, if you do not help to replace the existing anti-human world architecture. If you do so you are more likely to enter history and be remembered as the mid wives a new global democratic civilisation than by helping one more orphan, aids or environmental organisation. Paradoxically by killing the age of heroes today's big men can become the

greatest of heroes and if not you here, others may do it or we will suffer from the combined onslaught of wars, diseases and famines. We need a new world where new heroes are celebrated; scientists, teachers, artists, philosophers, doctors and nurses, entrepreneurs and workers as well as the millions of mothers and fathers who teach their children basic decent values.

Piero Bassetti, *Former Member of the Italian Parliament, President of Globus et Locus, Italy*

I was just thinking that in all your speech what was not present is the role of localism because the world is not regulated only by globalism, but for instance identities come out from a sense of localism and that is the reason why I mentioned loci before. The fact is that globalisation goes together with localisation and so you, I think that a paradigm that refers new individuals to a new global contract forgets the necessity of sociality, pluralism, plurality of identities.

Nancy Roof, *Editor Kosmos Journal, USA*

I wanted to take up the point of the way our world is changing because of the internet and what is happening in terms of space and time, which Mr. Bassetti brought up at the beginning, which is one of the main points of my paper. I think we really don't know the consequences, the eventual consequences, of this enormous change in the possibility of all elements of our lives, of coming together as a global community, being able to work locally, while connecting globally. This point is pretty much developed by Ms. Sassen because we need to connect grassroots and the global, which I'm sure you know as well, Mr Davis. But I think our world is changing dramatically in every field of endeavour. The decentralisation of power, as I see, is one of the main trends of the time and it is happening in every field, it is happening in governments. Anne Marie Slaughter has written a lot about the way governments are networking instead of going to higher, looking for answers from higher ups; they're looking for answers from people from other countries who are also dealing with the same issues as they are dealing with. It's not only in politics, it's in production, in fact it has come to be called by Manuel Castells and some of the researchers in this area that what we're moving is from a scientific to a network society and the fact that people now are moving away also, from mass media, which is very much corporate owned in the United States. Gorbachev and the World Political Forum just held a meeting on the media, which I attended and it seems even though I'm very well aware of what's happening in the United States, it's just phenomenal news to me and a surprise to everybody that the journalists without borders, who do reports on freedom of the press find that the United States is now fifty-third in the world of freedom of the press. Although it's coming from the United States but it seems to me to be a worldwide phenomenon and this is making the internet even more important because people are now forming blogs and moving away from mass media to try to connect with other people all over the world to get their news. Now, where this is all going to end up I don't know, but I feel that we have to define what is changing. Power is changing tremendously, moving from hierarchal power to decentralised power and I would like to put that on the table as being a context of where we are now.

Victor Makarov, *Baltic Forum's Research Director, Latvia*

I do not deal with international relations every day; I deal with democratisation at the nation state level. Now, why should I come to this panel on the "New Grammar of International Relations"? How does this relate to this new grammar? I would say that it really does relate directly to the grammar of international relations and here I agree with Troy Davis and many other theorists who insist that at the core of a new grammar of international relations should be the idea of global democracy, the belief that there is an urgent need to counter the spontaneous forces of globalisation and technological, scientific progress with a kind of global governance or at least a global regime of responsibility. I appreciate the idea, the notion, that there is a need for a global democratic process and I agree with Troy Davis that we need a normative perspective on the international relations that is based on respect for human autonomy and dignity. Where I would disagree, take it as a footnote to this mostly international relations debate, my footnote would be actually that we absolutely need to look at the nation state level today, to see a way forward for the international relations, to see a way towards a better future and a global democracy. Allow me to use the country I come from, Latvia, as an example. Although it is a very small country, that might be called a European backwater and a periphery in world politics, for all its modest significance in world affairs, Latvia is an interesting starting point when considering the nature of democracy and whether democracy could go global. To those who wish to promote such global democracy in discussion and action, Latvia is an example of an encouraging development. Let me explain why. To put it very simply, Latvia today is a democratic state because it gave up the idea of being a perfectly sovereign state. It is not a sovereign democracy that espouses and promotes a peculiar, autonomous interpretation of democracy. It is entangled in a community, where any interpretation of democracy and government is open to critique, contestation and monitoring.

The EU is explicitly based on certain values, like personal autonomy and freedom, political democracy, minority rights and social justice. So it is a new kind of international regime. Its member states at least, as I see it; the EU has been an experience of globalisation on a regional scale. It has been the first step towards going global, working and seeing beyond the national borders. It is also, in itself, an instrument of collective action to deal with globalisation and the pressures imposed on the nation states by the European integration and globalisation may look similar, but there is, however, a crucial difference. The EU offers a benign, managed way of going global that keeps alive the ideals of democracy and social justice and many would contest this but I maintain that at least relatively speaking this is true. So the history of this is very important, most of the Eastern European political and economic transitions, that they would succeed, was for a long time, far from given. Without the influence and support of the European Union, many of these states, including Latvia, would have failed under the pressures of global economy. Without the EU's insistence on its values in the form of the accession criteria, the democratic institutions in these countries might have succumbed to the authoritarian political traditions, to the pressure of economic hardship and to the appetite of the elites to capture the state assets and then the state itself. All these remain valid concerns, but the democratic institutions, however imperfect today, still they are now stable and the democracies are becoming a tradition there. Now democracy becomes a tradition. A failure in the future is not beyond imagination either but it is conditional on the failure of the EU as a whole and therefore less likely.

So here comes the first observation. It is that there is reason for optimism. A value based international regime is possible, although building such a regime is a very long, historically complicated and uncertain project. The EU is a showcase and a benchmark for spreading

democracy. Its success is broadening and strengthening the area of democracy. The supra-national democracy that the EU is trying to establish will be a litmus test for the more daring hopes and there is reason to agree with David Held when he is talking about the twenty-first century as being the European century. What he means by that, as I understand it, is that the EU could lead the way, could show the way, towards a more global democratic community. What troubles me here in this nice perspective is that in the EU itself, there are very different opinions about how far the EU should go in engaging its neighbourhood.

Now, there is a second observation I should make here; this is a call for action: the way forward, as the EU experience shows, is external involvement in democratising states that are not yet democratic. This sounds like a banality but unfortunately the interest for promoting democracy in the EU's close neighbourhood is often very small. If something is bigger than the EU's democratic values is Europe's tradition for just forgetting about these values when this is opportune. So my argument is not that involvement in democratisation is a good thing, it is that it is a necessary thing, not only for moral, but also for practical and selfish political reasons and we don't have enough of that. We have been watching for last years how in many countries the democratisation processes deteriorate. These countries and societies are either not coping with the difficulties of multiple transitions or do not even embark on a course of economic and political development. Increasingly experts on democratic transitions today warn that there is no natural law guaranteeing that political transformations will only go one way, towards democracy. It requires a leap of faith to call these multiple versions of so called democracies, fledging democracies that will some day become full grown ones. Perhaps we are facing an alternative political model, a hybrid regime that can forever imitate democracy but never become one and this is an open question, this is a concern. There is an ever richer menu of manipulation tools, political technologies as they are sometimes called, for sustaining, for a long time, authoritarian regimes and speaking of internet I've just read that an American website for blogging that has a very strong Russian blogger community has been bought by a Russian internet provider and this is a way towards controlling it. So even with this media somehow we see the states are grasping the control and this is again a concern. So the argument that more authoritarian regimes make the world a less secure place has been abused much recently but it's still a valid argument.

So my third observation concerns the levels of democracy that constitute a global democracy. I suggest that establishing democracy on a global scale is not thinkable without having democracy, where we are used to having it, on the national level. However, I have a word of caution here. The road to such a desirable state of global democracy may not be so straight. I can hardly imagine how individuals can live in authoritarian societies, in conflict ridden societies, in societies plagued by violence, deep injustice and lack of trust, in societies that deny respect for human dignity, how individuals in these societies would be able to participate in a global democracy. First people, as individuals, need to be socialised into democratic values and norms. As far as the most influential source of political socialisation today and tomorrow are the nation states, we have a problem here. Second, the modern authoritarian states today are rather successful, as I said earlier, at controlling and pacifying their populations, that they can control communications, media, education and also the proximate social environments. Participating through such a wall of authoritarian regimes is next to impossible. Without empowering people for democracy on the level of nation states and indeed on other levels the idea of a cosmopolitan world order is unrealistic. In a world striving towards democracy and stability, we might hope that democratic states would be able to learn to take care of their national interests through a better understanding of the common good and the common global interest.

Lord Robert Skidelsky, *Member of the House of Lords and Professor of Economic History at Warwick University, UK*

I think that there are a lot of issues that are rather unresolved from the start of the debate to which others have made a very interesting contribution. I'd like to take one or two of those points up. The first point is I just don't think we're being serious if we say that the only hope for the world is to establish a world democracy. I mean, I just don't think it's a serious proposition, especially as a way of solving any of the really urgent problems that arise now and in the next ten or fifteen years. There will be some powers that are going to be much more important than others. Some are more sovereign than others. Russia is more sovereign than Georgia and the way you can actually start getting some solution to some of these problems is if the most important nations in the world, and I'd include in that China, India and others, actually agree on some basic rules of the game and are willing to enforce them and that just seems to me the way out of the blockage. Now, I think the contradiction, as was very clearly stated by Professor Greppi, is between the duty to protect and the doctrine of non-intervention. I mean, that is an absolute contradiction and only agreement between great powers on when it is right to intervene, the powers that actually have the ability to intervene can actually break that deadlock. Now, there's no shortage of social compacts in the world; there are hundreds of them. All they have to do is to be amalgamated. There are conventions against genocide; there are conventions of human rights. You can get people to sign up to absolutely anything you want of that kind. No problem, there'd be an overwhelming vote for it in every country and they would be hardly worth the paper they're written on. There's a convention against genocide. It is illegal. Hutus killed 800,000 Tutsis in Rwanda in 1994 and nothing was done about it despite the convention. Now, to me that's not a way forward. I'm a bit less worried than Mary Kaldor is about what you actually call the intervention. I mean, I agree with her entirely in that how it's done is very important, but what you call it is to me a bit less important. I think those Tutsis wouldn't have much worried about whether there was a mandate from the Security Council to intervene to stop it or not. In fact, if any of you saw any of those films, including the latest ones, the Canadians were there. People were being macheted, just within their sight and they refused to intervene to stop it because as the commanding officer said 'we have not got a mandate to fire except in self defence', and the priest in the film said 'fuck your bloody mandate, do something!'

Troy Davis:

That's not the point, you're contradicting yourself.

Robert Skidelsky:

No I am not. I think I'm being actually quite logical. They wouldn't do it. Now I felt ashamed being part of a civilisation that wouldn't stop that. So what I'm saying is that you have got the ability to intervene, you do not have the will to do it and until we accept the duty seriously and not get so hung up about the guilt at intervening and the fear that by intervening we are being colonialists or doing something that local leaders won't like, we are not going to be able to fulfil our duty and it's as simple as that. I don't know why you think I'm being contradictory. I mean, I think your program is complete pie in the sky.

Troy Davis:

Your program is pie in the sky!

Robert Skidelsky:

Why?

Troy Davis:

Because people are being killed today and you've even said yourself.

Robert Skidelsky:

But, that could have been stopped.

I'm glad we've got a discussion going.

Mary Kaldor:

We agreed, Robert and me, that we wanted an argument!

Edoardo Greppi:

We need a judge.

Mary Kaldor:

We have a judge.

Fausto Pocar, *President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Italy*

I'm not judging anybody. Not here, anyway.

It seems to me, and many have alluded to that also, that when we are thinking of a new grammar, in international relations, we should find out what is the place to be given to law. You have already referred to legitimacy as being based in law, which is not only just on the formality. The question then is: can we really replace law? Maybe what is important is that the intervention takes place. Was it legitimate or not legitimate? It depends on the substance of what is important in a given situation, like the Rwandan situation or that in Darfur now, the genocide which is being conducted must be stopped, simply, or be prevented. I may agree to that but if this is done without the law it may prove successful in a particular situation, but in the long run will probably lead to a result of anarchy which will not probably be productive. So it's a big danger to authorise, to say, unless it is done under the law, that the action takes place without respecting the principle of the law. But, now we are facing a paradox, as many in our situation, in our times, never saw such a development of international law like this in the last years and decades. On the other hand, we see that the law is disregarded even more than in other times, but treaties are signed, law is developed in many fora and at the end, especially human rights law, the treaties that were just alluded to, these treaties exist, but when you come to situations of mass violations, treaties are not observed because the procedures that are put in place, to protect, to guarantee the implementation of the treaties are procedures that are useful and practically viable only when you have limited violations.

Look at the European system. The European system is excellent in terms of procedure and the Strasbourg court does a lot of work with regard to sophisticated rights. I mean if your right to privacy is violated, you go to Strasbourg and you may get reparations for that. But, if next door in the Balkans, you have genocide or massacres, the mechanism does not serve any purpose. If tomorrow there was a genocide again in the Balkans, (states of the Balkans are members of the Strasbourg system), then no citizen would be able to go to Strasbourg to get anything. So, other mechanisms and procedures have to be devised, but the problem is that international law is developing, but is still based on states and is just an inter-state system. Although the individual plays a bigger role now than in the past, the individual is not an actor; it is an object of rules of international law. Simply, it is the states that are the actors and in fact the states are those that under international law are the only accountable actors. There is no other actor accountable under international law but the state.

The problem is that the policies of the states are made by other actors and not by the states themselves and here there is a problem of local law and global law (international law is global law). Unless we find a way of harmonising the local regime of accountability with the international regime of accountability, we don't get anywhere because it's a sort of dialogue on two levels which are different levels and they don't get together. So one must act, to try to work at the local level and at the international level by trying to harmonise the two.

The actors that determine the policies of the states have to become accountable, also under international law. Something has been done, I'm in a court that precisely wants to separate the accountability of the state and the accountability of the individual but what has been done up to now in this sense is not enough; it's clearly not enough because this is just criminal accountability for mass violations, but there are a lot of other aspects of accountability that are not dealt with at the international level. I don't say by a court, by the international institution because there are actions that are not taken into account.

This reasoning in my view applies also to the United Nations because the United Nations is, again, an inter-state institution and only an inter-state institution. Well, I don't like accusing the United Nations of anything. In media and in normal conversation frequently the blame is put on the organisation, but the organisation is just an organisation. The organisation depends on the policies of the members and what the members do in the organisation. To a certain extent you can adjust the structure of the organisation and improve the procedures, but only to a limited extent. No institution can work if those that determine the policy of the institution do not play correctly. The institution will certainly fail its mandate. I don't know if the debate about whether we should democratise the organisation is correct. Extending the presence of small countries or poor countries in the Security Council for instance, poorer states in the Security Council, this is fine, but would not change anything unless the policies of those who have the power will not be democratised. How to do that? That's a different issue. I want only to raise the point that probably we need to keep international law, keeping the legal aspect and the authority aspect of the law, find a way of defining rules for accountability that are not the current rules because sometimes they miss the target.

Piero Bassetti, *Director Globus et Locus, former member of Parliament, Italy*

It seems to me that you have connected two levels of our grammar, which is the one of authority of international law and enforcement, which is the use of force. This, I think, is something that may be acquired, because in a sense it maybe separated from many of the other items that we address. I do agree that power is not made by violence but by accountability in a sense, but behind accountability you have to discount the possibility of producing violence and that is the reason why states are reliable, because everybody knows that behind the state there is the police and the enforcement. So far, NATO is probably the only case of the raising of something that may be comparable to an international police, although it's not used, because unfortunately the United Nations policing is not yet considered reliable.

Mary Kaldor, *Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance and Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, UK*

Well, I sort of agree with you, except that I think it's not just that they know the police is there, they also think the rules are fair. Most people obey the law because they think it's right to obey the law, not because they're frightened of the police. That was my point, but at the same time, the knowledge that the police are there to make sure everybody is an important element in your sense of security.

But I just wanted to come back on a couple of things. I mean, first of all, the point that Robert raised and Mr. Pocar replied to, the argument about legitimacy and legality. I mean that was very much an argument we had. I was a member of the Kosovo Commission which was chaired by Richard Goldstone, and we argued that the intervention in Kosovo was illegal but legitimate. Legitimate because in the end the Kosovar Albanians went back to their homes. But the point there was that we made a very strong point that it's very dangerous and that's your point, if there is a gap between these things –that if indeed, I think everybody would agree, it would have been the right thing to do, to protect the Tutsis in Rwanda. The point about that, though is that actually it probably would have been legal. But the point is that if you start, if you have no laws around about this then all kinds of people can claim this is a humanitarian intervention. So I think there has to be a link between legality and legitimacy and it's very dangerous otherwise, and that links to the other point about law and the role of law. I mean, yes, I think it's true that we are moving, we are having lots of social compacts, and we are passing all kinds of law which are not enforced. But I would say two things. First of all, although it's true that by and large the individuals appear as the victims, I think a new phenomenon in the passing of law has been the role of civil society in pushing for it and that makes some of the recent treaties a little bit different than classic state to state treaties. That's the first point I would make and I think the ICC is a very good example of that where civil society groups played a key role.

But the other thing is that I do think civil society has also made something of the law. I mean, I became convinced of all this because of being involved in the opposition in Eastern Europe in the 1980s. At that time the Helsinki final agreement was a key instrument that was used by dissident groups against their governments. Their governments had signed the Helsinki final agreement and it provided them with an instrument for pressing for the opening up of human rights in their societies and so I think this is a more complicated process and enforcement is not just a matter of force in a military sense. It's also a matter of the extent to which people can use the law and make it effective and that finally brings me to Robert's points about the big powers again, of course in the end the states remain the repositories of sovereignty and legality, they sign the treaties, they authorise the use of force, but within a very changed framework in which there is a sort of new global public opinion, there are civil society actions and so it changes how they act. So I wouldn't say 'no, big powers are no longer important', but I would say the framework within which there are no longer straight forward, autonomous actors as there were fifty or a hundred years ago, and so that makes it different.

Just a final point to Troy Davis: I think the fascinating thing about both the European Union and the United Nations is that they were the first institutions unlike states. They were founded in reaction to war and the holocaust and I think there is a kind of emerging, if you like, global memory, and global consciousness. People do see these as sort of global events, rather like states that go back to battles, famous battles won and lost, as symbols of their statehood. The United Nations and the European Union go back to events like Hiroshima, and the Holocaust, as sort of global memories that underscore who they are. So we are building a new kind of sense of who we are.

Troy Davis:
Creation Myth.

Mary Kaldor:
Yeah, exactly.

Troy Davis, *President, Association de soutien à l'École de la Démocratie, France*

I want to answer points made by Mary Kaldor and Lord Robert Skidelsky, because there seems to be misunderstanding. We do not apply the same standards nationally and internationally. I'm just going to give one example in terms of what; it's a kind of litmus test, what we should do if we had a civilised society on a worldwide level. In a civilised society under law if a policeman is standing in the street and sees somebody attacking an old lady or attacking anybody, what is the law? The policeman has a duty, intervenes to save the persons being aggressed. Everybody accepts that. Now, there's another, that's one, that's a policeman. Now, in France there is even another law which goes even further. Any citizen has a duty if somebody is being aggressed or somebody is lying on the ground or something, you have a duty to call an ambulance or something. It's called duty to intervene, in a sense, duty to protect, even if you cannot, you don't know, you have to do something. You don't call somebody and ask for an order what to do. Now this is where it's schizophrenic and this is what I completely disagree with what Robert is saying and Mary Kaldor. On the international level we believe that before intervening we have to wait for some kind of order. Like Kofi Annan, who should be in jail for crimes against humanity, if we had a civilised world of law, he actually told the general in Rwanda not to intervene because there's no mandate. It's like 'no wait a second, why do you need a mandate to intervene to save lives?' This is the evil of the system, the inter-state system today. Lives do not count, people do not count, people do not exist. That is why I say it is anti-human. Now what Kofi Annan should have done, he should have sent a cable to New York and said 'by the way there's a genocide going on'. They knew it, you look at it, and in fact there was a report. 'There's a genocide going on, can I give the orders to the people to intervene?' There were 2,300 people right there with guns and everything, the other, the people doing the genocide, were with machetes and sticks and stones. I mean you could very easily have prevented that genocide and then the Security Council didn't answer. Now, under any other civilised law, first of all you wouldn't have had to ask for an order of your superior to protect anybody from being killed. But, even if you don't get an answer under the minimal norm of civilisation, then you don't wait.

