



**International Seminar**

# **A NEW WORLD POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE**

**Bosco Marengo, 27-28 October 2006**

**Plenary Sessions**

**Friday, 27 October**

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## OPENING SESSION

**Paolo Filippi**, *President of the Province of Alessandria*

In my capacity as President of the Province of Alessandria and on behalf of the Executive Director of the World Political Forum, Dr. Rolando Picchioni, who asked me to welcome all the guests that are here today, I officially open the international seminar "A New World Political Architecture". Rolando Picchioni is the one who had the important task to coordinate and urge the works that made possible the realisation of this meeting here in Bosco Marengo. In fact, the Monumental Complex of Santa Croce has been chosen as the World Political Forum's permanent seat and its restoration is quickly going on thanks to the fundamental contribution of the Regione Piemonte, of the Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Alessandria and of the Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Torino. I welcome you all also on behalf of the Province of Alessandria and on behalf of all the organisers of this conference.

Finally, I would like to thank the Mayor of Bosco Marengo, Angela Lamborizio; the President of the Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Alessandria, Gianfranco Pittatore; the President of the Regione Piemonte, who is Co-President of the World Political Forum as well, Mercedes Bresso; the Under- Secretary of state of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Senator Gianni Verneti; and, naturally, all the people who sit here at this table and all the distinguished guests who came to Bosco Marengo to attend this seminar.

**Angela Lamborizio, Mayor of Bosco Marengo**

Bosco Marengo is a small municipality; nevertheless, it boasts an important history. Today Bosco Marengo opens its doors and becomes cosmopolitan for two days. This would have been impossible without the precious help of the following people. For this reason I would like to thank for their dedication: President Gorbachev for honouring us with his presence and for bringing prestige to this seminar; the Executive Director of the World Political Forum, Dr. Rolando Picchioni, who believed in this project and worked with great care to realise its manifestation; the President of the Region of Piedmont, Mercedes Bresso, who was more than generous with her contribution; the President of the Foundation of the Saving Bank of Alessandria, Gianfranco Pittatore, who was always present and ready to help; the President of the Foundation of the Saving Bank of Turin, Andrea Comba; the President of the Province of Alessandria, Paolo Filippi, who did his utmost and placed the Santa Croce complex at the disposal of the World Political Forum for the realisation of this event, thus giving pride not only to Bosco Marengo, but also to the Province of Alessandria and all its territory.

**Gianfranco Pittatore**, *President of the CRAL Foundation*

I welcome all the participants, the speakers, the authorities and naturally President Mikhail Gorbachev, who was the founder and promoter of this initiative. I would like to thank particularly the Region of Piedmont, which is represented here by its President Mercedes Bresso, who is also co-President of the World Political Forum; the President of the Province of Alessandria, Paolo Filippi; the Mayor of Bosco Marengo, Angela Lamborizio; and the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gianni Vernetti. I owe a special thank-you to the Executive Director of the World Political Forum, Rolando Picchioni, because ideas are important, but they must be realised in the work of every day and he gives us a great example of how ideas can be turned into reality. The presence of many participants gives us hope for this initiative, complemented by all the subjects that I mentioned in 2002 when the Peace Nobel Prize winner Mikhail Gorbachev proposed to create the World Political Forum, in order to gather people who live and have lived meaningful political experiences. Today more than yesterday, we feel the necessity to dialogue and to investigate the matters of the world. The challenge is twofold: on one side we have to support this initiative and intensify the international participation in this forum. On the other side, we have to make strong efforts and synergies in order to obtain the complete restoration of the Monumental Complex of Santa Croce, which is designed to be the permanent seat of the World Political Forum. The very nature of this complex, which reminds us of the great Renaissance capacity of projecting and realising impossible dreams of balance and rationality, encourages us to believe that we are creating a collective path of useful and rational political growth.

**Mercedes Bresso**, *President of the Region of Piedmont, Co-President of the WPF*

I would like to welcome all the guests and thank the authorities of Alessandria: the Mayor, Mara Scagni; the President of the Province, Paolo Filippi; and the President of the Foundation of the Saving Bank of Alessandria, Gianfranco Pittatore; for the work they have done over these years, together with the Region of Piedmont, in order to make this seat fit for use. The restoration of the Monumental Complex of Santa Croce is most probably going to turn into one of the most important of our region. I believe that the designation of Santa Croce to become the seat of the World Political Forum and therefore a place of reflection and research is a meaningful choice that can give prestige once more to this historical and beautiful building.

My second reflection concerns the evolution of the World Political Forum: we are trying to imagine the best way to exploit, to the utmost, the potentialities of this seat to become a place of permanent reflection, which could offer the young researchers the possibility to study the themes that the World Political Forum will choose. In addition, I think that all the topics concerning the evolution of the European Union are very important to investigate. The European Union is undergoing a process of great expansion and there is a growing demand of accession by many countries that have transitional economies. The theme of the European borders is a fascinating one and it is particularly relevant in discussion both in Europe and in the world. The constitution of a new European identity is another interesting subject. Europe is a complex dimension from the cultural, economic and linguistic points of view. How can we structure a model that should be federal, allowing it to govern Europe and that at the same time, takes into account the identity of every single state and the enormous differences that persist?