Kofi Annan's excuse for not intervening was the same excuse that the Nazi's used at Nuremberg. What did the Nazis say? 'I was just following orders. I killed the Jews, but I was just following orders!' Kofi Annan said 'yeah, I let hundreds of thousands of people die; I was just following orders'. Mr Kofi Annan, don't you know that since Nuremberg there is a duty under international law to protect the innocent and even you said yourself since St. Augustine, why do we have to wait for somebody in New York to say explicitly 'protect the innocent'? Now, if Kofi Annan had the guts and the spine, he would have given the order, even against, without a mandate and maybe he would have been judged and called to order by the hierarchy in New York. But imagine global public opinion if Kofi Annan had actually told the general and remember he was in charge of peacekeeping, he's an African, and he was in charge of peacekeeping in Africa at the time. He would have given the order, or if I'd been, I'd have given the order and then I would have gone to the world press. I'd say 'Listen, I did my best, as a human being I had to give the order. The morality demands I had to protect those people. I did not get a mandate from the Security Council but they are wrong, because I have to, my commitment is to protect the people. It is in the charter of the United Nations and maybe I would have lost my job in the worst case. But what is better, to keep your job as a UN bureaucrat or to save thousands of lives?' Now, that is exactly, see you are the one who is the Utopian idealist. You say, oh it's a matter of guilt. It's not a matter; it's just how do we get over the guilt?' I'll tell you how we get over the guilt. You only get over the guilt if there is a process which people believe is illegitimate

so you don't have a guilt in the first place and you don't have to wait ten – fifteen years to create that process.

You can create the process very quickly. You can start talking about the need for a process. But the way you talk, you say, 'oh lets not even talk about the process, because it might take ten-fifteen years' without justifying how, because you don't even suggest a process, so it's completely arbitrary what you say.

I want to make a last point that we have lots of social compacts, which both you two said. First of all, we do not have social compact. Then you don't know what a social compact is. An international treaty is not a social compact. An international treaty is a contract.

What is the difference between a contract and a compact? A contract is a piece of paper. You write something on a piece of paper, you sign. Now, what is the difference? Every single international treaty is a contract, it is not law. Now, the evil of the international system is that we use the term law when there is no international law, it doesn't exist. Now in French or in English or in Italian or in German, we know what it is. In French we say '*le droite internationale*', in Italian you say '*diritto internazionale*'; in German you say '*internationales recht*'. This is correct. In English, which is a language which has ten times more words than any other language, we use the passive expression 'law' when it's not law, because law is made by a legislature. There are only international contracts. It is a slippage of language and this is also the risk of mono-lingual domination of the world by one language, we believe there is international law. There is no international parliament, how can there be international law? You ask anybody in the street 'how is law made?' and they say 'by legislature'. Is there international legislature? There isn't. There is no international law. There are only contracts. Now a compact, the difference between that and a law, is what? A law is made by parliamentarians or the representatives of the people. Now, why do you obey the law? You obey the law really because you believe it is legitimate. You as a citizen do not have to sign the law. This is the difference between a compact or a law and a contract. A contract you are only bound by if you yourself personally sign but if you rob a bank here in Bosco Marengo or in London you still will go to jail, even though you did not sign the law which said that it's illegal to rob the bank. You understand? That's why there's no world law today and you're confusing the issue. You're trying to confuse the issue.

Lord Robert Skidelsky, *Member of the House of Lords and Professor of Economic History at Warwick University, UK*

Sorry, there are too many things, but only two points. I mean, first of all, I think most lawyers would say that a treaty is signed by governments on behalf of their nations, and does actually constitute international law and so you're in a minority on that point. But, the only point that we seem, for some reason, to be disagreeing about is, we agree that international law is in an underdeveloped state. I mean, as there was no mandate to intervene in Rwanda to prevent the genocide, he could have done so, and it contradicts some other very deep principles in international law, which are those to do with intervention into the affairs of sovereign nations and we haven't yet found a mechanism for overcoming it, that's all. We will one day and I hope we will. At the moment we're in a blockage. I would only argue that each time we do intervene we do create some case law which then causes international law to shift, but I do think the argument between compact and contract and the way you tried to set it up to me is a red herring. You think it is at the centre of the argument, I don't.

Fausto Pocar, *President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia*,
Italy

In my view, I mean it is the dominant view, a treaty is law. It's certainly part of international law, it's one of the sources of international law, a treaty. So there is no doubt it being a law and in a way also in domestic law a contract is law between the parties. The codes and the laws say this explicitly. But, take the United Nations Charter, it is a treaty having been signed by everybody and ratified by everybody. It is law. It's simply law. Now in my view the question of the responsibility to protect should have been dealt with in a different way and I believe that the Charter itself could provide for the solution. The Charter puts obligations on the parties, there is no doubt. One of the obligations is not to use force. Is that an absolute obligation or has it to be interpreted within the system of the Charter and within the principles of the Charter. If you use the force to protect human rights, which is one of the goals of the Charter, in Article I, when you have a situation of conflict between two different obligations, because on the one hand you have the obligation to protect human rights, on the other, you have the obligation not to intervene. Now, you have to balance the obligation one against the other and make a decision. Ideally the decision is made by a judge. There is no judge making that decision, but there could be a judge making that decision because you could imagine that International Court of Justice may be given the power, as it has to interpret the Charter and to decide, in a given case, whether a state, having intervened to protect rights, was right or wrong. Was his intervention in conformity with the Charter or not and the system in itself would provide for the solution? This is normal in assessing the scope of the obligation under a treaty that you have to interpret the obligation in light of the aim and the goals of the treaty. This is part, also, of international law. It says treaties can be interpreted that way. So in my view that's the solution, it would have been relatively easy to take, if only those who intervened, or did not intervene, had interpreted the Charter in the way it had to be interpreted.

You could do it also exultant because the certain moment you are bound by the treaty you are obliged to follow the treaty and it's for you to interpret it. Of course you can ask for the interpretation of Security Council. The Security Council is not giving you the interpretation. You defer to the Security Council if the intervention does not come, you interpret it and take the risk of interpreting. I think that should have been the solution.

Piero Bassetti:

As a matter of fact it's not such a simple decision because he was involved also in the point that he had to use the Canadian soldiers. They might be killed and how did he respond to the Canadian government without a mandate. There are many, many problems.

Fausto Pocar:

You are right. I don't accuse so much the Secretary General, what I am pointing to are the states. They have to intervene. Canada had to intervene, having forces there, that's the point, because these states are bound by the Charter. They have to interpret the Charter as it has to be interpreted.

General Debate

Piero Bassetti

And now we may take an intervention from the floor.

Jan Mortier, *Civitas International*

It is a sad fact of our non-altruistic world that governments are not going to authorise military interventions on humanitarian principles in every deserving case. What is encouraging though is the construction of a body of customary international law based on precedent and state action when they do intervene. The real question I think here is the concept of state sovereignty and how it has diffused since Westphalia. There is a debate that the first generation human rights in international law have now become principles of *Jus Cogens* that supersede Westphalian notions of sovereignty in situations of extreme humanitarian emergency: genocide. Kosovo was the turning point for this evolution. I recall, Lord Skidelsky, how you spoke eloquently at the 2003 World Political Forum annual assembly and you described the three conceptions of modern states in the world: where you had the pre-modern world, those states still aspiring to develop; you had the modern world which were those states which are stuck in the old paradigm of sovereignty which Troy Davis was talking about here and then you spoke, which inspired me, of the post-modern world, which is what we have in the construction of the European Union project and the integrationist projects around the world that emulate this. So the problem here is that there are some governments around the world which are ready to go forward and construct the New Order, the structure for peace, and those that are still rooted in the old conception sovereignty.

Professor Gardner pointed out in the plenary session today that it is most important to bring the government of the United States of America on board. We must find a way to reach out to the USA and reweave the broken web of international law. If we just look at what happened with Kyoto, the finest minds in the world were brought to devise Kyoto but it was not universally ratified into law. The fact that it did not go forward is a great shame for humanity as a whole. Now, to bring the United States of America on board in this process of constructing a lattice of international law binding upon all nations, we must include in this web a global law that is binding upon the peoples within the states and on the non-state actors. I think this is the greatest challenge in the construction of a World Government. But, we must be patient. It is not going to come about by the declaration of a constitution –that would cause a backlash. I very much also agree with the idea of an elected world parliament because that would help, it would inspire the people and could evolve as the European Union Parliament has done and accrue sovereignty to itself.

The world is at a stage of evolution now where it is not necessary for a global crisis to institute a New Order. We need to think about establishing international law, between governments on a gradual but customary basis as opposed to the Roman imposition of law. We need to encourage states to integrate economically and politically around the world, it is happening now. We need to transcend intergovernmentalism and nationalism in all international institutions by using the example of the European Commission. The primary authority of international law resides within the agreement and ratification of texts by states, therefore a global structure with durable universal authority –that will not lapse – must be derived from the authority of signatory states. To do any of this we need to ask the Americans who are building such a state based structure, ‘What is your concept for a New World Order? How and what would you agree to?’

There is one answer and we at Civitas have been privileged to have consulted in its NGO process. It is called the Community of Democracies. This was founded by Secretary of

State, Madeleine Albright. In 2000 they had the Warsaw conference where over a hundred states took part and agreed on a document, The Warsaw Declaration. The Community of Democracies has so far held three ministerial meetings. The next one is going to be in Bamako in Mali and after that it returns to Europe, in Portugal in 2009. Now, what they are doing here, they are building themselves through a customary process a progenitor for a body of law. These documents that the states are agreeing between themselves are memoranda of association; the Warsaw Declaration, the Seoul Plan of Action and the Santiago Commitment. These documents are not binding upon the states, however all it would take is for this Community of Democracies to say: "Right, now we have built up our body of law through the precedent of our preceding documents" and ratify a treaty drawing its authority from all previous intergovernmental documents.

Development is very much part of it and they are doing poverty reduction as well and they're not an exclusive club. It is not a club just for democracies, separate from the rest of the world. It is actually a club which allows observer states as an incentive for reform. Russia is a full member at the moment which currently is a problem for its credibility and the Community of Democracies seems to me to be the construct favoured, if not initiated by the type of 'power' that Councillor Bassetti referred to in his opening remarks. Now, perhaps the World Political Forum and other esteemed organisations like this could examine this concept and see where it comes from. In fact, I recommend to you a report called *'Forging a World of Liberty under Law'* by Anne-Marie Slaughter and John Ikenberry and they actually consulted the establishment in America and they pretty much said, "well, we're going to look at the United Nations and it may have only ten years, if reform cannot be implemented."

Now, the United Nations was never constructed to be a world government. It serves as a wonderful organisation for a safety net for the world. The problem of its legitimacy comes from the failure of the peacekeeping aspect of it, which is the fault of its member states. So we need to transcend intergovernmentalism, perhaps in the instance on this debate on genocide through a rapidly deployable UN peacekeeping division independent of states. Amongst states, we need to perhaps work with the Community of Democracies and go with the gradual integrated process and bring through trade, bring through development and bring through investment because you cannot have global economic development without transparent and efficient governments –which are normally democracies.

Nancy Roof

Can I just clarify one point, there are representatives from the US, Anne Marie Slaughter, for example, is on this, and Madeleine Albright?

Jan Mortier

That is correct. Madeleine Albright brought it forward. It was Jim Huntley's idea, who wrote 'Pax Democratica' and I'm sorry, the second part of your question was?

Nancy Roof

Anne Marie Slaughter.

Jan Mortier

Anne Marie Slaughter is not on it, but she has written a report with John Ikenberry that examines this concept. In the report she and Ikenberry call it a 'concert of democracies' when actually they refer to the Community of Democracies, Javier Solana has gone to the United States. The EU-USA (June 20, 2005) summit has specifically endorsed this organisation. The community was founded by 107 governments in Warsaw and now numbers over 140 governments of the world. They have established the Democracy Fund

of the United Nations. They operate as the caucus of democracies in the United Nations and they have been seminal in bringing about and lobbying for a proper functioning Human Rights Council. I believe that for humanity and people of the world this is the kind of thing that we need to examine, because it is so important in constructing global structures to save mankind and to save the environment that these structures are not just created overnight and given. Although law can be written and most constitutions are just given and adopted it must be developed gently over time on a customary basis. Otherwise we're going to have a backlash against these structures from the global citizenry, unless there is proper representation for humanity.

Nancy Roof

But there is no representative of the present Bush administration?

Jan Mortier

Yes there is. The Community was started under the Clinton era and Condoleezza Rice spoke at the last ministerial conference. At the EU-USA summit President Bush, Javier Solana was present and the President of the Commission at the time, Jean Claude Juncker and they all specifically endorsed it. There's a European Council document I'd be more than happy to forward to the secretariat to distribute to your selves. Paula Dobriansky of the US state department is the person concerned promoting this at the moment. Ban Ki Moon, while South Korean Foreign Minister chaired the second conference and Gianni Vermetti is looking into establishing a permanent secretariat for it in Rome. So here may be a way to bring the United States of America into a global structure.

Robert Skidelsky

Great idea. Two objections which I think are pretty decisive. First of all there is American exceptionalism. I mean Kagan wrote rather well about all this in his book where he distinguished between post modern and modern worlds, Europe having moved into post modern, America still being mired in the modern world in which the use of power is crucial. America uses hard power, while Europe's got onto the soft power. He called it Venus with the Americans as Mars. The Americans have always been extremely reluctant to have their military forces and their security policy under the control of any organisation other than Congress. American unilateralism, whether in foreign policy or in matters of exchange rates, is a big obstacle to a community of democracies. My second objection is that a community of democracies does not actually address the question of the role of non-democracies in the world. Now China is one of the great coming powers and you can't think of a world order that does not include the participation of China. China may not qualify as a democracy for years to come. Is it to be excluded from this Community of Democracies and if so how is it to be integrated in any scheme of world order? It seems to me that it's a very Western oriented view which might run foul on many other countries who will play an important part in shaping rules in the future. So I think those are two objections.

Piero Bassetti

I just wanted to add that democracy is an important thing, but in the global order you have other problems, for instance CO2 emissions. How do you deal democratically with these types of problems which affect the whole of the global, which are not of this country or another country, therefore does not establish the connection between democratic control and the thing in itself? So I think there are many reasons to discuss the problem of democracy in a problematic way and in an open way. If not, it is a sort of theological assumption. So be careful with a myth.

Jan Mortier

It is with the creation of the fora for a community of democracies it is not so much focusing on democracy itself, it's actually focusing on development and civil society encouragement. They are looking at other issues as well. It's just one more forum for states to cooperate intergovernmentally and perhaps integrate possibly. But you are entirely, absolutely correct that a global issue such as CO2 reduction could not be dealt with in such a fora unless the community were to evolve and involve all the states in the world one day. Kofi Annan said that he would like the United Nations to become a Community of Democracies. I think that there should be a global environmental mechanism established urgently to deal with global issues such as CO2 emissions while a world political architecture would evolve separately over time. I believe it was the intention of its founders that the Community would one day encompass the world.

To just respond also to Lord Skidelsky about the China question. It is possible that maybe one day China could be in this (it is intended) but as I said the community is actually not an exclusive club. It was never set up to be like that. It's a club run by sixteen governments: the Convening Group, who decide who is coming to the next ministerial meeting and non-democratic states are invited to participate as observers. They do not get a right to vote on ministerial documents and the resolutions that will one day become their body of law. However, it is quite possible that representatives from China could come to this. It is not specifically about democracy. It is just a model for a New World Order that originated in Seattle, and I think we would need to take into account that as well, because it seems to me that if we do not take into account some of their concerns, of the American, (their state, I must say, is locked in the paradigm of the modern world) then they are probably going to be working against the construction of the global structure for peace.

Mary Kaldor

I just wanted to say something about the role of the United States. Of course it's absolutely critical that the United States should be part of any World System. We need the United States, but first of all there is a tendency to be pre-occupied with this and I think there is real problem that particularly in Europe and in the European Union the agenda has always been for or against the United States rather than setting the agenda itself, and I think that's something that's terribly important. The other thing is, again the issue of state level. I mean thinking about CO2 emissions and Kyoto, I keep thinking, and this comes back to your local point, I mean why don't we distinguish between old and new America? The states on the East coast and West coast have agreed to conform with the Kyoto principles. The Americans do that to us. Sometimes it's the European Union; sometimes it's old and new Europe depending on what suits them. So I think that we should do a little more of that and work with the old states of the United States and at other levels than simply at government.

Troy Davis

Both Jan and Lord Robert spoke about the idea that a kind of case law is made every time you intervene and case law advances then the cause international justice and whatever. Jan also spoke about the need for integration, political, economic and so forth but there is a big problem with that. If you just let this happen on a case by case basis there are two major problems. First of all, it takes a lot of time so it contradicts the idea of urgency which you also spoke about before. Secondly, if you leave the interpretation on a case by case basis every time there is an emergency either to Kofi Annan, who's on the ground or to the Canadian General, it means that you lose time and it means that you go back to the paradigm that the moral fibre of the person that makes the decision determines whether

people live or die. Why should a thousand peoples lives be dependent on the moral fibre of one individual or two individuals, the Canadian General or Kofi Annan, who happen to have to decide whether they should intervene to save lives? That's why if our goal is to save lives, we should have, before interpretation we should say 'In those circumstances, you can intervene, in those circumstances you cannot'. For instance, one circumstance you can intervene: if you see that someone is actually being killed, there should be no discussion about having to ask for a mandate. This is where you wrong. You shouldn't leave it to Kofi Annan to decide, should I intervene, maybe or not? And if he doesn't decide, then the case of international law is not advanced. If he happens to decide then maybe it is advanced. So to save lives and to urge to save people, we could have saved Darfur today if we had decided after Rwanda: 'let's make some clear rules'.

Now this is where I come to the second point about the global social contract, which by the way doesn't deal with democracy. You need a global social contract which deals with all the issues at once: security, trade, environment, health and so forth. You put all the issues on the table and the big problem with international law today, as you said, there are ten thousand treaties or whatever, there are kilometres and kilometres of papers and sometimes often they contradict each other, and it's complicated. One part of democracy is also that you can actually know what the law is. Often you don't know what the law is, supposedly international law and there are gaps in the law, there are contradictions. So I'm saying there should be a basic law which basically says those are the fundamental principles. So that if also you have judges in the International Court of Justice, if there is a gap they can go back to the basic law, interpret the gap according the basic law. But there is no basic law for the world today. There is not even a law for the world which says that human rights are the basic law. It's not, there's a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it's not law. It says it's a document which we aspire to. There's not even a declaration this should be the law. So that's why if you have global social contract you include China and you negotiate everything at once and then you make a deal and that's why I say you have to negotiate to make a deal and it will be faster to make this deal, this global deal, than it to wait hypothetically for some further catastrophe to come and to wait for what you call case law to happen.

Victor Makarov

I have two points to make here. I think it is a pity that most of the discussion here has been about whether states can legally do something about some extreme cases of human rights violations. What we haven't discussed just as much is whether the states in the present international relations system have a desire to intervene generally to protect human rights because there are lots of situations where a lot can be done without violating any international law or regulations, without violating the principles of sovereignty. My impression from just observing what is happening even around Europe is that very often the states don't really care about doing something, having an activist policy and this is nothing to do with respecting sovereignty and international law. Now I could mention names and states and so on but it is a good tradition at this Forum perhaps that we don't do it.

My second point is about democracy and CO2 and here I would oppose Mr. Bassetti's point. Democracy does have to do with CO2 and sometimes in the end you find out that without democracy in the nation states you can't deal with the CO2 problem. To give you another extreme example that relates democracy to environment take Iran and North Korea. If these two states were more or less democratic states today, I don't think we would have had the same kind of problems to deal with today. We don't know, but the chances are that you could probably have less difficulty reaching a deal with a democratic state and not a totalitarian regime, that's the hope.

Piero Bassetti

I would be careful about establishing a very strict relation on behaviour of states according to the fact. It may make a difference but that is an historical feature, it is not a theoretical assumption. Also the other thing, when you, as I see, are horrified that there is life involved but politics has always been based on managing death and life. Assume the capital penalty, I mean as a typical institution which was there and is still there in the United States. So I think that the handling of power is a very complex thing and that the global world has increased the difficulties of handling power because in the Westphalian assumption with frontiers the handling of power, and with sovereignty, the handling of power has been reduced to a less complicated problem. Now that the globalisation has opened up and down the subjects of politics, handling of power has become by far more complicated. So I have been a Member of Parliament, but I never thought that the parliament is the very hand of all the powers. It's just a small source of power in a complicated system.

Charles Groome

It occurs to me that the concepts of universality and legitimacy are more or less mutually exclusive. You can't talk in a meaningful way about legitimacy on an international level and try and include everybody. You can't look at China; you can't perhaps even look at Russia in a meaningful way. You have to exclude in order to create balance. Now that does not mean to say you cannot have two organisations running side by side at different levels, for instance, I do agree with Mr. Bassetti that there are certain problems that do demand a global all round effort. Such was Kyoto, sadly it failed. But I think there is room for action on both fronts and I think in a sense the sort of mutual support of both from both sides offsets any potential disagreement that makes it a western centric project, which was your fear about the Community of Democracies. So I do think they work together as tangents and in fact the caucus of the community of democracies in the United Nations, which is already functioning, is a very good way of bridging the gap I think.

Robert Skidelsky

I just want to make a very quick comment. I do agree; I think the danger is always to try, is dividing the world into two blocs. If you set up a club and say this is the club which is really the teleological goal of the world, which is to create democracies in the Western fashion and then you become gradually eligible for membership of this club when you reach certain requirements, it's an invitation for others to set up a different club and to say well, we don't accept this actually and if these non-dissenting members are powerful enough and populous enough and after all they may well contain most of the world's population in the end you recreate a divided world. So the aims of the club, if one was really serious about a club, you've got to: a) I think, try and make it as inclusive as possible, which means abandoning democracy as an explicit criteria but also it has got to have rules that are negotiated and that's true of exchange rate systems, it's true of WTO, it's true of occasions for intervention. These have all got to be negotiated between the powerful members. Now of course I also agree that there are some sort of issues the issue between democracy and non democracy is irrelevant. You assume some basic rationality and if there are global problems people will cooperate. I do also believe that China is much more reasonable in international affairs than it's given credit for despite not being a democracy. I don't believe, for example, that it's Chinese vetoes that prevent intervention by the Security Council in places like Darfur. I believe it's just lack of will on the part of the Security Council to do anything about it. So those are the points I'd really make. The danger is to divide the world into two blocs.

Charles Groome

If we look at the two blocs, if we look in the UN and we look at, for instance, voting on human rights resolutions and objections to Darfur it may well be the case that China isn't taking an active stance against those things and it's really just acquiescence, yet you compare, you look at a colour chart of voting records on this and again and again the non-democracies vote against these resolutions and the democracies and those in between are a total mix of abstentions, sometimes against, sometimes for. So I think in a sense there is already a division; it's just not one that is commonly perceived. And what I'd also say is that we discussed earlier, in fact President Gorbachev mentioned himself in his speech whether the world was safer prior to 1990 or after 1990. Are we living in a safer world now, a chaotic multipolar world with a rising number of nuclear states with narrowly defined interests or was the world safer when we had a predictable state of affairs when there were two blocs orientated around a clear divide and is this not a much more substantive reason to disagree, one of political principle, one of democracy, one of human rights rather than one of say economics which is really what the divide in the Cold War was about? So perhaps there is an argument for a division?

Piero Bassetti

Our final conclusions might be those we were looking around in the last minutes. I mean, I think that the rate of safety of the world of today can be discussed and that means that globalisation in a sense has increased the risk of our world. The second point probably is that the solution can't be looked for in going back to Westphalia.

Mary Kaldor

Just to disagree with you. Look, 50 million people died in the Second World War. I for one think the move away from states may make individual life risky but it's not as risky as when we had armed states.

Piero Bassetti

A useful point because it is absolutely true. Although we have the impression that the old world, being somehow regulated, provided sources of safety, it wasn't so. That is absolutely true. If you go in Darfur or somewhere there they would wonder about your judgment, but anyway. So I was saying: we can't go back to the Westphalia order. We have to deal, and this is the final conclusion, we have to deal in new way with the program of authority of international law. That is something that has to be worked upon. The questions of sovereignty in a sense have not come up because apparently we all assume that it has to be taken to be considered over. We contribute to make clear assertions, the fact that the use of force is not enforcement. Enforcement is something that might be different from the use of force and legitimation does not come from force. This is something that we probably agree upon. Diffuse violence, this is something that we have to deal with and be careful that a more accurate procedure to decide intervention does not increase the risk of diffuse violence because in a sense if we do not consider international diseases and violence, in private society violence is getting more diffused that it used to be. I wonder if this assertion is a correct one, but I will dare making it. So even there, for instance, the problem of diffuse violence and the problem of how you agree between localism and other sources of social control is a delicate matter to be dealt with. Then finally society action: I fully agree that in case we would agree on implemented the same society action, like for instance a global treaty that will bring us back to have a common book. I mean, not the Bible or the Quaran, but something similar although lay in terms of function. That would be certainly a strong contribution to the ruling of a globalised world.

But I think that the final conclusion is that the World Political Forum has to work a lot to clarify the procedure or the assumption necessary to get some new political order.

Workshop II

Security for States and Citizens: by what means? At what price?

Chairperson: **Anna Caffarena**, *Professor of International Relations at Turin University, Italy*

Thank you for joining this panel, which is going to be on: "Security for states and citizens: By what means, and at what price?". Today I was happy to hear from Andrei Grachev, the Chairman of the Scientific Committee, that we don't have to come up with final answers. As was said this morning, this seminar today is a first step in a process. The idea is that the different panels discuss different issues, that we come up with ideas, and these will help us to focus better our programme for meeting, the bigger seminar let's say, for next year.

So I really think we have to be very free to discuss all sorts of topics that we think may be relevant, with respect to the issue of security, which is at the moment wide enough, I would say.

To introduce the theme: I think in the past, if we had to have a panel of this kind on the problems of security, we would be thinking mostly about means, about tools, how to provide security. And perhaps we would be talking about arms control or collective security. I think now (and it came out very clearly this morning, when we talked about security) we have to focus on ends, I would say, more than on means, in the sense that it's not really obvious what security is today; for example, if we have to take into account citizens or individuals in the picture. Someone said this morning that, when he was studying international relations as a student at university we were talking only about states; individuals were not part of the picture at all. Now, I think it is absolutely right, that Professor Kaldor was saying that human security is probably the most interesting approach to the problem of security today. But of course, if we take individuals into the picture, and we accept or develop an extended conception of security, as the one for example put forward by the High Level Panel of the UN, then we really have to change our framework. We are not thinking any more of interstate relations, in fact we are talking about something which is usually labelled as global politics, no more divide between the domestic sphere, the domestic environment and the international environment.

And of course if we think of global politics, we have to think of more actors. This was one of the points on which we focused this morning, not only states but also NGOs, but multinational corporations and international organisations as well, big media networks. But also I think we need to discuss sovereignty. And this is another point that the Scientific Committee, in preparing the paper for this seminar, really wanted to stress, that we should go possibly to the fundamentals. It's not possible to discuss security only as a technique, let's say. We have to discuss all the concepts, the fundamental concepts which are involved in the issue of security. This is particularly important for us, because discussing security helps us to shed light on the complexities of the present situation. If you think of what to say when discussing security and sovereignty today, then in some cases we want to strengthen sovereignty, we want weak countries to become stronger from an institutional point of view, but also we want strong countries sovereignty-wise, to learn how to share sovereignty with other subjects and institutions, and exercise it jointly. So this really helps us to understand what kind of situation we are dealing with, very quickly

transforming, changing deeply, and possibly putting us in a condition to work out thoroughly new concepts to deal with them.

One other reason why we thought leading with sovereignty was very important is that sovereignty is linked in mainstream international relations theory with the security dilemma. So it has to do very much with security in the traditional sense. But also, of course, if you want to tackle problems of human security, we have to think of international public policies which are quite intrusive. Again it is something which has to deal with the perfection of, or debating the present form of sovereignty.

Another point is that, in recent political discourse and in the pages that I could read before this seminar from some of you who were sitting around the table, they stressed very much the aspect of trust developing in international relations, making reference to the EU as a model; making reference to security community literature. This is something which takes us very far from the normal conception of international relations as linked to the security dilemma and sovereignty again. So I think we should really face the challenge of thinking about security today very freely, absolutely not thinking that we have some fixed parameters that we can not go beyond, and perhaps challenge the ideas that we normally use to think about this problem.

So that's just to let you know what we had in mind when we prepared for this seminar, and what we hope we can have from the discussions that will be going on this afternoon and tomorrow morning.

Adam LeBor, *Journalist for The Times, writer, UK*

I'd like to change the terms slightly, although we're supposed to be talking about security for states and citizens, I would like to focus on security for citizens, which I believe should come before those of states, especially as recent history and continuing events show us. To advance a simple proposition to our workshop here, which I think could be a big step towards ensuring security for citizens and actually it was already echoed this morning by Mr. Petrovsky which is essentially to return to the UN Charter. Now this is an argument that some people might dismiss as naïve or unrealistic, but I believe it has both logic and moral force. The United Nations, where the nations of the world gather, and where the Security Council has the power to make international law, essentially should return to its founding principles. This is why the UN was set up, and this is why the UN still exists, and I think that's the way to ensure security for citizens. I think their needs should always come before those of states. Even though that might sound unrealistic and naïve, this could be a starting point.

If we look at the United Nations, it was founded by the victorious allies in the aftermath of the Second World War. If we look at the words of Charter, which were ratified just 61 years and a couple of days ago on October 24th 1945, it aims to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. Now the UN Charter, and the accompanying Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, are the most advanced formulation of human rights in history, which means nothing in the sense that for decades they have been comprehensively flouted by UN member states. Even as we meet here now, the carnage continues in Darfur, where the Sudanese government has unleashed a campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide. More than 400,000 people have been killed or have died of disease or malnutrition, more than two million have been made homeless since the conflict began in spring 2003. The abuses committed by the Sudanese military and the process militia, the Janjaweed, have been comprehensively documented by the United Nations' own international commission of enquiry report. The report's 176 pages were published in January 2005. It established that the government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are "responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, amounting to crimes under international law." In particular the commission found that the government forces and militias are responsible for indiscriminate attacks including the killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement throughout Darfur.

Now when we are talking about security for citizens, every UN member state agrees to abide by the UN Charter and the UN Declaration of Human Rights. But the commission's findings triggered little more than a yawn in Khartoum. There was no reaction essentially. Sudan remained and Sudan remains a member state of the United Nations in good standing. Sudan has refused to let in UN peacekeepers. Sudan has recently expelled the UN's envoy, Jan Pronk, just a couple of days ago. Yet despite this, Sudan remains a member of the UN. And here I think, is the crux of the matter, when we talk about ensuring or trying to ensure security for citizens. As long as there is no linkage between UN membership and human rights, Sudan has no need to stop the carnage in Darfur. Especially while the Security Council is divided, with China and Russia watering down the sporadic attempts by the West to put sanctions on Khartoum. I believe, and I would argue, that UN member states who fail to live up to the requirements of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights should be subject to a stepped procedure. First of

sanctions, and I don't mean here necessarily economic sanctions against a regime, I'm talking about a discipline in their membership, that their UN membership is sanctioned, suspended and in extreme cases should be expelled. I think the threat of such an action would have an effect. Member states who abuse human rights know that as long as they are accepted as part of the international community they have little to fear. UN membership is important, especially to post-colonial states, which are uncertain of their place in the world. UN membership confirms legitimacy and prestige. It provides states who abuse human rights with psychological and political succour, and the plentiful company of kindred spirits. Nor should personal factors be neglected. Many dictators of the developing world are always happy to visit New York, whose plush hotels and fancy shops are perhaps a bit more congenial than their own home cities. I think that losing these privileges could also prove a useful weapon for human rights.

But more than this, in 2005 the United Nations agreed the principle of the responsibility to protect. This was a crucial development. Had the responsibility to protect principle perhaps been established a decade earlier, events in Srebrenica and Rwanda might have worked out differently. The principle says that the UN is mandated to protect civilians despite national sovereignty. This principle may ultimately include military action i.e. armed intervention, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The responsibility to protect I think may be Kofi Annan's most important legacy to the UN, but only if it is enforced. It may be unrealistic to expect that every member state observes every paragraph of international human rights law, but it is realistic to demand that the United Nations takes action against member states that commit genocide, the most grievous crimes against humanities. Only then may citizens feel secure, especially as in Sudan, where they are in danger from their own state.

Anna Caffarena

I think of course you raise a very important point, and I think that most of us here feel that such gross violations of human rights should be justly punished with expulsion from the UN, from the community of civilised countries. The point is that the strategy which has been considered most fruitful has been inclusion- like let's keep them within the community of civilised states if they do not behave in a civilised manner because this could be a way, of having more contacts.

Adam Lebor

It provides a basis for dialogue.

Anna Caffarena

Yes. Of course, once you have thrown them out then no dialogue is possible any more, and then you would have the good ones in and the bad ones out. And I just wanted to raise that point.

Adam Lebor

Sure, I see your point. The thing is to have a stepped series of disciplinary measures, so first you could have a sanction and then suspension and then expulsion. Because it would be ridiculous now to suddenly expel Sudan not having gone through any kind of process. But I think it does show the ludicrousness of the situation, where here is a UN member state that is refusing to accept UN peacekeepers, and has expelled UN envoys, yet remains a member of the UN, with nothing happening to it. So it makes the UN into a laughing stock.

Anna Caffarena

There is something I suppose paradoxical about it.

Richard Falk, *Professor of International Law and Practise, Princeton University, USA*

I'm very sympathetic with that perspective, but I think there are some serious difficulties. For one thing, if you say you are starting with the primacy of the citizen, and yet you put your hopes in the UN which is an organisation of states that are notoriously resistant. It's the whole problem of representation. How do you represent citizens on a world stage? So far I think there's very little foundation for having much confidence in the UN to be a vehicle for the representation of the interests and primacy of citizens. So, as I say I'm sympathetic with the perspective, but it seems to me there's a kind of moral incoherence between your goals and the means that you chose to pursue them.

And then I have a second problem. It's easier to talk about Sudan. But how about the United States? If you're emphasising human rights, you can't leave out recourse to war. That's the core commitment you quoted yourself: "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". So if you overlook aggression and concentrate on what the states like Sudan and others do, which is obviously horrible from every point of view, it creates a kind of moral hegemony from the perspective of the powerful countries. But if you focus on the powerful countries and say everyone should be held to the same level of accountability, then the UN would collapse overnight. One of the strengths of the UN is precisely to suspend moral judgement, and therefore maintain universality. And as soon as you begin judging, you either have to convert the UN into a geopolitical arena of hegemonic powers, or you have to destroy it because everybody gets expelled.

Adam LeBor, *Journalist for The Times, writer, UK*

That's what I don't quite agree with. Because I think that, obviously we live in a world of shades of grey, but to return to your first point about representation, there was talk this morning about of a world parliament of citizens, but I think that's unrealistic, because the UN is there, the UN exists as forum, there's not going to be any other forum. What I'm trying to say is that the UN is committed to humanitarian values, and that's why it was founded, and I think that we have to keep trying to push it back to those values because it's through those values that we can protect citizens. That has started to happen in some senses. If you look at peacekeeping missions nowadays, they have very different mandates to peacekeeping missions in Rwanda and peacekeeping missions in Bosnia. I think it's hopefully inconceivable that something like Srebrenica could happen again, with UN troops putting people onto buses to be taken away to be killed, because there has been some kind of shift within the UN and within the mentality of the peacekeeping department. But the UN is already a geopolitical forum. If you look at the Security Council, cynical national interest prevail all the time. So what you're saying to an extent is already happening.

Aung Tun Thet, *Senior Advisor United Nations System Staff College, Myanmar*

To follow up Professor Falks' intervention. You know, often times we focus on what is immediate. The worry that we have I think about the UN is the perception of it having double standards. And if, because the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the whole issue of universality, the whole issue of indivisibility, the whole issue of non discrimination, all these come into play. So what we have found for example in what is now gotten rid of, was the Human Rights Commission, where the United States was very careful and strong on the good guys and the bad guys, they only want good countries in the Human Rights Council, and the constant criticism was because there was a Libyan law minister, a lady. Although they recognised that it was representation, it was not the country but the individual. She was not representing Libya, she was representing herself as an expert. And then the whole idea of trying to get rid of the Human Rights Commission was based purely on the use of double standards.

So another issue is if you look at the Convention on the Rights of the Child, of the 192 countries since last year there were 190 countries who ratified it, two countries didn't, obviously one was the Somalia, because it is a failed state (but even one of the warlords agreed to sign it, although there is no national government, so you can say that it's half done). So the only single country left with the CRC is the US. So when you talk of universal application of human rights, this is where I agree with your thinking but my worry is the application. And we (I don't represent the we) from the developing countries often times maintain the perception that some of the human rights principles are not universal, and therefore it comes from an occidental approach, a western approach, with very individual rights which are predominant, whereas we come from a different position where we are talking about communal rights, and at the moment this discussion has not really taken place.

Again another double standard is: I come from a country with the worst human rights in the world, period, Burma. And yet we know that our neighbouring country, China, never had the condemnation on human rights like us because there is interest in the West to protect the relationship with China. But for a country with fifty million they just don't care, they do whatever they like, and I think of course if you have to expel countries my country would be the first to be expelled, because we are obviously the bad guys. So my worry is that, as Professor Falk was saying, the UN from its original establishment tried to be non judgemental, that we are all inclusive. So I guess this is the struggle – how do we get to a situation where everyone could agree? Yet at this point in time, I think there is disagreement on the universal application of human rights.

Roberto Savio, *Journalist, Chairman of Inter Press Service, Italy*

Frankly speaking, I'm feeling a little bit lost. I think that we are having this panel because we are in a political crisis, and we have to start from the political crisis, we cannot ignore the political crisis. First of all let's remind all of us that in 1992 in the World Conference on Environment and Development, the concept of human security was introduced as one of the key points of the conference, and was accepted by everyone, including the American delegation, with George Bush the father. That father in 1995 went to the General Assembly and was involved in the concept of global human security, (and I was secretary general of the society for the intervention of development, we did work a lot at that), it was accepted by unanimous vote at the General Assembly. Then 2001 came with a different American administration from 1995, and then everything changed. The shift of security went from that of citizens and global human security to that of states in a never ending war against terrorism. Which was not clear when the deadline was, or what the field of action was. Everything was going to be done by a "coalition of the willing." And the idea of the coalition of the willing came in, substituted the idea of treaties, the idea of international agreements, the idea of structures. It was an adopted solution for an adopted problem.