Finally, I would like to offer some considerations on the themes that we are discussing at this seminar. In particular, I will consider one question: In a global world, must the states divide their power and, if so, with whom and according to which architectural institution? Beginning with Europe: I am convinced that the European Union should organise its presence at the United Nations differently. When entering the Security Council as a non-permanent member, Italy offered to place its seat at the European Union's disposal.

I believe that a discussion with the European states that are permanent members would be advisable in order to devote their seats together to represent Europe. This would mean that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the EU would take part in the Security Council together with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three European countries and he would represent the position of the European Union. Europe must face at the soonest this question of having a joint presence at the UN and I think that, talking about the reform of the UN, the proposals of the federalist movements are feasible, even if they can appear utopian at times.

I am convinced that the reform of the UN, in order to be efficient, must aim at representing the great regions of the world: the European Union, the African Union and Latin America have states that are striving towards continental structures. North America and Asia are in a different situation. The great regional and continental organisations that should be then represented as such at the UN within the Security Council, could give power and efficiency to the structure, contributing to the creation of a progressive system of global government on a federal basis.

Among other things, the federalist movement proposes to face the most urgent global questions. In my opinion, the global environmental question is a fundamental and dramatic one. Dealing with the environment today means facing the management of the great global environmental questions: climate, water, processes of desertification and the seas; all these themes are central ones nowadays. I believe that the UN system should be based on a series of small agencies of coordination – as it is today – but a great agency should exist, addressing the global environmental questions with the appropriate power and resources. No instrument exists today to intervene on environmental questions, which not only appear urgent, but also demand a new structure of resolution for the global powers.

This could be a first test to create instruments that allow us to face the great global questions, that most surely concern peace and war, the monetary system and free circulation of capital, globalisation and the impotence of the solitary states to face these phenomena, but also

the world-wide environmental questions. Creating a stronger, joint organisation on these questions could be less difficult than other things and it could provide for the experimentation of instruments of global governance that possibly could serve as an example to adequately address other problems.

Finally, I would like to thank our President and leading power, Mikhail Gorbachev, who has been dedicating all his intelligence and passion to the reflection on the New World Political Architecture for many years.

**Gianni Vernetti**, *Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Italy*

On behalf of the Italian government I would like to greet you and the local authorities that support this important initiative. In particular, Mercedes Bresso, the President of the Region of Piedmont, and President Gorbachev, who is the essence of this Forum. A man who decided to keep on playing an active role to create a new political culture, a new political doctrine, which should be able to better understand how and towards which direction, the new system of global governance must be redefined and reorganised. I will make some reflections on some questions that, in my opinion, the international community is attempting to address today.

Since its first few months of work, the new Italian government tried to invest in multilateralism. Multilateral action we consider to be the right option and the correct way to face the new global challenges. The Middle East case has been approached in this perspective: after the explosion of the new conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, which risked degenerating into a worse conflict than the others, Italy tried to offer a multilateral way of acting that, in my opinion was efficacious. For the first time we succeeded in persuading Israel to transfer a part of its sovereignty and to recognise that its security is an international theme, which has to be solved by international efforts and not by its army. The deployment of a UN force in Lebanon had the important effect of reinstating a role in the Middle East for the UN, where previously this role had been denied for too long because of unilateral choices. Thanks to these choices not only did we give a political role and more political visibility to Italy, but we also proposed a new modality of action: relying on multilateral instruments and on the UN, that for too long have been considered as difficult and inefficacious instruments to use.

Multilateralism is a political doctrine which must be used. From this perspective, I think that a new system of world governance must be built by the means of efficacious and efficient multilateral policies. Therefore, the question of which of the instruments to use in order to realise multilateral politics and consequently the reform of the UN becomes one of the points of our debate. Some positive efforts and some innovative proposals have been made by the outgoing Secretary General, Kofi Annan, some of which have been accepted: I am thinking about the summit of the UN of September 2005, which posed the basis for the empowerment of the organisation in some crucial sectors.

After one year, we can give a moderately positive judgement, something good is emerging: the Human Rights Council, even with its difficulties in acting, surely is a better instrument than the old Human Rights Commission, which proved to be inefficient. Recently, Italy was elected with great consensus in the Security Council. We are very proud of the votes we obtained in the election as non-permanent member for 2007 and 2008, but it is a mission of great importance. We think that the Security Council must be democratically reformed, we stand against a simple increase in the number of members, we want to create a more democratic system, representing all the geographical areas. It must be able to deal with a world that is deeply changed after the two big fractures: November Ninth and September Eleventh. These are two big fractures of our recent history which force us to think about a new model for our international relations.

When I talk about efficacious multilateralism, I am not only thinking about the UN, but also about the other instruments that must be reformed. Think about the NATO, which is a political-military alliance, born after the Second World War. In the years after the Cold War it lost its reason to be an instrument of defence, but it may turn into an instrument of the new world governance. It can become a political-military alliance that must face the new global challenges of international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, illegal trafficking of drugs, arms and even of human beings. We are convinced that the NATO can perform such a new role, but only within a new culture, a new, multilateral approach.

Finally, I would like to reflect on sovereignty, which according to me is a theme of crucial importance. I think this is one of the fundamental aspects of a new world political architecture. After all, the transfer of sovereignty is the key for the success of the European Union. The EU was able to attract new members because it was able to build mechanisms of common choices and above all, because all of the member states had the courage to transfer part of their sovereignty. This is

the crucial theme: the transfer of sovereignty. It is clear that starting from a doctrine that reflects on the themes of national sovereignty, we arrive at the theme of the Responsibility to Protect, to Kosovo, to Rwanda, where the international community failed, to Darfur, where the international community is failing and we clash in front of a national sovereignty that, in this case, should surely be limited.

I believe that these are the themes that the international community must face today and I am sure that this original instrument, the World Political Forum supported by many of you, who have had such an important role in global politics and international relations over these years, can be a place where new ideas can be focused and can give a really relevant contribution. Without any doubt the World Political Forum is not only a research centre, it has become a think-tank and only God knows how much we need new ideas in the new system of international relations.

**Mikhail Gorbachev, *President of The World Political Forum***

The focus of our discussion today is the modern world in which we live. Today's world is really complex, controversial and most importantly, rapidly changing. Generally, we are not yet used to living in a world of this nature. This is probably the most important problem of today's world: the rapidly changing world and mankind's place in this rapidly changing world. Therefore, it also refers to everything that relates to human activity: every day, the individual is exposed to a huge avalanche of information and new things. This world is full of problems that, unfortunately, are more rapidly accumulated than they are solved – undoubtedly a major conflict. This is the world which has essentially become the global world of today, a world in which common human interests have attained top priority. So the problem of how to see, how to interpret national interests in this situation, is an extremely important one.

I have to say that there is one common problem with our vision – and I refer jointly to the Westerners, to the North and the South. We emphasize our national interests, since we have another election ahead of us and this is our overriding concern. So the common human problems are left unattended and resultantly are put on the back-burner, so to say. These concerns need to be addressed and I have given you just a few examples of the features that characterize this really new world.

On the other hand, today's world is a product of a historical process. The fact that, today, the world is what it is and is undergoing fundamental changes at the civilizational level, is largely predetermined by the quantitative and qualitative changes that took place during the twentieth century; maybe in the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century. Here, I would like to make some illustration to show how rapidly everything was changing during that period.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, planet Earth had a population of 1.6 billion. Now it is 6.5 billion. You can imagine that it took the entirety of human history to reach 1.6 billion people and now there are six billion. The annual Gross Domestic Product in the beginning of the century stood at 90 billion; now we produce the same amount of GDP in just one day. Another telling fact: we used to consume three hundred cubic meters of fresh water; now we consume four thousand cubic meters of water and fresh water is becoming the scarcest of resources.

The environmental burden has grown enormously, since all this growth translates into an increased burden on nature, on our habitat and upon the very environment that gave birth to the human being and could do so for the new humanity. Today, sixty percent of ecosystems have been badly damaged. In many instances the situation can hardly even be reversed. The conflict between mankind and the rest of nature has reached an unprecedented level of intensity and the world community has found itself in the situation of a global environmental crisis.

Ninety percent of all the scientific discoveries made over the entirety of human history were made during the twentieth century. The world has entered the information era; however, today we face on a global scale, real shortages of food, fresh water and energy resources. All these and many other factors have set humanity in motion. I travel widely across the globe and when meeting people I see the same questions in their eyes: What will be with us tomorrow? Where does the logic of events take us? Who can explain this to us and say what are we to do and how are we to live in this world? This is therefore the problem not only for political leaders, but also for the people and big politics starts when it concerns billions and millions. Today this concern is the focus of every analysis.

However, the twentieth century was also the cruelest century. It saw two world wars and the Cold War. Revolutions took place in dozens of countries, including Russia and China. The world was divided into two systems which shaped the main conflict of the century. The birth of the world socialist system and the collapse of the colonial system – all this happened over the span of the twentieth century. The end of that century saw the developments which have had a great impact on the entire world and still continue to affect it. Perestroika in one of the superpowers, the Soviet Union, was one of such event and it was a turning point in the world, bringing transition from a totalitarian system to freedom and democracy in the USSR, doing away with confrontation in international relations thus ending the Cold War.

Today we are commencing a project which we have called “A New Political Architecture for the World”, fulfilling the task of our initial stage. We are just embarking on this project and we have many meetings ahead of us in various formats, including annual conferences devoted to this problem, since you cannot solve it without some groundwork. Attempts to address it head on have brought losses and frustration and many have given them up, saying in effect, “let things flow as they will and let the strongest win and the poor die.” In a word, Social Darwinism. This is, of course, the great delusion and helplessness of politics. People do not accept such an approach by political leaders. They disagree with such policies. Therefore, at our initial stage I see the objective of our conference – and this is the first conference within the framework of this project – in preparing the next, annual, extended conference for a more detailed discussion. This is because today what is needed is expert analysis. Expert knowledge is essential and it should help us in preparing this conference for concrete discussions. Today some of these concrete issues have already been raised. We have deliberately tried to evoke thoughts in this regard and we will hear them in the exchange of opinions during the discussion.