This brings me to why I am lost. I am here because I am a representative of the World Social Forum. Like it or not, we have been mainly debating why there is a growing divide between politics and citizens, which is increasing dramatically. Every year fewer people vote, political parties become less and less participatory and more machinery. And you will have great difficulty today in finding citizens who relate to politics as an expression of participation and shaping. They look to this as something which goes over their heads, and which they have no say in. This, which happens at a national level -much less at a local level by the way, but up at the national way-, happens even more in the intergovernmental way. This is why I want to share in the debate about the United Nations, because there is no way you get into the agenda of the United Nations unless you are a member of ECOSOC, a very limited number of people. We are out of the main agenda.

Now this is because, and it is my main point, we were in a period in which, when, after the Second World War, we built up a world of idealism and vision, where the idea was to bring together all nations a change in the path of development, peace and so on. We went to the idea at the end of the Cold War that ideology was out. A number of people wrote books, the end of ideology, the end of history and so on. Then after the end of ideology we went the end of idealism. Then from the end of idealism we started to phase out words – solidarity, social justice, interdependence. And the new shift of the paradigm came with globalisation – efficiency, competition, a number of other things which have nothing to do with the value of development which are the values on which we created the United Nations. The United Nations was created on the idea of development, the final goal of which is for the men to be more, not to have more (like globalisation). So it is a totally different shift. This situation when everyone started to talk about being pragmatic, the effect has become utilitarianism, not pragmatism. Utilitarianism is the individual gain, the individual gain of the country, the individual gain of everything. How can you discuss the idea of citizens and security in a situation where the value is utilitarianism? Utilitarianism is against any idea of social relations, social constructs or social anything. So it is the idea of utilitarianism which fosters a situation of division. You have the government of the United States and the Congress of the United States eliminating Habeas Corpus for a group of citizens which is part of general law and there was no criticism. Well, you have some editorials in the New York Times, in Europe no one said anything, and then you have all these double standards – these double standards are terrific – because you say to India "yes we support you as a nuclear power" but then you say to Iran and North Korea: "No,

you cannot be a nuclear power.” And you have thousands of examples of these double standards. We go into Iraq but we don’t go into Darfur. There is no coherence in anything we are doing in the international system because we have no system. We have no system under which to relate, a system of values under which to act. So we act case by case. Then you go case by case, and, every time politics is administrative without the systematic approach, you solve a punctual affair but that solution creates other problems. Iraq is the best example – you go there to solve a problem but you have a number of other problems. Because there is no system.

So my point is that in a world in which, on environment, on human rights, on security, on a number of issues, there are a lot of double standards, everything is double standards. We don’t have a unified approach on anything. I cannot recall on anything on which you would have 185 countries speaking the same language, since at least four or five years. In this situation of a political crisis, which in my view is coming from the decline in the ability of politics to provide a system and take refuge just in punctual solutions to problems that come up, from the idealism to the administrative, together with the decline of the information system, which today media by and large reinforce the standard and the standardisation (they do not introduce criticism and debate), you want to ask, what should we do, as the World Political Forum?

My view, about what the World Political Forum has to do, is to move more and more the group of people who discuss this – the academic world, which is much more sensitive of this – with the organisers of civil society, try to establish a dialogue with the political groups, but start to have a debate under which we call for a unified system (which looks very complicated and it is very complicated). But if we continue to address every issue by itself, without providing a general framework in which how to work together to establish a relationship, I think we are going to have another panel like this in ten years with different problems but exactly with the same general situation. This is why I am lost, because I think that the goal is not the double standards or Darfur, but why we have come to a point where we have North/South dialogue, official conferences in Paris and so on, to a point where I now do not know where we are. Who is in charge of what? Where are the instruments to discuss governance? We have no instruments? Governance is a day to day affair, according to who opens their mouth and who plays the role. This morning we had the Under Secretary of Italy saying that Italy decided to play the necessary role in convincing Israel to abdicate part of their sovereignty. I found that extremely suggestive. I think we didn’t play any role at all. But it shows that today anyone can say anything, you can say whatever you like, as you have no point of reference, we live in a big chaos, and that is why I am, frankly, at a loss.

Anna Caffarena, *Professor of International Relations at Turin University, Italy*

What Roberto Savio is saying I think is that we are lacking a kind of a common framework which is like saying we are lacking rules of the game reflecting shared values, which in international relations language you would say: we have no international society. Is that the problem we have to face now? We don't have an international social framework in which we can think of ways of meeting challenges. That would be very worrying. And I think that is exactly what Secretary General Kofi Annan was pointing out in his last speech in front of the UN General Assembly, at the opening the 61st Session, when he said that gaps are widening and the international community is missing more and more what makes a group of states a community. This may be a problem for providing security for citizens and human beings.

Richard Falk, *Professor of International Law and Practise, Princeton University, USA*

I very much share Roberto Savio's assessment. I think that part of the loss of a sense of coherence or a sense of system is the abandonment of international law by the principal actors, because that did provide at least a common framework of fundamental rules. If the leading states ignore that, it undermines any sense of a normative coherence in the system. I don't think that's the whole problem, but I think that's a significant part of the problem, that the way in which the world is structured depends on reasonably benevolent leadership by the main actors, and if the main actors are not pursuing a reasonably benevolent path, then the system is reduced to its lowest common denominator, and I think that's what we are experiencing. What you call the political crisis, I think is the loss of any kind of confidence that the normative frame that the Charter represents in having has some leverage in relation to behaviour. And if you look back historically (and that is what I think Hall Gardner was saying this morning), the kind of leadership that the United States tried to provide after World War II, was to champion these core norms as a basis of avoiding a Third World War. But gradually the geopolitics has shifted to such a point that the US has become, instead of the supporter of a normative order, its most subversive actor. In that condition, there is no possibility of a system, you can't get a system without having a political foundation that emerges out of the behaviour of the leading actors.

Aung Tun Thet, *Senior Advisor United Nations System Staff College, Myanmar*

Agreeing with the identification of the political crisis; we have worked on this and tried to lever it in a slightly different way – not to identify it as a crisis of politics, but as the crisis of the governance gap. There is a gap in the challenge the global community faces, and the way the institutions are able to address these gaps, so we start with this governance gap. Then, accepting this, but most of the discussion is on the structural level, institutions etc. We want to go slightly one below the structure, then we come to the functional, which is, what kind of leadership do we need at the international level to address these challenges. We cannot afford to have the traditional types of leadership, *vis à vis* the great man theories where someone else is in charge and everyone follows. But now we are advocating issues like transformational leadership, where it is the citizens, and we don't make a distinction between the leaders and the followers, it is for the leaders, the accountability rests with the leaders to mobilise the citizens around certain key issues. So we are now asking, at least from where I come from, for a different kind of leadership altogether. Issues of servant-leadership, that if you want to become a leader you must be a servant first. Unless you go deep into the personal individual patterns of providing leadership, all these structural solutions, to me, as you were saying, we will have the same panel. So what we are now asking is: can we develop a different kind of leadership, a global citizen leadership, where the idea of servant leadership, the idea of transformational leadership, the idea to be authentic, are not driven by the polls, not driven by the media? This is to me the leadership challenge, to address the governance gap by recognising the political crisis that you correctly pointed out.

Roberto Savio, *Chairman of Inter Press Service, journalist, Italy*

I find this intervention extremely important, for a very simple reason. That in Vienna in the Conference on Human Rights, we had quite a debate on the two different models of application of the concept of human rights. In large parts of Asia they accepted much more on the community than individuals because it works much better through organising a community with a goal of common values than just by trying to gather individuals under an abstract set of rules, which would be the Declaration of Human Rights. We had quite a debate there, it was very interesting. And I have been following this debate in Asia quite a bit. I think we have not to forget that (I am now of course making a personal assumption) I don't think Europe will be able to digest its expansion and have a unified foreign policy before quite a bit of time. It will take, let us be optimistic, ten years. This would bring us to 2015.

Also, I think the United States is on the deterioration path, which is very serious. 30% of the electorate are fundamentalist, 40% of Republicans are fundamentalist. The country has changed; it is changing very much. I hope it will go back again to a different course. But how long it will take, I do not know. If it continues like this, you have to change the Supreme Court, you have to change several things which have changed already, let us say another 10 years, two terms.

Well, we go to 2015. In 2015, like it or not, Asia has taken over. So this debate, where we look to Asia like something local, in effect becomes global. So the debate we have now is extremely important, because their way of choosing a leader, which in the United States would be considered totally absurd. Are we making any effort to create some common codes about double standards, and about how we apply them – if I take my original hat off as an Argentinean from the south of the world, I would say: No, on the contrary, the North-South divide in the issue of governance has increased, it has not decreased. Now if you go to the Latin American continent, we look to the United States as a far away power with whom we no longer have real relations, unless with some very specific things which are finance and trade. Finance and trade are the two engines of globalisation, and the two by the way are out of the United Nations now. So I think this intervention by Aung Tun The is very important because, when we discuss what we are discussing here, we are doing that, like it or not, unwillingly, with an assumption from the North, and not with a very global assumption. When the power will shift from the North to the South, I think there will be an inevitable change, and this issue of human rights, if it has not been working already before, will become more a point of divide than at any point of unity.

Anna Caffarena, *Professor of International Relations at Turin University, Italy*

Just to raise a point, following Professor Falk's statement. Of course the revisionist attitude of the US after 2001 did weaken the rules in a sense, as he said the perception of the framework is less clear to all of us, it depends on the breaking of the rules and trying to change them. But in trying to change the rules, the United States got in a serious crisis of legitimacy. It seems to me that actually the rules are there, that most people feel that the rules are there, they know what the rules are, to the point that Ian Clark in his recent book *'Legitimacy in international relations'* talks about legitimacy with respect to constitutional rules, talking about multilateralism basically after the Second World War. So this I think is quite interesting, because if we think about leadership perhaps we should think how much the preferences of states will get into choosing the leader of the future, how much the preference of individuals in some ways enter the process.

I was just having a look at transatlantic trends lately, the last one that was made, from 2002 to 2006 the percentage of Europeans who would like to see the United States as a world leader taking the lead of the international community, has dropped from 62 to 37, something of the kind. So I think this will in some ways make a difference. So breaking the rules, or acting without taking into account the rules, does create problems for states. I'm wondering if the conduct of the United States after 2001 has not even made clear to people that the rules are there, and which are the rules.

Amitai Etzioni, *Professor of Sociology at the George Washington University, USA*

Actually I very much agree with this last point. I'm using a concept called 'moral dialogues'. These are dialogues in which people talk to each other about values, not for acts, not logic necessarily, but they are passionately engaged with each other. The current conversation we are having here is: what are the right values which should govern our future? Now one tends to think about this as not very easy to do. But the notion that 60 million of us, 300 million people, can have a conversation and come to a new shared moral understanding, I think at first blush looks absurd. So I'm going to take a minute first to show that it happens on a national level, and much more important to me, that it is now happening on a global level, which is the point that you just made. So it's easiest to show it in a national society because already this dialogue has matured more. The global conversations are more recent.

But just to quickly illustrate. In the 1950s, to the best of my knowledge, in none of our countries was there a sense of a moral duty to the environment. Maybe someone had written a paper about it, but if you asked people, 'what are your moral duties?' It wasn't on the list any more than when we wake up today and say we have a moral commitment to Sanskrit grammar or the other side of the moon. And then a dialogue was started. Out of that a new shared understanding has arisen. Actually this one is also global: now it's true that the United States didn't sign Kyoto and so on and so on, and we still have enormous disagreements at the margins about exactly what it entails. I'm not aware of anybody who goes around and says we should go back to the 1950s and have no obligations, we can just drop anything into the air and into the water, it doesn't matter and so on and so on. As I say, I'm not trying to minimise the debate about global warming and trying to cheat and all that. But values are often like this; values are not like laws of physics. We all violate them and then try to go back to the norm. It is a constant struggle. I hate to admit it, and I hope no one quotes me on this, but the church has it right – we have values, we fall from grace and we try to find our way back. It's always a struggle, but it doesn't mean there are no norms, and it's not just lip service.

Human rights are another very important example. For a while people in some parts of Asia used to say: "This is a Western invention, go away, it has nothing to do with me." They don't say that anymore. Most of the intellectuals in Singapore say: "Actually it is part of our tradition, we also have it, Confucius already knew about it". Or they say: "We are just behind the times. We just need to make more money, and then we will become democratic." So in effect, they're paying homage to the same set of norms, and often they refer explicitly to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. And then again I could go on hours showing how far we are from that – social economic rights are often not included, yet if you read the declaration very carefully, there are kind of odd things in it. But, as a moral concept, I think it is catching on. The example you mentioned is really dramatic. The United States' invasion has been considered illegitimate by practically everybody, as if the whole globe had a town meeting in which it discussed it. Now that's step one. I could go on giving more examples, about land mines, and trading in white slavery or antiques or ivory, many many more, women's rights, many more issues, which all have the same flavour. We have often had very painful dialogues about values and we reach grudgingly new shared understandings.

And the next step is, do they change behaviour? Not laws, necessarily. You see the problem with law from my view point, once you have the police you already have a problem; I'd much rather people changed their minds and their behaviour because they believe that things have changed. And there is no better example, I must say, than my recent visit to Italy. It reinforces my example a thousand times: is smoking in public. We

had a prohibition before, on alcohol, which was also an addiction, and it was not based on a shared understanding, it obviously corrupted, it didn't hold. But most interesting, there's a detail practically nobody knows, that it was the only constitutional amendment in the United States that was ever cancelled, that was ever repealed, was the prohibition on alcohol. Now we have a prohibition on smoking in public, and people so believe in it that it is completely self-enforcing. I've never seen the police or anything. Now the last place in the world I thought it would take place was in France and in Turkey, and, my God. Now it is true that it is expressed in the law, but the law in this case does what it does best, when it follows and doesn't lead, a new shared moral understanding.

So now we have to bring all of this to bear on the new global order. Here a surprising thing happens. Now let me first say: I've been against the war in Iraq from day one, it's been written on record, with the book I published in 2003, and I wouldn't vote for Bush if you killed me. But look at what happens. Bush suddenly says: 'We don't want to talk to North Korea alone, that is unilateralism, we want multilateralism, we want six people around the table.' And he says about Iran: 'Oh you think I'm going to go without diplomacy? I want Europe around the table.' What's happening here? It's not that he suddenly found his god, or that his god finally spoke to him in a better English. It's that international pressures have consequences. That's my last point. It's not simply public opinion that floats out there. It cost us South Korea as an ally. I mean: 'us', I mean the American government; I take 'us' back. A very important ally. It changed sides. It became neutral instead of an ally. Iraq affected the consequences of the election in Germany. It prevented the United States using its military bases in Turkey. And the 1991 invasion pulling Saddam out of Kuwait, there the United States paid 20% of the costs, and now it's paying 110%. And I think that everyone agrees that the United States trains more terrorists in Iraq than we ever had to worry about before. So, both good and bad behaviour now have global consequences. So we see the beginning of a global community and I see the job of institutions like this is to feed this moral conversation, to come up with new terms like the duty to protect, which is a moral concept, which is very different of course from what we agreed. Where did it come from? I mentioned it this morning. It came from a book, and from a commission report. But it is beginning to catch.

And so I think that is where we can serve best, if we can enrich the moral dialogue, but not in a way which pleases us. Forgive me, I'm going to use a strong term to make my point. A lot of people around here masturbate, in the sense that they enjoy themselves but there is no fruit. I think the purpose of this concept is not for us to go and feel good about ourselves, that we declared some wonderful sentiments. The hard work is to put these moral concepts in such a language that we speak to people and bring them into the tent.

Ana Isabel Prera, *Guatemalan Ambassador in France, Permanent Delegate for Guatemala to Unesco, Guatemala*

What are the differences of the role of the church and the role of the states among the values and the citizens' values, the moral values and the citizens' values?

Amitai Etzioni, *Professor of Sociology at the George Washington University, USA*

You see from my view point the number one conversation in the world now is between religious nuts and the rest. But the religious nuts are found in all groups. There are some Jews in the West Bank who are religious nuts, there are some who bomb abortion clinics in the United States, and then there are a few who are called not Muslims but a sub group. In all religions there are violent sub groups. And by the way in all religions the majority they are not. That is really a terribly important point. If somebody wants to see documentation, I just published it as the lead article in the Cambridge International Review. If you think about that you want to find the liberal democrats, the way the west defines human rights and democracy, you find small minorities. If you define what you want as people who do not want to kill each other, who are willing to live together but not necessarily to accept the rest of the western values, you find for instance in Indonesia, in Bangladesh, the majority of the Muslims are what I would call "illiberal moderates". I went recently to Kyrgyzstan. Most of them are illiberal moderates. So in short the more conversations we have at the moment within all religions not across religions: is violence justified or not. You can't have a new international order unless we agree that you cannot just raise your hand against other people.

Roberto Savio, *Chairman of Inter Press Service, journalist, Italy*

I know your work, and as a matter of fact you are quite a preference in the world of Porto Alegre and the World Social Forum. The only point I don't understand, all the work you did to create global civil society, communitarian movements, value orientated common good and so on had this effect from what you were saying from smoking, to human rights, to women who were once not part of the political debate. My point is that this does not create a link between the political agenda and the political institutions. We have to go ahead with the logic that is not inclusive of states which I think is giving us problems, because while millions feel awareness of human rights the political agenda does not translate that into action. And so they immerse themselves in creating NGO movements where everybody is busy but this does not get into the political agenda. There is a divide between people who work on voluntary movements and how they relate to political parties, so much so that in Europe we had to create the Green parties to bring the environment into the political agenda. So I think there is a divide between citizens and their awareness and the political institutions which is bringing this problem of lack of values for a creation of a system. This is the problem, not so much a problem at the local levels, you are right but if you take a community in the North they are aware much more close to the action in a Third World country, that if you take the national governments in both parts of the world. In other words, the closer you are to the reality, the more tendency to community. The more you tend to delegate power through the system of national elections, the less people move away from the ground.

Amitai Etzioni, *Professor of Sociology at the George Washington University, USA*

I agree with you that politics is lagging behind. The global community is not interested in the local communities, but look at the direction they are moving in, and you see the secular trend and you will see that China will become more democratic, and less totalitarian, you'll see that there is less support for war across national borders, the greater pressure on the future Sudan's. So I am not very different from you, the political lags, but the social and moral leads.

Adam LeBor, *Journalist for The Times, writer, UK*

I'm very interested to hear from our American colleagues here on what they think are the implications of the increasing American unilateralism, for the long term stability of the international system.

Hall Gardner, *Professor and Chair of the Department of International Affairs of the American University of Paris, USA*

Obviously it depends on what you are looking at, certainly in the Bush term, Condoleezza Rice came to Science Po on purpose to talk about multilateralism and made sure every French person was there to hear her. So that's in the second term of course, precisely because they realise that the war in Iraq is such a disaster that they need their partners, that are both democratic and illiberal, both China and Russia to help handle the Iran and North Korean crises, and I would hope to strengthen the UN at some point, but that's not entirely clear yet. I think there are signs despite expanding US military use, there is some sign that we are more willing to work with democratic partners, democratic and illiberal than before. And I would like to believe that that is a continual trend, only because we are in a such a bad shape because of Iraq financially and morally and politically, that it's going to be a theme in the next election. I can see how unilateral efforts can kind of come back, but I don't think they will be successful. I think that we are in such a situation that we literally have to work with our neighbours or the world community whether we like it or not.