We are indeed talking about a long-term project. Of course, you have noticed what questions we have brought forth for the discussion – and in this regard I am grateful to Mercedes Bresso, President of the Region of Piedmont, who is my friend and Co-Chairwoman of the World Political Forum. We two are the persons with primary responsibility for this forum, therefore she is placing me in the top seat and I am giving the top seat to her, for her to remember that she has no less responsibility than me. I think our tandem is successful and I welcome it and am happy about it. The result of our initial discussion is to see the light soon – this would be a concluding document summing up our discussions. And these are less about reflections and more, so to say, about stating some important fundamental concepts on which we are to base our efforts throughout the year to achieve an interesting concrete platform for joint discussion and critical examination. We need to be very responsible. Those who have been involved in effecting changes, who have participated in these processes, know what it means to get a grasp of general problems. If you did not get a grasp of them and started addressing concrete problems head on, you would make very many mistakes. As one prominent person said “you will always be faced with plenty of unsolved general issues if you don’t get a grasp of the general problems.” Therefore, my remarks are more of a general nature and will be focused, in effect, on a single problem – namely vision, politics and civil society.

I certainly think that this concluding document should be a working paper. It does not determine anything; it only announces a priori some approaches on which we should be focused – and these approaches can only be declared a priori. I think these approaches have already taken shape within the framework of our forum and they are of a democratic nature. We are all equal here, irrespective of one’s merits; everyone has the right to take the floor; debates are open here; and I must say that it is of great importance for us to see that when coming to this forum we use as our basis a scientific approach, leaving our political preferences behind. Here we use an impartial scientific approach otherwise, we will not solve anything and will not arrive at any decisions or conclusions. The World Political Forum welcomes the openness of discussion – we always have heated discussion in our ongoing debate. Truth is born of argument: this is a globally acknowledged fact, but I would like to add from my own perspective that truth evaporates even before we learn it, if passions run high in these arguments and debates. This is why participants at the World Political Forum deliberate in a calm, confident, committed and respectful manner towards one another, as our search for answers needs to be deep and thorough.

Now I would like to share my reflections on the substance of the matter under discussion. I think that we should pinpoint the trouble that has plagued politicians for many decades. I think we have some real problems, since throughout the second half of the twentieth century we were out of sync with this vision and are still out of sync with the real processes that are going on. We do not find time to give due attention to examining and analysing them and therefore, we miss out on many things and more often than not politics lags behind. Most importantly, it often simply does harm and creates situations, which we then have to overcome, in the process suffering big losses. I would like to cite just two examples in this regard.

After the end of the Cold War, member-states of the anti-Hitler coalition had a great opportunity to build cooperation for decades ahead. We had the experience of successful cooperation in fighting

fascism; we had put aside various class and other differences and even cultural differences and joined our forces in the face of that danger and we defeated it. So, the joining of forces is possible and one should not cite some obstacles standing in the way of this. What is often seen as an obstacle, as a resistant force should be treated instead as a challenge that requires stronger efforts, with more vigour and more reflection.

The military and political cooperation between the powers in the coalition were based on the support of their respective peoples. Those were the very same countries which previously had poured all sorts of condemning documents on one another, and still they joined forces and solved that task which got the support of the peoples. In our case it is important to similarly bring an understanding to the people of the world as to what we want and plan to do.

A mechanism of political cooperation was first created within the framework of the coalition, which allowed the resolution of the problems of mutual assistance, military coordination, the opening of the "Second Front" and the later postwar order. As a result, it also made possible creation of a universal organisation, the United Nations. This all shows that history is not predetermined. There is always a place for alternative solutions, for showing initiative and for achieving concrete decisions. Despite the presence of such powerful factors, however, events started to develop according to a different scenario. Here, I would like to remind you that certain events happened in early 1946 which pushed forward that different scenario. Stalin's speech in the postwar election period, where he introduced his terminology about the two camps: one was the camp of war politics, headed by the party of war and another different one was headed by Stalin himself. This previously discarded theme of the two camps resurfaced again and then a response followed from Churchill some time later. Churchill was aware of the fact that there really were some real possibilities for the United States and the Soviet Union to continue their cooperation and, by this means, they could determine many things in the world and exert influence. Churchill was not happy about that, being an anti-Communist and, above all, because this would have pushed Britain to the sidelines, a scenario which he could not accept. As a result we heard his Fulton Speech, with all its themes, although there was nothing so scary about it – just like in Stalin's speech – it was just the usual rhetoric of that time. It gave a different impetus though. I was fifteen years old when that issue of Pravda was released, with the entire second page covering Churchill's speech at Fulton. The article was called "Churchill Rattles the Saber." Senior citizens, people who are older than me, remember it quite well and that was the turning point, after which things went according to a different scenario.