Anna Caffarena, *Professor of International Relations at Turin University, Italy*

Do you think that the US is now thinking more in a long-term fashion? This is a point with respect to providing security, about the role of the US on the global stage. I don't think from what I could read, after 1989, for different reasons, because after 2001 there was an emergency to deal with, from what we read in books and articles it seems that there are two schools: one how to maintain US supremacy in the next decades, the other one, how to manage the decline of the US as an imperial power. Both schools seem to pose a problem in a long term fashion. Do you think that there is a moral capacity in the politicians to see in themselves a long-term attitude toward this problem?

Hall Gardner, *Professor and Chair of the Department of International Affairs of the American University of Paris, USA*

The answer to that is that I wish so, and it is not. In my view, the neoconservatives are definitely on their way out, but they are being placed by traditional realists. I think both are bad. And they are not thinking in the long-term in the sense that this conference is about and to establish some form of global governance. I have these great quotes from Reinhold Niebuhr from way back in 1941. He was a theologian and IR theorist who inspired Martin Luther King. We are at the third time in our century, where we can think about, we had Woodrow Wilson, we had the American century, and that precisely because of this crises, it's just going to take a lot of people talking more and more to force politicians to act, because it's not going to happen unless the media pressure is there pushing for them.

Anna Caffarena

We have a point in that governance is linked to responsibility, because we have in the US the biggest political actor, so I think when we are reasoning about governance and leadership we have to consider the United States as well.

Richard Falk, *Professor of International Law and Practise, Princeton University, USA*

It seems to me that the neoconservatives had a long term conception but it's a long term conception that is a contradiction to this conference, as they recognised that the world needed a kind of global governance, but they felt that the United States could provide it and they were critical of the Clinton administration because it failed to take the opportunity of the collapse of the Soviet Union and it wasn't willing to use military power to eliminate obstacles. Their blueprint, the Project for the New American Century, it's very clear there, what they think. So what we are really talking about is an alternative long term and more humane notion of global governance. One could say that the good news from Iraq is that maybe it represents the end of the American illusion, although it's not clearly over. Maybe Iran could be a further effort to prove their point that only the United States can provide security by controlling the Middle East, as the United States controls Europe, from an arena of global conflict. And I would interpret the Lebanon war as partly a militarist reaction to the failure of the Iraq War. And the building up of a new effort of a crises in the regions, Rumsfeld had this rule of bureaucratic politics, if a problem proves insoluble, make it larger. And they pursued, and that has been the basic strategy, and so, I think it's very important that groups like this form an alternative vision of global governance that is informed by the kind of ethical and more humanly grounded values that take account of the rise of non-western society.

Roberto Savio, *Journalist, Chairman of Inter Press Service, Italy*

Richard, I agree with you entirely, but the war in Iraq was pushed and considered by the neoconservatives, but was executed by pragmatists. If a neoconservative would have been there, I think he would have sent many more troops and it would have been a whole different game. While I'm very much against the neoconservatives, I would say that at least they have some idea of the system. The trouble with the Bush administration is that the people did not have any idea of a system and were thinking of how to solve problems one by one on an ad hoc basis. Of all the arrogance of power without any conceptual framework under which to put it. I hate neoconservatives, but I think they were not the worst of the Bush administration.

Richard Falk, *Professor of International Law and Practise, Princeton University, USA*

I think if you compare Richard Perle to Donald Rumsfeld it's not a happy alternative, and it's not the kind of system that you want; there are totalitarian visions that are coherent, but they are still horrifying, so what we want is a humane system. Rumsfeld and Cheney might not be neoconservative but that is their ideological anchor. They have created a kind of mutual relationship with them.

Hall Gardner, *Professor and Chair of the Department of International Affairs of the American University of Paris, USA*

Just to clarify, the Clinton administration had contingency plans to put several hundred thousand troops in Iraq if they went in. So the idea was there before.

Richard Falk, *Professor of International Law and Practise, Princeton University, USA*

But he had other aims, it wasn't just about Iraq he thought Iraq would be easy and he was trying to change the whole course of American military strategy. He was also trying to alter the way that the Pentagon was spending money.

Georges Estievenart, *Honorary Executive Director of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Senior Lecturer, France*

The United States of America for the moment are beginning to recognise officially in which kind of difficulties they are in relation to the Iraq situation, but apparently they are not doing exactly the same exercise in relation to Afghanistan, which raises the question: why? Is Afghanistan that good or working well? What is the point? What we can see from the European perspective at least is the strong deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan as well, and this has a very strong impact in relation to drugs when you see it from the European perspective, which is mine.

So a second remark would be precisely that this deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan is affecting very much the situation of drugs in general at a world level and regional level. At the same time there doesn't seem to be too much information coming from this issue. And this issue doesn't seem to be too much a priority at the moment. Just to take an example: the director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released the 2006 worldwide report, in which he says that there are some weak elements in the global drug control system, most notably heroin from Afghanistan, cocaine demand in Europe and cannabis supply and demand everywhere. This is the general judgement.

I'll concentrate only on heroin supply, in general. In relation to heroin he is also saying that the world supply of opium has shrunk in general, in an unbalanced way. Within a few years Asia's once notorious golden triangle, once the world narcotic opium centre could become opium free. That's the positive information, but in Afghanistan while he says in an area, cultivation decreased in 2005 the country's drug situation remains vulnerable to reversal. This could happen as early as 2006. And this is actually happening now.

If we look at the situation, in terms of hectares of cultivation in Afghanistan that has been the recent evolution starting in 2001 the last year of the Taliban, and afterwards in 2006, we have around 165,000 hectares of opium cultivation in Afghanistan, an absolute record in relation to the period starting in 1986. If you take the production it is more or less the same. In terms of global production in 2006 there is an absolute summit record, of 600,000 metric tonnes at a global level and Afghanistan is taking 92% of it.

Hall Gardner

In 2001 there were two stories, one is that the Taliban were purposely cutting back, the other one was that they were cutting back to make the prices go higher.

George Estievenart

Everybody agrees that both are right, but they did it on purpose. The interpretation is that if they had remained in power in Afghanistan, they would have anyway eliminated the ban on cultivation. They did it just for a short period that's not sustainable for a longer period.

From the point of view of Europe this is posing serious questions and the most serious is that around 90% of the opium being produced in Afghanistan goes westwards. That means that all this is dedicated to the countries which are between Afghanistan. There are two main roads, one is the Silk Road in the north the other is the Balkan Route in the south, and between the two you have the gateway of the Caucasus that is the entry to the Caucasus and this is followed by the quantities that have been mentioned. This is now a very serious problem for Europe because everything that is happening between the production fields of the opium production and the routes to the west is just circulating back.

So this is a real trans-regional problem for Europe, its neighbours and of course for the producing country itself.

The first and most important consequence of this situation is that over the last few years the demand and the consumption of heroin has been increasing very fast, in all the countries along these routes from the western European perspective we were rather happy about the evolution of heroin consumption in our countries, the fifteen now, the twenty-five towards the last decades of the last century. Because starting in the early 60's and 70's it was possible, in the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, to curb the consumption of heroin of the western European countries, and to stabilise that consumption. This is now changing, because first: consumption increases very fast in the countries where it was not the case before, in particular the Russian Federation, the Ukraine and the Baltic states, which are now part of the European Union. Even to a lesser extent towards the south, but if you look at the figures you see what is the consequence of the increased production or on in our case what is the consequence of the increased demand in our countries, in particular in Western Europe.

So what you have now is a situation in which there is a market of around 16 million people worldwide for opiates, among them 11 million for heroin only. More or less 90% of the opium being produced is being consumed in the different countries along the routes. We have now a very strong concentration of heroin consumption along those routes, the figures are frightening. Even in Afghanistan there are apparently now around 60,000 addicts, in the Islamic Republic of Iran there are 1,500,000 at least; in Pakistan: 700,000; in the Russian federation: 2,500,000, more than in the European Union in general, where we have around 1,5 to 2 million of heroin or opiates consumers. Even in the West in the UK, in France, where the consumption was stabilised towards the late nineties, it has increased in recent years and is very easy to explain now in what we know as the production circles and those routes being followed by the traffickers. So we have now around 340,000 heroin users in the UK; 300,000 in Italy; 190,000 in Spain, 170,000 in Germany, 150,000 in France and in Portugal and so on. The United States has much less. The heroin consumption is still not the major problem, the major problem there is cocaine and amphetamines, not so much heroin, the heroin being used in the US is not coming in principle from that region.

Through the recent evolution in the world situation we have now what I would call a very new 'cross regional problem' related to Europe and around Europe. But we don't have any solutions up our sleeve, and the people who are in charge of the drug problem inside Afghanistan are the UK, and the US is not that much interested in looking at the problem, in particular because it's not their problem, which we can understand quite easily, but if it's not their problem its our problem. So, if we are not able to establish solutions to solve the problem, we should at least establish mechanisms to meet that problem.

This is a very new and recent problem, the Afghanistan drugs economy was 2.8 billion dollars in 2004, the illicit GDP of Afghanistan that same year was 4,6 billion dollars. There are huge changes in the benefits coming from the drug trafficking which are going to the peasants or to the drug traffickers. The share of the traffickers is increasing and the share of the peasants is consequently diminishing. According to the very interesting study produced by the World Bank, in Afghanistan there is a real vicious cycle, you have the peasants- the producers, who have mostly no real economic alternative for this production. You have traffickers, who are heavily interested in maintaining this kind of economy, and this is very much linked to the war lords in Afghanistan. Even in the processes of democratisation, and having last year the first elections in Afghanistan, we know that many of those people who are relying precisely on this drug production and trafficking are sitting in the parliament itself. So the possibility offered to the government and to the power and to Karzai to acclimatise democracy in Afghanistan is obviously very limited.

Again we don't have solutions in Europe, and even we don't yet have full consciousness in Europe about these facts. If you want to make further progress at world regional and national level you have to be able to change the way you are or you are not respecting people. And this is to give the people appropriate and accurate information, that is not easily said and to done. First, you must be able to set up bodies who are scientifically able to produce that kind of information, and then you have to be able to diffuse this information around, I think that we are all playing a very important role in this situation, it is not possible to leave the director of the UNODC or the Council of Justice and Home Affairs in Europe, having this in their files they are saying: "We are congratulating the government of Afghanistan in making this very important reduction in cultivation of opium", based on the idea that there were less hectares cultivated last year, but production was increased. So this is not serious at all.

I think that a place like this World Political Forum should try to strengthen in any possible means the structures producing information, because information can force actors to take it into account. This information is not only a way of quickly informing the public, it is a way of being accountable to the public. From the European point of view, we have, in any case, to take on board this kind of situation which is given to us by the international situation, by globalisation if you want. But, for this we can't wait until the United States change their policy in Afghanistan, and we can't wait until the UK is ready to go back to Europe and prepare with the other Europeans a real responsible strategy based on appropriate information and on evaluation, at least to curb and to change this situation.

Richard Falk, *Professor of International Law and Practise, Princeton University, USA*

It seems to me that we should spend a little time discussing what I feel is a tension between security for states and security for citizens/people. I wonder if the word citizen captures the human reality, of stateless people, refugees and governments that are not representing them, who don't implement human rights. The assumptions underlying the old political architecture are premised on the unity of interest between the states and citizens at least. But I think that one of the characteristics of the information that we do have now is that in many circumstances the political leadership of states security contradicts the well being and security of its own people and I would say that goes for the powerful states as much as for the weak states. I think of course of the United States as an example of prevailing attitudes toward security that at the level of the state are undermining the security of the people, both by wasting resources in unusable military investment. The country is less secure now even though it spends as much as all the countries in the world put together in their military capabilities, so there is a kind of dysfunction that has emerged in the way that security is being pursued by many of the most powerful states. And one can demonstrate this relation to nuclear weapons. Instead of pursuing countries that don't have the weapons, it would be much more fruitful to try and get rid of the weapons altogether, through nuclear disarmament.

It's a great mind game that has been played for years; that the danger in the world comes more from the countries that don't have the weapons, instead of those that do have them. And we understand this with biological weapons and chemical weapons; it would be absurd to say that you can have permanent members that can keep biological and chemical weapons, but no-one else can have them. So I think one needs a real rethinking in what creates security for states in the twenty-first century, and the other part of the notion of human security for citizens and for people really depends in its implementation on a comprehensive view of human rights. Citizens will be secure if economic, social, political and cultural rights are being implemented; as long as they are not being implemented there will be a condition of insecurity at the human level. Human rights are not enough. You also need to deal with the environment, you need to deal with global disease and global poverty and so you can't separate security for citizens in my view from humane global governance.

Even if the state reorients its own concepts of security, it isn't capable of achieving security for its own population without regional and global cooperation in regional and global institutions. So it seems to me that both for states and for citizens, the fundamental challenge is how to move toward a more humane form of global governance. This can't be provided at the present time by the mixture of state action and rather weak international institutions. We are living in a time when citizens, individuals and civil society are both being empowered by new technology, by new information technology, and by more trans-national organisation, but at the same time are being disempowered by the formation of strong global markets. Economic globalisation has basically disempowered people.

As someone has mentioned here, there is a disinterest of citizens in voting in their own elections because this sense of alienation comes from the realisation that the outcome of elections don't mean very much and it's really at two levels. For instance, speaking again of the American situation, it has become clear that you cannot be a credible national candidate if you don't please both the Pentagon and Wall Street. But if you please both of them you can't please a large proportion of the people, so it comes to pass that the outcome of elections is no longer meaningful. Now, it is meaningful because people are displeased about Bush. But there are deeper structural problems. For the rest of the world there is a certain disenfranchisement, because the outcome of their elections are not very

relevant to what happens to their society. They are subject to this global hegemonic order, so they are disempowered. Democracy, unless it's globalised, cannot empower people to control their own destinies. And I think that those issues have to be in some way acknowledged.

Hall Gardner, Professor and Chair of the Department of International Affairs of the American University of Paris, USA

In 2003 I was invited to the Forum, and out of that came my book, *American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism*, this time I've got one called *Toward Confederal World Democracy or a Retreat to History*, and believe me, I wrote the majority of it this weekend. The Vandenberg resolution that I talked about today, in my view, holds all the keys to what should have been done during the Cold War and in the course wasn't, but we can still return to it at least from an American point of view and build it up as a way to move toward a new real global governance and new security system. It's very interesting, not only because that resolution was used to justify NATO that is a regional collective security arrangement for collective self defence, but it was also used 'to strengthen the UN and not use armed force except in the common interest.' The main point here is the progressive development for regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self defence in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, that's number two. Number one was 'voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions', but the fifth one was 'maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the UN with armed forces as provided for by the Charter, to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guarantee against violation'. The last one which I think is the theme of this conference in a way: 'if necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the UN, a review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a general conference called under Article 109 of the Charter by the General Assembly'.

Everything is there, for the restructuring of the United Nations and a move toward regional security communities (this comes from a Karl Deutsch conception.) Let me go through a list of things that I think can move us towards global governance, and what I call "confederal world democracy". The first, is the question on economic interdependence and new perspectives on sovereignty. The second, which I will push right, now is multilateral and multiparty diplomacy, involving the concept of multilateral persuasion and dissuasion. Third, is what I call 'regional security communities' and what I call 'regionally integrated peacekeeping'. Part of the problem with the UN is that it is ad hoc, it is one country at a time there is no vision to create regionally integrated peacekeeping forces. The fifth one, is what I call 'a new multiculturalism' in advanced industrial countries. Suddenly the United States is looking south because of the Hispanic population, and the Asian population is looking East rather than towards Europe. Europe is looking south because of the Muslim population, and this is changing the political dynamics, and opening a new perspective on politics. The second to the last is real dialogue involving different cultures and religions to achieve a rough moral consensus. Finally, a radical reform of the UN that means developing a world citizens' assembly, and that's problematic because it means who is going to pay for it and which groups are going to be represented.

Let me focus on regional security communities Professor Falk mentioned in focusing on those states like Iran and North Korea; in order to prevent those states from acquiring nuclear weapons, we need to create regional security guarantees so that they feel confident that either their neighbours or the United States will not attack them. For that we can use the example of Ukraine: Ukraine was given in 1994 security guarantees by the Permanent UN members in exchange for the Ukraine giving up its weapons and the Ukraine complied. It took a lot of pressure. The US and the Russians really pressurised them and they gave it up. Now the problem is that you had to dialogue with the Ukrainians to get that to happen. You can do the same thing for North Korea and Iran. The Bush administration is moving towards multilateralism, and I call it back door multilateralism and

the United States is allowing Europeans in the case of Iran and Germany in the case of Russia, in the case of North Korea it's the UN plus Japan. They're doing the discussion, the US steps back, they are doing the dialogue, but the key to the problem is that the US doesn't dialogue to give strong security guarantees to both, so then the tension is going to remain. Engagement with Iran: engagement is the key to moving us towards an elimination of these weapons. Those two states, if they do pursue it, will result in regional arms races, much worse than the one they are already in. This is why we have to focus on them, but in the same time in negotiating with them. We have to make some sort of symbolic gesture of moving towards arms reductions and moving towards a denuclearisation of the world if possible. I don't think that it is as possible, but we can at least lower the arms build up. To do this requires real dialogue, both with Tehran and with Pyongyang.

Targeted sanctions are important, but multilateral persuasion and dissuasion are going to be necessary. Dialogue with North Korea and Iran does not preclude reform. One of the arguments of the Bush administration is that they don't want to deal with dictators. In the case of engagement with Ukraine, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons and the Orange Revolution came ten years later. Dialoguing with North Korea and Iran does not necessarily preclude the possibility that North Korea and Iran will ultimately reform in a more positive manner at some time in the future. It may or may not happen, but the point is we can at least try and get them to eliminate their weapons and prevent a regional arms race.

Aung Tun Thet, *Senior Advisor United Nations System Staff College, Myanmar*

My perspective is slightly different: first, when I think we had this discussion on human security, I thought that we would talk about peace, because to me that's what's in the UN Charter, it's not just about security, it's about having peace for the whole world. The whole issue of non-violence is missing from the dialogue, how can we create a peaceful world where we deal with issues of conflict through debate in a non-violent way? All of us know about these so called freedoms, and I love this because it was Kofi Annan who talked about the freedoms of Roosevelt: freedom from want, from poverty, freedom from fear, through managing and preventing conflicts and freedom to live in a society based on human rights and good governance. I think the framework captures very much a sense of security without talking very much about development. You cannot deal with security without talking about human rights, so I must stress the whole idea of trying to position security within the larger holistic framework; I think it is very important for us as we are very concerned with the issue of disarmament, which has disappeared from the agenda. For example, 80% of small arms in the world are produced by the Permanent Five. How can the Security Council members go around talking about violence and security when they are going about producing these arms which are killing thousands and millions of people? So again, let us re-visit this concept of revisiting the Charter, it is not only about this concept of peace: it is about non-violence.

One concern which is related to development: even in countries which are successful, like China and India, we look now at the growing disparity between the quality of life of the rich and the poor. The richer are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer. How do we address this? I was telling Professor Falk that I am old enough to be an ex Marxist. In those days we talked about some egalitarianism and idealism, but the growing inequality is about is a matter of concern in both the developing and developed countries. I was once in Armenia, the number of Mercedes Benz per capita in Yerevan is five times the number of Mercedes Benz in Oslo. If you go in the streets of Yerevan everything is so filthy rich. This factor at the nation state level creates huge security issues unless you also elevate the community.

Related to this is what we call: *problems without passports*. It is drug and human trafficking, these problems do not recognise any frontiers, HIV/Aids, issues of terrorism are global phenomena with no frontiers. All these issues have a trans-national nature with no boundaries. And how do you deal with the so called 'southern emergencies?' We need to deal with the southern emergencies that do not get the attention of the media and the press. How do we address that?

Regarding the issues of global governance and the global architecture, I would still ask: can we think of more creative ways of developing certain networks? If I could highlight a certain key group that I have not heard here so far: the voices of the young, the youth. It is too late for us. How do we catch them young so we can talk about non-violence and the resolution of conflicts? How do we help them deal with negotiation? What about the voices of the poor, the marginalised, how do we do this?

I also hope that the organisers will focus on the gender dimension of human security. Because it hits the females more than males unfortunately, so how do you deal with the gender issues that are there?

I notice that our Chair this morning was thinking about information sharing, from our concern I think we should be talking about more knowledge management. Because there is a lot of knowledge around the table, how do we manage this knowledge in what we call communities of practice? How to bring the media to create awareness, to create or advocate? These will be issues to discuss.

We don't have a structural network, but I would say that we have functional networks of experts. Especially for those that are affected by security. We are sitting around the table all the so called 'experts', but we don't hear from the women. Someone spoke about landmines, but what about cluster bombs? There are many in Lebanon, and the armament industry deliberately makes them in plastic so that they cannot be detected by metal detectors. To deal with these issues would be the real issue for us.

My final remark would be: how do we build capacities? What we call early warning capability. With these issues, there is such a wealth of issues in the global community, can we not have a monitoring system, like with the tsunamis? Once we know that some countries are going to collapse, there would be human security issues. Can we then be more proactive in trying to pick up the pieces when countries collapse?

Finally, where is the role of the UN? I think there is still a misperception of the UN, which is dictated by the member states, which is the General Assembly. The Secretary General does not have this 100% free reign. He is not a CEO, if he is one, he is a CEO with 192 CEOs watching over his shoulder. So how do you have a restructured UN? The process to reform the management of the UN was dead on arrival. The developing countries did not accept it because they were worried that all the powers that they had would be vested in the Secretary General. So I think that the new Secretary General should start this management reform again. How can this Forum help the UN as one of the many actors in the global governance? To be more efficient and finally make a difference for peace. That is my plea.

Adam LeBor, *Journalist for The Times, writer, UK*

Do you think this problem about drugs is controllable, manageable or winnable? What's your forecast over the next few years? Just how much of a threat does this represent?

Georges Estievenart, *Honorary Executive Director of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Senior Lecturer, France*

Again a solution to this doesn't exist, my personal feeling after having been working in this field for fifteen years is that, in general, we are not taking the problems seriously. There is an official report, than you should take into consideration the conclusions of it when you are receiving it or just making a statement. The situation in Europe I think is the situation also at the UNDP, the main purpose of this programme is not to solve the problem, but to be proactive, to do things, but not to pose too many hard questions on particular topics, and in particular the relationship of the US on this is important.

So what I think could be done at least could be to try and improve on that situation, to try and establish around the problem at least a network of information that would be on a kind of free basis for people when they are taking a position on these issues, that at least they do respect while they are producing a solution that they have in place and so on.

There is also the political option around the drugs problem. There will be a strong dispute I guess. In recent years there has been a strategy established at the world level to have very ambitious targets, when nobody cares, to eliminate fully 80% of the production or consumption. This is crazy and irresponsible. I think with the pressure of the media, of the public opinion of the citizens this can be changed, slightly at least, to go back to reality at least and maybe to find a better solution.

When you see how it's possible to change completely a picture in a very few years and to eliminate completely a country and its surroundings, how this can be solved in the next twenty years? I do not know.

Hall Gardner, *Professor and Chair of the Department of International Affairs of the American University of Paris, USA*

There is talk right now about trying to forge a regional security community and to bring the Black Sea basin states neighbouring Europe into some sort of cooperation against smuggling, drug trafficking and women trafficking etc. There are two different visions to do this: one of NATO getting into the Black Sea and stopping the flow. The other is a vision of the states themselves which includes Russia and Turkey. So there are two competing visions and Russia and Turkey have blocked the NATO proposal. So looking at that error, it looks like Russia and Turkey have a lot of interest in keeping this problem going.

The question will be whether those two states can cooperate with the other states to deal with this problem, or whether NATO has to be part of it or not. But there is at least a vision there to integrate the Black Sea states together, in what I call regional communities.

Georges Estievenart, *Honorary Executive Director of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Senior Lecturer, France*

At the level of the European Union there is a possible better way, this way is using the process of negotiating further accessions to the European Union, actually the drug problem and the organised crime problem should really be on the top of the agenda, especially with the entry of Turkey for example. This was not the case with the negotiations for accession with those countries, first you need to make people conscious about this situation because nobody knows that. The link between security and health protection is a really strong one, because all of this is generating a strong increase in the activities of the Russian, Albanian and Turkish mafia and so on who are just working with this. If you are opening the doors completely towards this, which I couldn't imagine, when you look back at how difficult it has been to stabilise the situation in Europe over the last thirty years and when you see this is increasing again, you see the same way of taking this injection again, for example with HIV contamination some 60% of the Ukraine or the Russian Federation cases are from people injecting heroin. This is crazy.

Roberto Savio, *Journalist, Chairman of Inter Press Service, Italy*

Firstly, in this moment of the present intergovernmental system we are going to discuss damage. This situation could become worse than this. In Porto Alegre we are going to discuss this, if this reform is done only by the intergovernmental system we are going to be in deep trouble. Secondly, everywhere we go in analysis we reach the point in communication, in fact, globalisation has produced an ironic situation where coverage of international affairs in a number of pages has shrunk. There is a precise study where now, for instance, the only efficient scenario for having the united states of the world, is where 10% would vote for it not being American. It could then become a world leader, become there would be some connection of feeling of America as leader, because people would be out of the United States. American media is the worst, if you take all 22 papers, the average is two pages of international affairs. Let us not even talk about the TV news system and so on.

Thirdly, at Interpress News Service we are doing an open news source on the website and now we have twenty-five million read pages per month, three hundred million pages per year. It's much more than any individual paper that I know of. The problem is how do you communicate with the people? We, the World Political Forum, have to do something to bring the debate of our chairs. There are a number of things that we have to address. The meeting we had on perestroika, was about the lessons we could learn from history and how we could apply them for the future. We have to do something to bring ideas out of ourselves. We have to find a way to communicate the debate into the perception of people, now I am starting from that idea about peace.

I think peace is something that we understand now more than ever. When the march on peace was organised, and according to the UK Times there were 110 million people, Mr. Bush said it was a hoax group. The relation of power to public opinion is of course a very important process. How can we communicate the debate by the way to public opinion? I am a journalist, we need something that will catch the eye of the people, maybe we can think of peace as the element of the human security. Because peace is not only absence of war, but peace is a positive progressive concept, so more or less, if we link to what Hall Gardner and Richard Falk have been saying with regard to the cost of war, we could ask that 10% of the budget of war is dedicated to peace, not 50/50, but 90% for war and 10% for peace. Everybody will say that you are for war. In Somalia we spent \$900,000,000 to deliver \$90,000,000 of food. In Yugoslavia we spent 5% on reconstruction and in Iraq, if you take Joseph Stiglitz figure of one trillion dollars, 10% of one trillion dollars, is one billion dollars for peace.

If we could link the idea that security is linked to war and to peace, that they are the two arms of security. We are always mesmerised by war, and we should forget peace. I don't think it would work, but people would understand that our proposal is to use peace as another arm of security, because peace brings human security. If we were to take this approach as a way to work outside, maybe it would work. It is an idea.

Aung Tun Thet, *Senior Advisor United Nations System Staff College, Myanmar*

First of all, I think we have to choose peace as human security, not by imposition or arms; we need the peace to come from self governing democracy and security. The drugs are bad, the mafia are worse for global security. What do you think about this proposal to put the drugs into a free market, to destroy the mafia and transfer this money and use it to empower the people, through drug programmes and communications about those programmes?

Georges Estievenart, *Honorary Executive Director of the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Senior Lecturer, France*

The problem that I see, is that to reach this proposed alternative depends on public opinion, it is not always possible to make that change, it may be possible on a single country level, but is not possible at the world level. In the case of Afghanistan for example, there was a study on the idea of buying opium in Afghanistan and selling it to poor countries as morphine, the painkiller. From the economic point of view this could work, the problem is that nobody is ready to go in that direction. In 2008 the situation also can change, because in 2008 everybody is going back to a UN conference to study the previous strategy for the last ten years. We are nearly there, but a change could come at a certain stage. This is probably not going to have a great change, but at least it is most likely that the existing system will be questioned, more seriously than it was last time. In the meantime, what are you are doing with these existing figures? My point of view is that you should try to be good with what you have in place, which is not the case today, and this I insist on very much. We need to improve mechanisms and establish appropriate strategies based on a real assessment and based on actual information.

Anna Caffarena, *Professor of International Relations at Turin University, Italy*

Generally speaking, I think we all believe that we have to go through a radical rethinking of security and the common basis is that of human security. Going beyond modern interstate politics to what we call governance. On governance we can of course work in different perspectives. We can talk of sustainable peace, as in not just the absence of war, peace as in some justice to it. When thinking of peace, I think we have to think out how to implement all these things, and the environment, which will be changing. Another problem is: who is going to provide all this? States or individuals? We have spoken more on communities and their involvement in international politics, not only in a good sense but this can do a lot of harm as well. There is a problem of leadership and the problem of inclusion of universality as a value in the internationally community.

Transnational Institutions in the Global World: New Missions, Failures, Reforms

Chairperson: **Vladimir Petrovsky**, *Former Director-General of the UN in Geneva and President of the Conference on Disarmament, Russia*

We discuss today about trans-national institutions in a global world: missions, failures, reforms. According to me this is the right moment for such a discussion in order to put in practice our ideas. As you know, the new Secretary General of the UN has just been chosen and he will soon start his work.

Therefore this period of passage from the old to the new Secretary-General is the best one to present our ideas and it would be extremely interesting if the new Secretary General and his *entourage* could be informed about the results of our discussions on the new world political architecture.

I'd like our discussion to be very pragmatic, we are all experts, the most important thing is how to act, how to reach concrete results. We've talked about the new world political architecture, you know that the academic community discusses about this: some prefer talking about a new scenery, a new scene, but it seems to me that talking about an architecture is the right definition, because architecture always has to search for the "happy medium" and in the building industry this allows to keep the balance among the structures and, in politics, to be always able to find the best way.

We look at the world changing rapidly, we realize that the changes are huge and we often use expressions that are obsolete while the reality is absolutely different.

Talking about trans-national institutions, I'd like to highlight the fact that they have been and still are the most important actors of global interaction. But we can but note that today they are going through great changes, they're changing both in quantity and in quality.

First of all I'd like to say that there are new actors on the scene, this is evident; some years ago we just had the UN and its 16 agencies, today the situation is completely different. There are grouping of countries, organizations that act as autonomous institutions in the field of international relationships.

Naturally there are new trans-national phenomena, new ideas that become international structures, such as the Forum of Davos. The new actor today is represented by the civil organizations, the NGOs, the non-governmental associations, that deal both with the UN and with other international structures. I think we must consider these structures.

Then we can not deny that the mass media are today among the principle actors, because they create the "information field" in which we live, and we have to add that we deal a lot with the image, which is created through the means of communication.

Moreover lately new tendencies have emerged, such as the organization of indigenous people: an organization which was created and that is causing problems both to Moscow and Washington. Today the native populations have the possibility to have their voice heard not only in the countries where they live, but all around the world. The association for local power was created in Barcelona, in order to have its interests represented.

Finally, as you can see, actors are changing.

But I would particularly stress the fact that the principle actor today is represented by the new regionalism. This is something to discuss. When the UN was created, only two organizations existed: the Arab League and the organization of the American countries. Nowadays we have more than fifty regional organizations.

New trans-continental organizations appeared as well: take the NATO, it keeps its old name, but its functions are now different. It is a trans-national structure which produces its effect on Europe, too.

Then there is the movement of non-aligned countries, they recently held a meeting that was joined by 116 countries. There are still other trans-national organizations, the European Union is even a trans-continental one, somehow.

Regional organizations grow very fast and from my experience – I started working in regional organizations – I know that, differently from the old regionalism, when belonging to just one regional association was allowed, today there's more freedom of adhesion, you can be a member of the NATO and at the same time be part of other regional organizations. Everything is inter-related.

A new phenomenon, in trans-national organizations, is the role of local power: take the Baltic Union as an example, where not only Russia participates, but also the local authorities of the city of Kaliningrad. The development of trans-frontiers cooperation is a really interesting phenomenon, that allows to define common positions, for example in the sanitary field, and this gives new possibilities to the interaction and integration.

We talk about empires, but the tendency to integration, to create a common economic space, has always existed in the world, the European Union is the most evident example.

Today, with the opening of the frontiers, we are immersed in one economic-political space. I don't agree with the comparison of the global village, I'd like to confront our planet with a space shuttle.

Nowadays our planet represents a big space shuttle moving in our galaxy, and it is not important which class we are flying, if economy or business class, we have to think about the security of our shuttle. Defining our national interests is natural, but not only from the point of view of the economic progress, we have to think about the global context, because without this kind of approach we will never be successful.

Obviously the various institutions have to face new missions, new tasks: the UN, which was created with the purpose of reconciling the interests of the countries, today must turn into a centre for action. We've talked about peacekeeping operations: there are 19 peacekeeping operation and 92.000 men are joining them.

Many countries are facing a change of their political, economic and social structures; I am still an advisor of the UN and whenever I have a meeting with the members of the Parliament, I tell them to consider the 16 regional agencies of the UN: the UN provides a unique example of mechanisms; obviously its process of adaptation started after the end of the cold war. We've talked about the problems of peace, I'm concerned about the fact that after the cold war we talked about preventive diplomacy, because obviously for civilised countries preventive diplomacy is like an interference in internal affairs.

Some interesting proposals have been made: creating de-militarized zones – these are exceptional examples, given by Middle East and Finland. Obviously this idea was never realized.

I'm talking about these things because we don't only have to think about the negative things of the past, but we must treasure all the UN positive experiences.

Even if it started in the Nineties, today the UN process of adaptation is complicated, also by the lack of political willingness, by an obsolete management and by some episodes of corruption – just think about the scandal of Iraq. But everybody makes mistakes, both people and institutions, the important thing is to admit the errors and, on this basis, make the necessary conclusions to avoid the same errors in the future.

I believe we have to talk about the reform of the UN, but without repeating obvious or useless things. The new Secretary-General is one of the most responsible political leaders and I think he will be able to take the best from the experience of every country.

I hope our discussion could be a kind of brain storming which provides material of reflection for the UN in this period of transition.

Stephane Hessel, Ambassador, France

I think that we have to arrive to the core of the problems as soon as possible. I would like to start analyzing what we have in front of us. You reminded us that we have a new Secretary-General, who for the first time has been appointed two months before the start of his mandate, which is unusual, and who is going to find a world situation in which one is wondering which could be the most efficacious role for the United Nations.

Everyone said this morning that the UN have the legitimacy: they were founded on a Charter that links all of us, all the states, and there's no other place in the world where the 192 states sovereign of the world do meet.

Therefore I believe that we must try and give as much efficaciousness as possible to this organization. I would like to point out an innovation: the creation of the Human Rights Council. The problem of human rights is a fundamental one for the UN, they were created to protect and promote human rights, not only to preserve peace. So the UN have a mission in this sense. A mission which has not been sufficiently carried out.

I would suggest that we could propose that the Human Rights Council, with its 47 members, has the strongest function as possible, which should be central within the UN system, that is to say, it must have repercussions on the ensemble of international organizations which are part of the system.

I remind, above all to the younger ones here, the architecture of the United Nations, which had from its origin two types of institutions: cultural, social and work institutions, and financial and commercial ones. According to me the problem is that the financial and commercial institutions are not headed by a central organization, which could give them the necessary information so that their job, which is essential, respect the human rights.

I think we will recommend some modification of the trans-national institutions, and I would suggest that we start from the Organization of the United Nations, which is the most important of the trans-national organizations, and that we propose that the recently created Human Rights Council has a better use, and that who, in the family of the UN, deals with problems which are directly related to the respect of the fundamental rights of men, work more closely with the Council of Human Rights.

We have a High Commissioner for Human Rights, it is an important personality, she can lean on the Council. I think it is our interest that she is given central missions, which are essential for the existence of a global village, because there's no answer to global challenge that does not deal with the respect of human rights.

Lakdar Brahimi, *Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Algeria*

This morning, talking about the UN, two points have been raised: the first one by Mr Gardner, who spoke about the particular situation of the US and about the necessity of this state to play its role and to be a complete member in order for the UN to be able to play their role.

The other question concerned the legitimacy of an international organization which wants to play an important role in peace keeping.

I think these are most essential questions nowadays.

The legitimacy of the UN is actually questioned, above all in the field of peacekeeping, which I know a bit. Not long ago, the white cars, the white Toyotas with the logo of the UN, were the best protection for the UN staff when they were in a war zone. Nowadays the white cars and the flag of the UN are turning into a target. This is a big problem.

This happens because people think more and more that the UN lost their independence and impartiality, and it is absolutely essential that the UN re-establish this legitimacy of an organization that all the world respects and honours. And in order to obtain this the help of all its members is necessary. Because the UN have not a particular interest or objective, they do not defend anyone's interests, and people who work at the UN know that we are supposed not to accept and above all not to ask for instructions to any member country.

Therefore, if the UN and their bodies are perceived as being at the service of one or more members, instead of being at the service of the whole humanity, there is a problem. And this problem consists essentially in the relationship with the United States.

In New York you often hear people of the member countries or people working at the UN saying that the Americans don't want the United Nations headquarters there, that the UN offices must be moved and that the participation of the US to the work of the UN is not so important.

The Organization can leave New York, this is not a problem, but it cannot live without the United States. We must not think to the possibility of a universal organization without the US, it is still the greatest power in the world, it is one of the founders of the United Nations, and it is important that the United States go on being members.

But it is important as well that the US accept to be members of this organization they contributed to create, and to obey to the rules which they contributed to establish. Unfortunately there's a different tendency, which is not only Bush administration's – maybe Bush administration pushed it to the extreme, but it existed before. Americans consider themselves as being outside of international right, which can not be necessarily applied to the US. And there's a tendency that is even more serious, nowadays in the American parliament: the majority of the American parliamentarians believes that the US have a calling to make laws for the whole world.

I think that a mutual apprenticing is necessary between the US and the rest of the international community. The international community must accept that the US is a giant which cannot be reduced to the proportion of a minority, but this giant must accept that other people are part of the organization together with him, and he must accept the rules.

Finally, I think that the UN's trustworthiness is going to depend on these two questions: how to live with the US, how to make of the US a complete member that accepts the international right and accept to be subject to it, but also that the UN or better the rest of the international community accepts and learns to live with this giant.

Flavio Lotti, *National Coordinator Table for Peace, Italy*

I'd like to seize this occasion to thank the organizers of the World Political Forum: coming here to Bosco Marengo was very useful to me, I'll go back home richer than I was before. The reason why I was invited to this meeting is because my experience is linked to the processes of organization of the civil society, the ones that today are called "civil society movements".

I joined, since its foundation, the Organizing Committee of the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre; in Italy I am the coordinator of a net of more than 400 organizations of the civil society and more than 650 municipalities, provinces and regions. Every two years, we organize the March for Peace from Perugia to Assisi, which last year gathered more than two hundred thousands people; I am a member of international organizations, such as Global Call to Action Against Poverty, that last year promoted a big mobilization, in order to urge governments to respect the Millennium Declaration. I am also a member of the World Council of "United Cities and Local Governments", the one that Vladimir Petrovsky was mentioning before, which has its seat in Barcelona and whose President is the mayor of Paris: since ten years, we promote an initiative called "the UN Assembly of People", whose first meeting Vladimir Petrovsky attended as a UN Commission of Disarmament's representative in Geneva.