There were other attempts; even as late as until 1952, Stalin believed that a division of Europe could be avoided and that, above all else, a division of Germany could be avoided. Even in 1955, already under Khrushchev, there was another attempt at this, but it came to nothing. Looking back on that era it is important to consider the mindset of the Soviet leaders at the time, especially when you look, for instance, at the known fact that Molotov suggested that Stalin consider the option of joining the Marshall Plan and that was a very realistic proposal. We have it archived – that's why we know about it. But the most interesting thing is that Vyshinsky made a public statement to this effect. That very same Vyshinsky who was implicated in the reprisals of the 1930s. He published an article in Pravda in which he suggested a return to some elements of the New Economic Policy (NEP) with private property and cooperatives. Stalin read the article and immediately ordered a rebuttal to be published, claiming that the article in question reflected only the personal view of Vyshinsky. However, the very fact that such an article was published indicates that there were such processes going on amongst the Soviet leadership at that time. Those questions were being discussed and something similar was occurring at the top. However, it all fell through and the leadership was instrumental in making that happen, which was only natural: however, one could have hoped for a different kind of contribution.

This all led to a campaign being launched in our country against cosmopolitanism and foreign influence. A political reaction generally started. Already a student of the Moscow State University, I saw how meetings of scientific councils were conducted at the time, with prominent professors being anathematized. This is how the domestic politics of countries are built: On vision, on the declaration of certain ideas and views for the future. As a result, we saw the division of countries into blocs and then the Cold War. I think it was then, at that time, when unique chances and

opportunities for cooperation and peace were missed. All of this happened because of the inappropriate visions and the lack of political will shown in those years.

Now let me cite a more recent example of a different approach. It became clear in the mid-1980s that the logic of global development was extremely dangerous and led to a real threat of nuclear conflict, not to mention the waste of resources and of everything that was needed to address the problems that emerged in the leading countries and the world in general, particularly in the developing countries that were leaving the colonial system. So an understanding emerged, along with a similarity of views on the situation and the way out of it, on both sides of the dividing line. I think that we in the Kremlin, came to realise then we had to discard that old view, that every morning people woke up in the White House with the thought of how to destroy the Soviet Union and looked at us only through the crosshairs. It was a normal human thought, a normal human reasoning. Not the reasoning fixed on ideologies, on rivalry, or on the idea that everything should be solved through confrontation. That vision of ours, which we used as a basis for domestic changes and shifts in both internal and foreign policies, was met with understanding and things started happening which led eventually to the end of the Cold War. The elimination of nuclear weapons started and prospects for cooperation in general were opened. The Charter for Europe came to life; velvet revolutions took place; and democratic processes swept through more than 100 countries run by dictators and authoritarian regimes.

I see here Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, sitting across the table; he was one of the foreign ministers in that period – there were three of them within that short period; he and I were eye-witnesses to how the conflicts which had been going on for decades – in Africa, in Central America, in Cambodia and so on and so forth – suddenly proved to be resolvable. We were even able to launch a conference on the settlement of the Middle-East conflict. We could launch many efforts – solve one issue, while starting to address another. Relations were normalised with the United States and China. I would like to emphasize this point: We will not be able to achieve anything, unless we achieve a sea change in the attitudes of politicians, who neglect common human interests and do not put them on top of their agendas and unless we involve think-tanks. This is not only our own claim – we do not say that we here, at our forum, will decide everything – every think-tank should take that responsibility and such steps and attempts are already being taken. I think that Federico Mayor will say in his speech that he suggests a culture of peace – and he has been promoting it for a long time; this is his idea and the whole world is aware of it. Take Riccardo Petrella; he is one of the ideologues of the resistance, so to say, of the protest movement across the globe, against the kind of globalisation that we have now. So, think-tanks are actively working on these issues. The main motto put forward by the protest movement is that a different world is possible, as contrasted to the one which wastes away resources and draws us again into making new divisions in the world. I think that it is most important that we should make persistent efforts to develop these approaches in cooperation and interaction with these and other think-tanks.

And when, after the end of the Cold War, we made many steps in that direction – to eliminate weapons, confrontations, conflicts, etc. – hopes re-emerged to achieve a new world, the new world of cooperation. Statements were made – I also made statements more than once at the initial stage following the end of the Cold War - about the need of a New World Order. It was almost like a competition between George Bush and I: who would make more statements in this regard. Everyone was eager not to let the initiative slip away and the chances be wasted. But I think the best statement was made by Pope John Paul II, who said that a New World Order was needed and that it should be more stable, more just and more humane. In my view, this is the most accurate formula and it still can be fleshed out and developed.

Nevertheless, chances were missed; we lost more than a decade in discussion and globalisation developed a spontaneous nature with all the consequences that one would expect while politics remained the same. The departure of the Soviet Union from the political stage strained the situation to the maximum. A desire emerged to restart the playing of geopolitical games. Struggles started for spheres of influence, for resources and for markets. As a result, today everything is so strained in the world that our leaders and governments are going from one extreme to another and have clashes in the areas where they should be cooperating and addressing problems. Mistrust has re-emerged – and nothing can be solved in the absence of trust.

A second reason for our destabilised world is the replacement of the political elite. A new generation of political elites came and they had to start everything anew. Everything which was made before by the previous generation was not enough for the new generation, who feel that they have to do something original. So in discarding the old they also have thrown the baby out with the bathwater. Of course, every generation makes its own contribution both to society and to politics. However, that does not mean that everything should be discarded. And, it so happened that good things which started growing out of the end of the Cold War and the cooperation which emerged during the process of ending the Cold War, were thrown away but the methods and the way of solving problems have remained the same. So now, we again see an emphasis on force and the tug-of-war on every side.

What we have today is a very worried and dangerous world, which can lead to grave consequences. We are already facing the consequences: we are not addressing the problem of poverty and we have given an impetus to the development of extremism of all kinds, since poverty is a breeding ground for extremism and most notably, international terrorism has used it to its advantage. We once thought that we were freeing resources to provide assistance and fight poverty. Remember how we talked first about the target of 1%, then the target of 0.7% of the national income of each country and how it was to be channelled into the fund to combat poverty? Nothing of the kind happened; only four states allocated the money and all the other countries reneged on that commitment. The whole of process of globalisation has in actuality only benefited those countries which had better starting positions from the outset.

So, delusions in vision have led to a delusion in politics. To all this we must take account of the fact that we are again witness to new arms races that have been underway for a few years now. The military budget in the United States has risen to heights unseen in the years of the Cold War. Trade in weapons has not been curtailed: it has grown to incredible proportions. Finally, countries are now particularly worried about their security and spend their resources on purchasing weapons.

We at the World Political Forum are also concerned about the problems of nuclear weapons. What I hear in the world today and I myself often speak on these subjects when participating in conferences, is North Korea and Iran. But what about members of the “nuclear club”? What are they doing? They have put everything on hold and they are supposed to be seen as the guardians of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Paragraph six of the treaty requires members of the nuclear club to “continue the reduction of nuclear weapons”. Yet they are restarting efforts to upgrade their nuclear arms, to make them all-penetrating, more destructive and to make missiles even more accurate and sophisticated. In this situation all the “threshold” countries – and there are now over thirty of them – certainly are drawing their own conclusions from all this.

I think that it will be very difficult for us to enforce compliance with this treaty if the “nuclear club” members themselves do not lead the way. The way of solving problems that the United States has used – despite long debates in the UN Security Council and discussions with partners and allies, going to war in Iraq without a UN mandate, supported by a number of countries – has ultimately prevented us from achieving anything there. All the objectives that had been set were not achieved. No nuclear or chemical weapons were found and the situation in the Middle East has become even more complex.

Generally, we now have a world which is even more dangerous when compared to the mid-1980s. The questions we now face are: What are we supposed to do? And generally, what kind of world do we need? To arrive at the answers, it is important to understand that changes have taken place during this short period of time, without the analysis of which no policy-making is possible. So, here is our starting point. Take the United States, for example. This superpower has already tried doing all kinds of experiments in Europe, in Africa, in the Middle East and now in other parts of the globe and the former Soviet republics. It looks at how to use its status as the superpower to get the final say on everything. But that is not a realistic approach. No problems today can be solved by any country alone or even by a group of countries. Today these problems are global and they can be addressed only through the pooling of efforts. We have to arrive at such conclusions through the efforts of think-tanks and pressure from non-governmental organisations. These conclusions

should be the foundation for a new politics. We at the World Political Forum should formulate ideas like these and voice our opinion.

One cannot ignore today the existence of such a powerful regional organisation as the European Union. Today it represents almost half a billion people and its economy is larger than that of the United States. While people in the United States itself say that their country has passed its peak of power, in Europe they are just gaining momentum. This should not be ignored. Nothing can be solved without Europe and Europe now is involved in all processes, in all kinds of road maps, here, there and everywhere. Giants like China, India and Brazil have also arrived on the world stage. Already today major global problems cannot be solved without their participation.

Finally, the Islamic world has been increasingly, strongly and harshly, even with some aggressiveness, asserting itself. It is asserting itself because it has found itself sidelined from the historical process. And here we are talking about a population of 1.5 billion. This is the world which played a great role during the Middle Ages. Take that and add the former Soviet republics with all the complicated processes that are taking place there, not only in Russia, but across the entire post-Soviet territory. We may face grave events and consequences if we do not comprehend it all and develop our political approach based on this observation. In short, today everything hinges on politics. Today we can say that we have a world political crisis. Scholars say we should not be afraid because they will certainly find out that only five points signify a world crisis and seven and half points do not yet signify it. We should understand the trend and realise that things are going this way. We are already at a global political crisis, although in its initial stage. Things should be called by their proper names. Maybe it is at this juncture where preventive strikes are needed and not at the point when the situation requires missiles and aircraft to launch preventive strikes. Preventive action, preventive politics – that's what we need.

We started acting at Green Cross International and had a most heated debate. Some argued that Green Cross should be similar to Red Cross: have money, investment funds, the necessary equipment and some rapid response teams. Thor Heyerdahl took the floor and said that, should we go down that route, that he would not accept chairmanship of this fund (Green Cross International) and would leave it. He said he saw just one possible line of action: we should help shape the global environmental conscience and, based on that, unite people to jointly stop the destruction of nature, which is already at disastrous proportions.

Federico Mayor was a big international leader at that time and probably did not have the time to participate in that meeting in Kyoto. But he knows the situation. Heyerdahl faced me with the question: "President, what is your stand on that?" I said that we should shape a vision, make assessments and shape consciousnesses. I think that in our case we at the World Political Forum, as a think-tank, should help shape in cooperation with other think-tanks, the global vision appropriate to the global challenges that we face. We face the challenge of security; we still face the challenge of poverty; we face the environmental challenge; the challenge of globalisation and the challenge of the growing shortage of resources.