I made this presentation just to explain where do my reflections and proposals come from: they are not my own, but an expression of this mobilization.

I'd like to answer to the questions: "what to do and how to do it" from this point of view.

What has been said today is correct: the Un is going through a deep crisis of credibility, first of all within the international system and then in the public opinion all over the world.

This crisis is part of the problem that we have to solve; it's at least 50 years since we've been talking about reforming, enforcing, democratizing the UN, I think that all the possible ideas were conceived and written, reports exist, ten years ago there already were a lot of reports.

Boutros Ghali wrote an Agenda for Peace, then an Agenda for Development, then an Agenda for Democratization, three documents which resumed a great number of the proposals which could have given force and credibility to the UN.

The problem is that this reports are now just materials for libraries, for scholars, but still they're not political reality. Therefore there is a big credibility crisis which must be faced and the problem is: *how*, not *what* we still have to propose. But how we can realize all these proposals, or at least some of these proposals.

I believe that, after 50 years of attempts to reform the UN, we have to recognize that, without a concrete mobilization of the public opinion worldwide, to obtain a real change of the UN in the sense that we wish will be impossible.

This is my thesis: without a mobilization of the public opinion worldwide, the governments alone accumulated a lot of failures, this is the reason why since ten years we are trying to create a civil society mobilization, which unfortunately still has not achieved a great success.

Why? Because, for example, the World Political Forum works in a room, and the organizations of the civil society – like Porto Alegre Forum - work in another room, and it seems like there are no communication doors. Today we have to open a door for communication, we have to recognize that your ideas, your study, your action, must be more and more connected with the action of the civil society.

I'd like to make a proposal – Federico Mayor is here, he coordinates an important network which works for the mobilization of the civil society: the Ubuntu – last year we worked, together with the Ubuntu, to promote a campaign called "*Reclaim our UN*". The UN was

kidnapped by some nations, or better by one nation in certain occasions; we have to obtain that the people get back the UN, because it is a necessary instrument to solve their problems on a global scale.

We promoted a provocative campaign to move the UN seat – we want the USA to remain in the UN, but you know that the City Council of New York is even going on and obstructing the restoration of the UN Head Quarters - but not in any place: let's take it to Jerusalem, where the heart of the longest of the conflict is, a conflict which the UN should have prevented and solved.

It's a provocation, but just imagine which great power could have the moving of the UN seat to Jerusalem, so transform the city in the capital of the world, an international, open city – obviously capital of the two states that the UN created with its resolution: Israel and Palestine – and moral capital of the humanity.

What is the concrete proposal that I make to you? We propose that the General Assembly of the UN establishes a body which could be called: Global Convention on the UN Future.

The model to follow is the attempt of the European Union to establish an European Convention for the writing up of its Constitution.

This Global Convention should be the place where not only the states and governments, but also the international organizations which are interested in contributing to the reform of the UN, the parliaments, the local authorities and the organizations of the civil society meet.

The proposal wants to take note of the fact that the governments haven't been able yet to break the deadlock in the process of reform, therefore they have to involve in the process all the new international actors that today are interested to the enforcement and relaunching of the UN, to their development.

It's a feasible proposal, nobody can oppose the veto to this proposal; it depends on the General Assembly, and so on the majority of the member states, who could and should be interested in strengthening the process enforcement, reform and democratization of the UN.

The process of realization of this great Universal Convention should go together with our mobilization: we could create national, regional, local auditions in all the regions of the world, and make humanity join the discussion, take the discussion on the reform out of the restricted circle of the "experts". This is the challenge.

We're trying to do it, but we need your help: we need to connect our work to those of all the groups, the movements, the local authorities, the civil society, that, in the end, always face the same problem: which alternatives can we create to this situation? If we don't like the US' unilateralism, which is the alternative?

And if only the UN can be the alternative, then we have to make the UN really become the object of the commitment to change of all of us.

It's the challenge that I propose to you, adding a concrete willingness: we're organizing the World Social Forum's next edition, which will take place in Africa, namely in Nairobi, for the first time, from 20 to 25 January.

Come there with us, in order to organize, with the African people, the next meeting of the WPF, and give voice to Africa, the most emarginated part of this world, relaunching from Africa the necessity of a democratic governance that starts from the periphery but looks at a common world.

Moreover, we offer you the possibility of joining us in the organization of the new edition of our March for Peace. More than 200.000 people will be there, if you'll join us we'll be even more and our message could become stronger.

Olivier Giscard d'Estaing, *Chair of COPAM (Comité d'Action pour un Parlement Mondial), France*

I do not believe that the reform of the UN can reach the objectives that we demand. And this is due to various reasons. The first one: I don't think we can make 192 countries agree on the reform, anyway this is a very difficult issue to discuss.

Second reason: the US don't want it. If you pose them the question of the principles that we want to introduce in a reform of the UN, this is not acceptable. And we must not write a reform against the United States, because I recognize their role and the necessity to maintain the United Nations in their structure evolved and improved.

As an example, we could improve the ECOSOC, which would represent much better civil society, the world of labour unions and of enterprises. These are things which can be done.

Which are the causes of deep changes? Wars, revolution and the vision of some heads of states who take political decisions that change the world. These are the three issues.

I do not want the war, I do not think a global revolution is possible, it would be necessary that a leader with a vision propose something. Why? Because actually the problem we have is an institutional vacuum.

No institution has the political power or the financial means to deal with the problems of energy, environment, world commerce and all the problems we are worried about, therefore there is a vacuum.

Again about reforms: we wanted to reform the Catholic Church – in the XVI or XVII century – but really we did not reform it, we created the Protestant Churches at its side, which remain in the framework of Christianity.

We talk about architecture. Building new things it's easier than modifying old ones, this is expensive, it takes a long time and not always one succeeds. Therefore I think that we have to be courageous if we want to make some proposals and say: "We want the creation of a new world institution, that we need in order to solve the problems of the world, with a world taxation system, a world parliament, a world parliamentary assembly, a world commission and a world government".

But I will develop these points tomorrow in the plenary session.

Still I would like to stress this idea: there are two ways. One is to reform. I want to point out the great action of the Secretary General Kofi Annan, who did great efforts for the reform, who invited the committees, who made some reports, I have seen many reports.

I think that we need an approach that the Secretary General can not accomplish: he is under the General Assembly's orders. If you look at the text of the Charter, he has not so much power. He attends, he listens, but he has little initiative power.

So I think that, in the present world context, some reforms of the UN can answer to the needs of our global society.

Hubert Vedrine, *Former Foreign Minister of France*

I think we do not have to fix impossible objectives for the UN, because this inevitably leads us to condemn them.

If we believe that, by some kind of magic, the United Nations can impose the respect of human rights according to our rules in an overnight, the failure is guaranteed and we will say that the UN are inept; this is not a good approach.

The same thing happens in the field of peacekeeping: we often entrusted the UN with impossible tasks when peacekeeping was needed where there was not peace, and maintaining peace is not the same as creating peace.

Therefore we have to fix realistic and reasonable aims just to save the multilateral system, which we very much need. It seems to me that in our world multilateral system clashes with many obstacles.

I spoke about the first one: the illusions. There are many others. When we gather the 192 countries of the United Nations – we call them “united” for wishful thinking, I guess – we have on one side some governments which are too strong, which somehow correspond to countries where the societies are too weak, and where the administration is very badly organized. Very often these are the countries of what we call the “South” of the world, but this expression does not have any sense nowadays. On the other side, when we deal with too developed countries, the Western countries and others, which are very media-oriented, we have very strong societies and governments which in reality are weak, because they are very influenced by the public opinion. Very often the opinion changes, these are opinion-governments, often opinion tyrannies, but they are not efficacious in any case.

So, when you gather 192 countries that, for one or the other reason, are incapable or do not want to apply the texts which they adopted together, the result is not good.

There’s an illusion on multilateralism; it is necessary, it is irreplaceable, but maybe this can correspond to a sort of mutualisation of the impotence of the governments, and it is difficult to understand how civil society could replace this.

It would be wonderful if it could strengthen a multilateral system that works well, if it could bolster, stimulate, force it to go further. One can not substitute it to a tired multilateral system, so I contribute to our discussion with a paradox: in order to have an efficacious multilateralism, we need strong governments and not the contrary.

Last point: the question of the United States. I totally agree with Lakdar Brahimi, the US have a totally different conception. Obviously the Bush administration gave a grotesque expression of it, but it is true that there is a background conception of ultra-sovereignty and unilateralism. However this is the natural tendency of the great powers, or of those small countries that think that for their security they must be free to decide, such as Israel. There are other examples.

The United States consider multilateralism as optional for them. They use it if it is good for them, otherwise they just pass by. We can not imagine things without the United States, this is a periodical tendency in the West, that of saying: “let’s create an organization among ourselves, excluding all the countries that are still not democratic as the Western”. This is an impasse, the exact contrary of the United Nations, but it is a temptation that exists.

Finally, two issues to conclude. I believe we must reflect, regarding the American public opinion, on which is the work to do on the elected persons of every kind.

There are other lobbies, apart from ourselves, which succeed in doing a very efficacious work on the American elected persons, with regrettable results, but I imagine a clever lobby of the United Nations. It is not a work to be done in ten years, to convince the

American public opinion, the new elected persons, that the place of the US is inside a new multilateralism, really playing its role.

We will not obtain this within a fortnight, and even if we wait for a miracle by the next Democratic president we will be deceived, because this will not change but the style, it will not change the basis, so the question is: how can we cleverly act on the American opinion. Finally, and I think Mr Giscard d'Estaing mentioned it, the reform of the ECOSOC is not up to its tasks, what is missing is a kind of body which should search for a coherence among what happens in the WTO, in the International Labour Organization, in an eventual Organization for the Environment, if it will be created, and in other important bodies of the UN, and if these bodies do not exist, the only real arbitrage is within the WTO, that is no more satisfying.

Therefore, we must not completely reject the idea of a Council of the ECOSOC not strongly renovated, but with a completely new level, gathered to create this place of synthesis, with Heads of States and Governments, because reforming is extremely difficult. These big organizations were created after the World Wars, and we must not wait for another world war to create a good international organization.

Tomorrow maybe we will examine the idea of creating something new, but of improving the existing organisms as well.

François Trémeaud, *Former Executive Director of the International Labour Organization (ILO)*

Many times we have said today that reforming the UN is extremely difficult, if not impossible, and someone also said that a good approach could be that of trying to improve the functioning of what already exists and already gave some good results in certain cases.

I come from a long experience in the International Labour Organization, of which the civil society is part, because there are the organizations of employees and workers, and I would like to propose three ideas for some improvements which seem to be indispensable, necessary but also possible.

The first thing is that the system is complicated. Mr Chairman, you mentioned 16 specialized institutions, in addition to the United Nations, and the first measure must be that every State coordinates well the national delegations that represent its government at these bodies. This habit does not exist.

Every country sends the representatives of the concerned Ministries, who do not discuss and concert the meeting together. On behalf of the single nations, there is never an effort to conceive the global position of the country in front of the great challenges of today and of the globalization and of the multilateral systems, and starting from there, the instructions that are related, coordinated, complementary, articulated in the different delegations that take part to the various bodies. Because, after all, the same countries are the members of these institutions and in the moment in which we talk about the gap that exist between the United Nations on one side and the Bretton Woods organizations on the other side, of course the system of governance is not the same, but the (members of the) organizations are the same.

Therefore it seems to me that this is something to do, in order to avoid a dispersion of mandates, an overlapping.

Nowadays in the world of work, in the field the BIT deals with, there is much more action, much more competence, much more money within the World Bank on these precise questions, and this is not natural, it is not normal, a remedy is necessary.

I agree with Mr Vedrine that we have to find the means to well coordinate the big organizations such as the WTO, the UN, the World bank and the ILO.

The second measure that, according to me, is necessary and possible, is to stop this system of financing according to which the big contributors demand to the international institutions to reduce as possible their budget of normal functioning – is what we call “growth zero”, which in fact after a bit of time turned into a decrease - and then give some voluntary contributions which widely consist in buying programmes, pushing the institutions to do what they want, in short-circuiting the normal process of decision of the multilateral system, and as a consequence the officers of the institutions which have no money rush towards the sponsors in order to do what each one of the sponsors wants to do, augmenting more and more the disorder.

The third point – and I would stop here – is the question of training of young people, because nowadays the international officers are formed and competent for their institutions, but not for the system. We never give them a total vision of the mandates of the different institutions of the system, the possibility to understand their complementarities, their articulation, and consequently there the capacity to act together.

Therefore, today, concerning the reform of the United Nations, we try to fix everything by saying: there will be a new head, an external coordinator, a national programme and a bureau of the UN. But this is just formalism: what is important is that people know the competencies and methods of functioning of the other institutions and are able to join and

organize the actions of the different organizations.

I think that, if we act on the level of a good national organization and of an appropriate reflection of what a State's politics must be towards the international organization, if we are able to give a system of resources which is sufficient and which really is in the multilateral framework, and above all if we succeed in creating international officers who are men of the system and not men of the single institutions, then, we will avoid giving arguments to the ones who want to obstacle the multilateral system, or reduce it to invoke its weakness and its contradictions.

Gyula Horn, *Former Prime Minister of Hungary*

We must say that the questions that were asked and the themes that we debated have been extremely important. I understood that talking about the relationship with the US is very important. Another theme is the fight against international terrorism, we need help in order to solve this problem, that affects everyone of us. The problem is that not all the states are able to act as they should, therefore a reform is necessary. Terrorism is international, while the fight against terrorism is national, this is one of the aspects.

I'd also like to ask if you are informed about who pays and how to the UN, because a new politic started, there are new structures that cost a lot. I can tell you that it is not fair when a great country gives an ultimatum to some single Arab states, it's not right, it's not correct, because not all the Islamic are terrorist, quite the contrary.

We have to keep in mind that the politics toward the East must answer to the needs of every single state of the Middle East; as I said before, in our country there's the big problem of social contradiction. These are the origin of many problems, we must begin to face them. Technology goes ahead quickly and in fact we have to find new forms for the social system.

How to do it? This depends on the scientists, we have to work on this basis: how to give a new content to jobs.

The problem is not only the salary, but it also affects, in the social sphere, education, which is a new aspect for us.

We must consider all these problems because a lot of negative consequences were born from these contradictions.

Second thing: it never happened that man acted against nature, here in the West some say that to be member of the European Union is enough to have the protection of the environment.

I'd like to say that the answer to globalization is the integration in a unique system.

Regarding governments, we often forget that what we decide in our agreements must be realized. We must not go far from our main goal and consider feasible proposals.

Jianmin Wu, *Executive Vice-President of China National Association for International Studies, President of BIE (International Bureau of Exhibitions), China*

First, I think it is time to clarify things out, with regard to international organizations. It is true that these organizations don't achieve yet all expectations, but still not all is lost. UN has achieved already quite a lot of important tasks, and other organizations alike.

In my opinion, to face humanity's big challenges it might be necessary first to select among the existing international organizations, and in this view I would like to remember the BIE (*Bureau International des Expositions*), which I chair.

This organization is shortly mentioned in the international processes, but yet it is one of the oldest organizations in the world. It has been founded in 1931, and its charge is to regularize, promote and organize several Universal Expos.

This year we celebrate the 75th anniversary of this organization. Expos present some extraordinary advantages: today, in the world, which are the most important events? There are the Olympics; there are Universal Expos. Last year we had the Expo in Aichi - how many people visited this Expo? 22 million during six months. And we will have the Expo in Shanghai in 2010, where we foresee more or less 70 millions visitors. What characterizes Universal Expos? They gather men and women from all over the world, regardless of their race, of their beliefs, of their nationality, who meet with the only goal of searching for cooperation, for mutual understanding. In my opinion, these are the things the world has the greatest need of.

These kinds of events unite men and women all across the Earth. Today there are already too many things that divide our world, but there are also things that can unite us. The Expos are one of these. This is the reason why I think that it is necessary to fully enhance what works, what unites men and women over the world.

It is necessary to valorise to the maximum these processes, because in this way we all get closer. These kind of realities are needed nowadays.

Then, in my opinion, it is also necessary to reinforce cooperation at international organizations' level. Presently everyone works isolated in his own corner, there is little coordination. For example, on the occasion of the Expo, 70 millions people got together: we could seize the occasion to realize so many important things within it, but still no one thinks about this possibility. If there is any Forum that is committed to gather together the international organizations so that they can uphold each other, to put forward the advantages of all of them and to put these advantages together, I think that this would gradually allow a real change in our world.

In my opinion the world is facing so many problems, what can we do with them? It is necessary to identify the common interests, to develop them and to maximize them. This could be a valid approach.

You evoked relations with the United States. My Country has developed cooperation with the United States. We have some divergences. What is the Chinese approach towards the United States? We tell our American friends: "Look, we have some divergences, but we also have common interests. In our opinion, our common interests largely overtake our divergences, therefore it is proper to work on our common interests".

The divergences, the differences, since we live in a world that is so different and various, will always exist! We won't never manage to cancel our differences, but if we manage to gradually develop our common interests, then gradually the confidence will grow, just as someone evoked this morning, when all is said and done, mutual confidence is the key, but how to gain mutual confidence? It is through creating contacts, through enterprises that put together their common interests and then, gradually, one can develop a real mutual confidence.

Riccardo Petrella, *Professor of Globalization at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve*

I much appreciated, Mr President, your reference to trans-national institutions, and actually it is right to say that trans-national institutions must be the platform to elaborate the way to advance, and when you use in a pertinent way the concept of trans-national institution, you are already beyond the phase of international institutions.

Let's say that there is a logic fundamental part of the United Nations institutions which is quite international, but which is very little trans-national, because trans-nationality is different from internationality. Internationality says that mechanisms of joint action depend on a fundamental principle: that the Nation-State, sovereign, is the real subject. Trans-nationality, instead, is always based on the concept that the determining actor is the Nation-State, but that there are other phenomena that go beyond the institutionalised field of nationality, of the Nation-State. There are phenomena which go beyond the field defined by the sovereign state, but sometimes in internationality and in trans-nationality the starting-point subjects and the arrival-point ones are the Nation-states as well.

Then I think that all the interventions until this afternoon are right in saying that a radical reform of the United Nations will not reach a good result, if it is not linked to the founding principle of internationality and trans-nationality, that is the Nation-state.

I don't want to discuss here the matter of feasibility and practicability of the reform of the United Nations, because according to me having a deadline makes this discussion limited, it does not allow to solve the problems. Anyway, if we use the words with historical conscience, we do not find ourselves in this moment in a phase of human society founded on internationality or trans-nationality or super-nationality, or something else, but we say that we are facing a globalisation, that is to say the global world and the subject of the global world is humanity.

Globalisation is not in fact the stochastic result of interactions among the Nation-States. Globalisation is the expression of the humanity organisation, and humanity is the gathering of human beings, and not of Nation-states. So from a juridical point of view we can say that United Nations do not represent humanity. Humanity today is not represented by nobody, and this is a dramatic element of our discussion on political architecture. If, in fact, it's true that States are represented, are acknowledged from a juridical point of view, and therefore they build the whole architecture of internationality, trans-nationality and sovereignty, it is also true that globalisation does not find any subject able to represent it. The one subject representing globalisation is humanity, but humanity is not acknowledged, not from a juridical point of view and neither politically.