I would like you to concentrate on this subject and not to dwell on peripheral issues. We at the World Political Forum should not play with abstract ideas and, if many of us have a better knowledge of regional problems, national governments and regional systems, let us discuss those regional problems, but do it having in mind the bigger picture and general issues of which they are all part. It is the interrelation between common human interests and national interests, the problems of vision and of politics and their influence, the role of public opinion, the opinion of the world community and global civil society and the shaping of a new more appropriate politics. This is what we need and we should use the entire potential of our expert community, members of which are present at our table here at the World Political Forum.

# A WORLD IN CRISIS: CHALLENGES, CONFLICTS, ACTORS

## I PANEL

Chairman: **Giulietto Chiesa**, *Member of the European Parliament, Columnist for La Stampa, Italy*

Every one of us is aware of the deep crisis that the international community is going through. The diagnosis is clear, while unfortunately the prognosis is obscure, uncertain and somehow already fatal. Most surely it will be so if we cannot succeed in substantially changing the world architecture. The question that gathers us together is not "Whether to change" but, "How to change? Which direction to go and what methods to use?" The principal question is whether the international community is prepared for a New World Order? I do not think so. I believe we must realise that the actual economic development model, as it stands, is no longer sustainable, which is to say that the future is not sustainable.

In 2003 the world produced 25 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide; even using the best technological resources we have, by 2030 we will produce 38 billion and in 2050, 59 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide, which is to say 137% more than today. Should the Kyoto protocol, which in any case is a step forward, be applied, it would not be enough. A scenario of advanced technologies can be imagined and should be realised. But this would imply a coordination of efforts, a combination of investments that currently is lacking. Instead, everyone goes his own way and the greater part of states and big corporations do not yet go in this direction. I choose this example from amongst the many components of the actual global crisis because, in my opinion, it could help us in finding methods that could be used to start the new world architecture. I would define this method with the term "transfer of sovereignty".

We should apply the European Union model on a global scale. There are some big challenges: water, migratory flows and energy. These challenges cannot be faced by means of occasional forums like Kyoto or Johannesburg that analyse problems without the possibility of making decisions. The question arises of where these decisions should be taken? Nowadays we have a better knowledge of the problems, but there is no place where these kinds of decisions are made. We need to create institutions to do this. So this is the question of the world architecture.

In order to lay the foundations of a new architecture, we must create "agencies" for the emergencies. These would be new agencies with executive and sanctioning powers. The World Trade Organisation should be used as the model. It is not only necessary to reform the big existing structures of the United Nations, but specific structures have to be founded with the authority and empowered to make decisions and to impose sanctions. The global crisis is growing faster and faster. If left unaddressed, this urgent situation will soon cause catastrophic wars. Unless we create the instruments to manage these crises, they will inevitably turn into conflicts.

We can expect that it will be certain that there will not be unanimity on all the answers to all these crisis, as was the case in Kyoto. The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol was not prevented by the lack of unanimity on its contents. Likewise, we cannot wait for total unanimity to decide on other pressing questions. The proposal is to build agencies that will be in a condition to obtain a certain consensus (as was the case of the International Criminal Tribunals) and to start a process of preliminary, collective (although not necessarily unanimous), decisions while waiting for the other states to join later on. This solution will immediately introduce virtuous processes and start the necessary cooperation in a new order. I would use the expression "union of the willing" in this innovative sense. If the willing becomes the majority, they can change the world situation for the better.

## **Stéphane Hessel, Ambassador, France**

You have in front of you a man who, when he was thirty years old, having spent a year in a Nazi concentration camp, reached New York and became an early United Nations official. It was my luck to work with the team chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, the President's widow and I was enthusiastically enlivened by the great French jurist René Cassin, who drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10th, 1948 and which remains today one of the essential cornerstones of worldwide international cooperation. In those years, most of us had a solid faith in the United Nations, convinced that we had learned the lesson of that terrible war, of Auschwitz and Hiroshima and would be able to found the future construction of the world on the fundamental value of human rights.

Forty-five years later, at the age of seventy-five, I was assigned to lead the French delegation to the World Conference for Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. We were in the middle of one of the most promising decades of modern history, the last of the twentieth century. Thanks to *Perestroika*, when the Soviet Union embarked on the path of democracy, it seemed possible to manage the new world-wide challenges together. It was the task of a series of world conferences, like the Vienna conference that I attended, which reaffirmed the indivisibility of civil and political rights and of economic, social and cultural rights and added the inalienable right to a sustainable development for all. The time was exceptionally ripe: there was the Beijing conference on women, the Copenhagen conference on social integration, the Cairo conference on population and the Rio conference on environment and development. Together we also put an end to the invasion of Kuwait.

Unfortunately, a few years later came a terrible shock, out of which arose a crisis of which we have not yet seen the end. I am obviously referring to September 11 and the emergence of a type of terrorism very difficult to grasp in its specificity, something different from the various local forms of terror linked to the remnants of colonialism and liberation movements. This time the country hit was one that we all need to build the world of tomorrow, the United States of America. Throughout the XXth century, the U.S. had played a prominent role, in which both President Wilson and President Roosevelt had made major contributions. Now suddenly, after September 11, not only a president, but a "team" took the lead and created a climate of unilateralism and of domination by military, economic and financial power in a world in which problems are not solved this way and the challenges become more and more threatening.