There are two little elements of juridical acknowledgement of humanity: one is the UNESCO program, which acknowledges that certain things may constitute world heritage of humanity, but it is something a little bit "cosmetic", even if symbolically quite important. More important is the other element, the International Court for Crimes against Humanity: for the first time in international law humanity is acknowledged as a subject of rights and duties, and so we built a system which allows to defend the rights of humanity. It is the first time that we acknowledge humanity as a juridical subject and not as a political one.

Then, my question to work on this afternoon is: «Are we culturally, scientifically, politically ready to start a discussion on how to politically organise humanity?».

If we are not, I can stop speaking now. If we are ready, and I hope that we are, there are a number of things that can be done. It seems to me that the first thing to be done by the World Political Forum is to study the concrete, realistic means to make operational the political acknowledgement of the humanity organisation on world scale. I stop then again: are we actually ready to enter a logic of 20,30,40 years in the future, in which we will pose problems that realistically go beyond the historical phase of the UN organisation, which

reflects the logics of 30-60 years ago, when the Nation-State was the juridical, political and organisational subject of living together on world scale? So my question is: are we ready to pass, in the coming 30-40 years, from the organisation of United Nations to the Global Organisation of Humanity and to conceive the politic architecture as corresponding to the Global Organisation of Humanity?

Federico Mayor, *Former Director General of UNESCO, Spain*

I am aware of the general difficulties in changing, and certainly not only in changing just the United Nations, because it has the big problem of inertia. Change is really always difficult. At the same time I am also aware of what is convenient and that maybe we will find even deeper solutions in the future, but for the time being we must understand how to ameliorate the system.

I think this is very good, and including in the project new institutions would be an important step. This morning the great person that I have on my left – Mr Hessel – proposed a summit on the great challenges of our times.

I think it is absolutely important to know what is going to happen – at most with the emerging of China, India, etc. – with energy, environment, climate change, ozone hole, sea, so I think it is absolutely necessary that we do not depend on one or another President of the United States deciding for example that a war is necessary for energy. We must take into account all these things, and so include new institutions.

I think that it is necessary first of all to rebuild the UN system, because on one hand the International Commerce Organisation, as you know, has been cut out since the beginning, but it had been cut out by the United States. On the other hand we have two organisations: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. We must not forget that the complete name of the former is World Bank for Reconstruction and Development: the name was too long and we cut it, but we must not forget that it was created directly by Mr Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1944. The International Monetary Fund also has well established and defined functions, which anyway in the course of time have no more been correctly applied, and, as you know, today they are instruments for formulas that do always protect the most powerful subjects.

I must tell you, frankly speaking, that if we accept this all, we must improve, we must include, then I think we must dare, we must dare more. It is generally said: «No, listen, we must respect the United States, they are so powerful, we need to respect them». Me, I do not agree. When I was 15 my mother told me: «You must never accept something that you think is unacceptable», and actually when we see that there are unacceptable things, we must react. The real unacceptable thing is to think that there is an institution that never respects the resolutions of the Security Council – even the Iraq war and all that happened, or the building of the wall in Israel, to which, as you know, the International Court of La Hague said “no”. When there are institutions in the UN system behaving this way, against rules and agreements, I think that in friendship, but even with steadiness, we must keep the tiller for the world. We can't be good allies if we are no good friends, without fear of the reaction the United States can have.

I think this is the great role of the European Union. In total honesty, I think that today – I repeat – we must say things with great friendship, but even with great determination.

We cannot accept these behaviours about questions on which the future of humankind depends, of that humankind who is no more represented. I also have to say, actually, that the original intention of Franklin Delano Roosevelt was addressed to “the people”: “we, the people”, is just what the Chart says, starting with: “We, the people, we decided to spare our children the horror of war”. And who were the people? So the people were represented progressively only by states.

Here, this morning, you spoke of the advantage of certain institutions, making examples, good examples, as the International Labour Organisation. Why? Because ILO is the one organisation of the United Nations system coming from the League of Nations. We must remember that this also was at the beginning another institution created by another President of the United States. So when we talk about United States we do not talk against

the Country United States, but against the concrete administrations, which do exactly the contrary of what they say, in some moments. For example Roosevelt and also his wife worked for what must inspire the system, which is the declaration of Human Rights. Precisely at the ILO we could see how, just like in the League of Nations, there were always two states, a party of owners, a party of syndicates. So, it is solutions like this, like the Wilson's one, that now we should apply to let humanity, so the people, be represented in the General Assembly. So should it be for the General Assembly, I could even admit that probably it would have 50% of States represented, 25% elected, 25% of civil society represented. At that moment things would be in our way and we could convince United States that they can't impose us some questions which can also have irreversible consequences on social aspects.

Now you see how a big part of humanity lives, Mr President, and this is good ground for all terrorisms, for violence. We must never justify violence, but we must look for the origins of it. How can we fight against terrorism, if at the same time we produce all these asymmetries, these differences, this essential poverty in which so many people live? So, these all are the conclusions, and I repeat that I am for daring, for making daring proposals.

I must tell you that sometimes it works, even with the United States, because at the UNESCO we had talked about tolerance declaration, and then we started working on diversity. In 2001 we approved the Declaration on cultural diversity, and immediately after the United States got back, saying they were for dropping the decision, because it was against the interests of the United States, for example with all the matter of intellectual property. When it has been time to vote, we had a lot of pressures, even from Mrs Condoleeza Rice herself, but we voted and only one vote was against, naturally the US one, but the rest of the world had voted in favour.

In short, I want to tell you that I think there are only two alternatives: evolution or revolution. Me, I am a biochemist, and I always prefer evolution, but I know that when there is no evolution, one day a great revolution can occur. We must avoid this revolution, and to avoid it, it is impossible to imagine that administrations which have in their hands Guantanamo and all those dreadful situations that we have under our eyes – for example the Bush administration just suppressed the habeas corpus – can keep on without obstacles. So my recommendation is that we must, very friendly, but also very determinately, dare to propose structural solutions.

Empedocle Maffia, *Special Advisor to the Executive Director of the World Bank, Italy*

This morning someone said that two acts of discontinuity happened in the last decades: November 9 and September 11. Why the discontinuity of November 9 – which opened the doors of freedom to millions of people – did not determine that conditions of ideal opening of the world that we expected at the end of a conflict, even if a cold one?

And why the second act of discontinuity – that of September 11 – strongly signed everywhere the way of being within the international community?

We certainly are in a period of transition, but I believe that this phase – from September 11 on – is characterized by a condition of extreme danger for humanity, which according to me is not caused by terrorism, even if terrorism is a terrifying phenomenon, which should be rejected by the conscience and culture of people.

But it is caused by the fact that the biggest, the only power, the hyper-power, considers itself as free from every law. To imagine a worldwide organization that represents all the states of the world without the United States is a joke, but what blackmail are the US doing to the international community?

“Without us the UN are useless, but we’re in the UN in order to block them”.

There’s only one representative in the history of this administration of the US which did not have the support of his Congress: the US representative to the UN, John Bolton. A Republican majority to the Congress did not allow his nomination to be brought to the Congress for vote, but he is there for an institutional mechanism, which will fall at next elections.

Whenever a conflict starts the international community relies on a third subject in order to solve the situation – it can be a multilateral organization or a subject chosen by the two parts of the conflict; the actual administration of the US refuses this principle.

The actual administration of the US don’t contest the principle of multilateralism, but the concept that any entity in the world exists that could overcome the will of the US government.

In this condition, can we make compromises? I don’t think so.

I am convinced that people who share the high principles of the American democracy must be strict in such a phase, just like a family is strict when the sons are taking the wrong way.

Naturally even President Bush signed a series of international treaties; probably you know that in the US an institution called “Signing statement” exists: when the President of the US signs a law, he makes a declaration of interpretation of this law.

In American history this was just a bureaucratic act, the Presidents used to comment the law while signing. Since January 2001, when Bush became the President, he wrote 700 Signing statements, on social, economic, foreign and internal issues.

Chomsky wrote wonderful pages, documenting these 700 statements: 700 hundred times the declaration contradicts the spirit of the law. The last episode is that of the prisoners of Guantanamo: the Supreme Court said they could not be kept in those juridical conditions, therefore the Congress approved a different law. But in his Signing statement, Bush stresses that, in conditions of emergency, the President’s power overcomes everything.

A website of the American government exists, where one can read the Signing statements, but if you try and read them, you don’t succeed.

The actual American administration is creating conditions of democratic perversity, for example by the means of keeping all the acts of government secret, first of all to the national public opinion. And this is the basis on which we can operate: it is true that such an administration exists, but the country is more and more intolerant of this situation.

Therefore I believe that our role, within our countries and the institutions where we work, is that of isolating these behaviours, notice the reaction of the American public opinion and be aware that the American democratic process must lead to a moment when these tendencies will be defeated.

Until this won't happen, there's nothing we can do, by reforming the UN, the World Bank or the WTO, because we clash with a conception of law and of international relationships which is completely different from the values we're fighting for.

Last consideration: "civil society" is a generic datum everywhere and in the US is a paradox, while at the same time very strong and faint. Because it is a multicultural society, I give you an example: we speak about the horror of the Israeli wall, that seeks to steal ground to the Palestinians. Yesterday in the US the construction of a wall began, this wall will close the borders with Mexico from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. A wall.

How can we answer to this offences?

We must be aware of the fact that the American society has many jerks, and above all it makes pressure on the national leaders to think about the immediate, not the big problems.

So the only solution – and I am addressing the European identity – is that our conscience is able to find a model and bide America's time on this model.

Any strategy that does not involve an act of rupture risks to be, according to me, an act of complicity with this administration and anyway keeps us far from the necessity to close positively this period of transition.

Davlat Khudonazarov, *Film Director, Russia*

Yesterday in Turin there was the opening of Terra Madre, a movement which was born in the last years, created by the people, and according to me it was quite a surprising and intense event. The woman who represented Mali, while expressing all her sorrow, reminded me of Martin Luther King; in a little bit of time she was able to express all the pain of her continent, and at the end of her speech she turned to President Napolitano thanking him for having listened to her. To be listened is very important, as much as for a father is important going to a doctor who listens to his baby's sufferings in order to help him. If I could isolate those words from the context, I would say that that woman's words could be perfectly adapted to my country, Tajikistan, for the sorrow they expressed.

Thirteen years ago, when the civil war started in Tajikistan, I, in my capacity as former Secretary of the Russian Movie Directors, asked for help to the European politicians, but I didn't find any open door, even if I had some contacts.

So I want to say that somehow Americans have a right to rule, because the right, but also the duty, to assume some responsibilities are absolutely indissoluble. I was obliged to go to the US and the American institutions put pressure on the US administration in order to obtain that I was listened to, while all my attempts to create a contact with the UN representatives were frustrated.

We are talking about the UN architecture, but we must also recognize that the moral duty to be represented at the UN exists, therefore the UN's moral duty to represent everyone's voice. It's a moral duty, it's not simply to comply with a function, it's a mission, the mission to listen to the others. You said that it should become the worldwide humanity organization, this seems to me quite an abstract formula for the moment being, but this is the way to follow.

When the first shots rang out in Dushanbè, I immediately told the UN representative in Kabul that a revolution was starting: since I made this phone call, till the UN representative came to our country seven months went by. But which kind of help did we have?

It's not only about the structure, it's about how people work at the UN. Therefore, the woman who talked yesterday is a beggar, if you want, and I too was a beggar: I asked and Eltsin didn't listen to me, the Europeans didn't listen to me, while in America we have a great number of supporters. Someone asked before how can we influence the American public opinion: the half of the American people has our same ideas, it is important that the United Europe can assume more responsibilities and capacities to mobilize its forces, because, being like this, no one will be able to by-pass the European Union. Thus the other regional organization – African, Asiatic organization, etc... - will receive a positive example and the American will be obliged to consider them.

Believe me, American power depends on the electorate, and the big number of civil society organizations can very much influence the voters. Lately we talked a lot about the conflict of civilizations: as a Muslim, I can say that there's no conflict between Muslims and Catholics, there's a conflict between civilization and barbarism.

Mr Chairman, you used the image of moderates and extremists, but elements of civilization and barbarism live together in each one of us, it's really important how they mix. The Muslim word is the one that suffers more from Islamist radicalism, it should be at the civilised world's side in order to solve this situation of conflict. I believe that we must not despair: we must not support mythic ideas on the global governance, but reflect on the existing organizations in order to understand how can they reach the main goal of humanity; it is very important that people working for the UN don't forget their duty.

Concerning the actual administration of the US, unfortunately it discredited the most important elements, mostly by the means of the war in Iraq.

Stephane Hessel, Ambassador, France

I would like to use once again the argument of my old age. Being much older than you all, I can tell you that during my long life, the world has fortunately evolved, and it is going to evolve again. The extraordinarily precious contribution of the United Nations Charter must make us confident.

It has been reminded that it started saying: « We, the peoples », and that it is grounded on the promotion and protection of the rights of men, that is precisely of that humanity about which M. Petrella spoke, and which is actually the thing to protect. Much progress has been achieved in the following years. We have an International Criminal Court; we had the chance, in certain cases, to get a whole country, I think of Cambodia, of Timor East. United Nations achieved enormous progress.

The stops, the blocks that we all acknowledged, must not be attributed only to the United States, because the United States are no more stable, as I already said this morning, we will have another President, another administration, and maybe we will find again an America which promotes it also those basic values of men to which the most part of American people are at least not less close than the other peoples in the world.

The fact remains that, in facing the big and new challenges, environment and social injustice, we need instruments. We can find them within the United Nations. We hoped that the big financial and commercial institutions could play this role. The experience of globalized economics and of forces which rule it shows that neither the World Bank, nor the World Trade Organization, nor the International Monetary Fund are currently able to solve the problems of the basic economic, social and cultural rights of humanity.

A reform in this field is then really necessary. It will be difficult, because the financial and economic powers attached to these institutions will suffer from being subverted, but the action of people like Mr Lotti and of whom, in the civil society, have already prevented in Seattle in 1999 the World Trade Organisation from agreeing on negative projects for the promotion of economic rights for individuals, make us hope.

These powers exist and we'll see what will be their equilibrium with States. For the moment being, States resist. Give us still a bit of time. I will no more be there, but you, the young people, you will be there and in that moment we will use the United Nations Charter.

We must believe that it has the possibility to have an effect both in the field of which Mr Lakdar Brahimi spoke and in the one illustrated by Mr Petrella.

It is there, let's use it at its maximum, let's resist to all the ones limiting its action, and in those moments you will see that we will succeed in solving the big problems of humanity.

Riccardo Petrella, *Professor of Globalization at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, Italy*

I would like to insert my observation in the reasoning Mr Hessel has just made, giving us a fantastic lesson of youth.

I would like to develop the part of trans-national institutions, which is the theme of our seminar, to underline that actually in these last years the trans-national institutions multiplied out of the politic-institutional and juridical field. This means that the trans-nationalisation has become more and more a phenomenon concretizing beyond the possible action of states and out of their intervention possibilities.

We have today an explosion of the non-public trans-nationality, a non-public space that means actually a space not related to state, but a private one, responding to completely different logics than the ones of the state and non-state public space.

This private space, this “trans-nationalisation”, responds to logics which are totally different from the ones of institutional political public space. In many fields this logics represents mechanisms that subjectively we could judge – and I personally do – as positive.

In other fields, and in particular in economics, finance, commerce, these trans-national institutions follow a logics of conquer, of dominion possession, of “commercialisation” of life. So Today our colleague Maffia said that the first problem of the world is not so much terrorism, actually, but United States, theory that I totally share.

On the other hand, I think we could say that one of the main problems, one of the main cultural and political challenges that we must face when we talk about the new world political architecture is the commercialization of life, actuated by private subjects, the privatization of life.

This privatisation of life works on a different level. It works through all those processes of transformation of all aspects of life in commercial acts, commercial transactions, and its most advanced expression is the right of intellectual property on knowledge. Commercialization of life on world scale today is represented by the phenomenon of trans-national institutions, of which the Wipo, (World Intellectual Property Organisation) – a non inter-governmental society, but a private one, so not representing states – is a faithful symbol of the problem I am trying to describe shortly.

It seems to me that if this seminar wants to answer effectively and concretely to the question « What should we do with trans-national institutions?», these aspects must be the focus of our reflections. We must try to study concrete measures to face these phenomenon, and in particular the one of privatisation and commercialisation of life, and a path that I pose to the attention of this group is to work on the identification and government – through the trans-national and world institutions of humanity – of common goods and services which are essential to life and which cannot be privatised or commercialised.

Therefore an answer to the question « What should we do with the current state of trans-national institutions?» could be to ask on our turn: « Is knowledge a common world good? Is it that water, forests, sun, are world goods, which must be subject to public space, to public trans-national organisation, through authorities having the capabilities to manage them?». Here comes again the question raised this morning by many of our colleagues: can we envisage world agencies, authorities which we could, in the interest of world people, entrust with the government of goods and services which in no case would be privatised or commercialised?

Andrei Grachev, *Chairman of the WPF Scientific Committee, former spokesman of President Gorbachev, Russia*

At a first glance, it seems that the reform of institutions, which is the subject of our discussion, is an impossible achievement. How is it possible to go at least beyond the main factors of resistance, such as inertia and interests?

Inertia, just mentioned by Federico Mayor, but even the interests of the main powers, which are political interests, material interests. How to make, for example, the five permanent members of the Security Council vote the abolition of their privileges, of their monopoly of power? Not to speak about the economic privileges, the trans-national ones etc.

Hubert Vedrine has just mentioned the factors that in the course of history have also unblocked frozen situations: wars, revolutions – fortunately, thanks to Gorbachev, we are at least no more scared by a possible new world war. I think we - especially the Russian people, who had the last experience of revolution, at least after the French one - are no more to expect even a revolution.

Another element remains: political will. Political will, which sometimes, quite rarely, comes from visionary people, from men having in mind a vision, but generally, for the most part, from imposed, calculated politics. What can we do in the current situation to unlock the apparently fossilized situation? A little bracket: if we had to look at the soviet situation in 1984, perestroika was mathematically and politically impossible, and that's why it arouse.

The outcome is that we gathered under the presidency of Gorbachev. What can we than do in the current circumstances? According to me we must try to gather a number of factors. The vision in the end is to educate the educators, elites, managers, let them understand that it is also in their own long-term interest, also the electoral interest, in the end. From this point of view it is evident that the weight of the civil society, which is at the same time the society of electors, can be important, so let's not hesitate to go on in the way just suggested by dr. Lotti, because these same managers, even if closed in their crystal palaces, are not insensible to the possibilities of elections and to electors preferences.

Second factor is the pressure exercised by society, by media, by the public opinion, a factor that could become an element of political play, thanks to our getting out the world of the cold war, out of its frozen atmosphere. Society is now authorised, even invited to produce this pressure, to express its presence, and so it is transformed in political actor by right.

United States. Certainly. But the United States are at the same time a super power but also a society, and a society ruled by democratic laws, and a State. A super power which, according to me, is currently blocked in a situation that is paradoxically vulnerable, very sensible to pressure. Super powers, in fact, empires of the genre of the United States are above all dangerous, but even blocked by the changes occurring in the two phases of their existences: the extreme power and the extreme frailty, because owing to frailty, to fear, they can act once again in a dangerous and irresponsible way. I have the impression that American society is currently between these two elements, and this could be a further element justifying our further necessary action on America - on political America, on the society of America, on our partner America.

Third element, a last factor necessary to trying to impose the change and unlock the situation, is «project». We must present a project – projects - we must have a project, an alternative one, a substitution project, to show that «something else» is not only advisable, but even possible, and according to me our structure, in the end the community of people and spirits gathered around this table, is a big prove of this. If we engage to act to attract in

this action other spirits, other partners, I think we can, even through our courage, get on the way to a result that can come even from your way, Mr Ambassador.