I have therefore felt it necessary to join a new "club", "team" or "lobby" which we have named the International Ethical Political and Scientific Collegium. The Collegium is comprised of those with scientific and political experience, former heads of state or government and men and women of scientific, cultural and philosophical vision. The first thing we have tried to think about is the urgently needed architecture of the new world institutions. Instruments cannot derive their legitimacy from anything other than the United Nations and the UN Charter, the basic values of which must be reaffirmed. We have a Security Council that could be made more legitimate by a review of its permanent membership and a limit put on the exercise of the veto; its mandate is strong enough to secure the peace of the world provided that the great powers want it.

But we do not have a body that we greatly need; Mikhail Gorbachev and Jacques Delors mentioned it, using a name that can be kept or changed: an Economic Security Council. Maybe it should be called the "Summit on the Management of the Great Challenges of the World". We need it to be composed of the heads of state of the twenty-two to twenty-five most important countries and it should be in permanent session, once or twice a year in full session, the rest of the year by "sherpas" in similar fashion to the G8. It must remain part of the United Nations, whose Charter provided for an Economic and Social Council. However, that body has lost its value and should now be replaced by such a "summit".

What needs to be achieved cannot be entrusted to anybody outside of the U.N., neither the G8, nor NATO or any other military or economic alliance.

We know what the challenges are. The crisis is here before us. We are aware of its details; the reports on them are available. But, the work has not begun: nobody is yet ready to renounce their

sovereignty, to put their resources at the disposal of global society. The financial and economic forces have not yet combined their efforts with the political forces to build together a fairer world. The great social forces, the churches, trade unions and the cities, should also weigh in to the balance.

In order to do this work, the UN must count on an organ endowed with “a global assignment”, with uncontested authority and legitimacy, able to exercise its rule over all the social, cultural and technical factors, but also those liable to show greater resistance to those in charge of finance, trade and economics. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation must be given a clear mandate by this supreme body: to ensure that human rights are promoted everywhere and respected by all, not only by those that have found political democracy but also the rights that put an end to poverty, to social injustice and to the degradation of the planet.

**Alexander Bessmertnykh, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia**

It is an unnerving habit of history to drop our world from time to time into the depths of despair. Now, once more, human society is struggling to see the light at the end of the tunnel. The political world today is passing through a very difficult period of time. Unprecedented problems demanding untested solutions have crowded in such a drastic manner within such an historically short time that many analysts have begun to believe that doom is creeping in from the darkness of an unpredictable chaos. This vision of an almost unbearable drama, although exaggerated, may be explained by the fact that the magnitude of what had happened was astounding even to the generations that had experienced the horrors and devastations of the world wars.

Shocking was the picture of great European federations – the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia – crumbling down without military pressures or domestic upheavals. Astonishing was the choice initially made by the only remaining superpower to use this opening for an attempt to present itself as an empire, ambitious enough to control global affairs and to use force unilaterally. No less surprising was the willingness on the part of certain states to play the role of a squire for the new principal. Terrorists, whom the international community have been fighting for decades, albeit quite unsuccessfully, selected the start of the twenty-first century for presenting themselves – in the most barbarous and cruel way – as uninvited actors on the world stage and managed to stay on it, killing innocent people, including children.

There developed a global disappointment about the fact that the end of the Cold War has not made the world safer and happier, as was expected. It did not bring a stability of the kind that would provide for the removal of a threat to world peace and of grave social and economic inequalities. I may only suspect that among the most disappointed today are the former leaders of the Soviet Union and the US, who, two decades ago invested great efforts to change the order of things in world politics. President George Bush (the father) stated in 1990 that “a New World Order” was coming and promised to undertake joint actions against aggressions. That was a response to President Gorbachev’s revolutionary concept of “a new thinking in world politics”. Both notions contained the word “new”, which reflected their honest desire to depart from the rules and practices of the tragic twentieth century. Unfortunately, subsequent events prevented the realisation of the new strategies that were produced at the peak of the US-Soviet and European cooperation, which were well supported by the allies on both sides.

**What was the promise of the “new thinking”, which was shared by the US leaders?**

The new thinking was based on the premise that; *ideology* would be no longer be a driving force in diplomacy; that there were and are, *common values* that are shared by the international community; that *negotiations and dialogue* would be the preferred method of inter-state communication; a refusal to use *armed force* as the main instrument of safeguarding national interests; that there would be *no interference* in the affairs of other states except in incidents allowed by the United Nations; and that there would be an optimal combination of foreign policy with morality and humanitarian concerns. Certainly, some of the components of the proposed new strategies were too romantic and too good for a world still deeply rooted in the habits of the Cold War. But, they presented a high standard to check against. The failure to establish the real New World Order opened doors to crises that are still dominating the global scene today. Essentially, the current world architecture consists of four sub-systems: 1. Political (which is mostly infected with crises); 2. Economic (active but unpredictable, producing growth and grievances); 3. Military (which is closely related to producing new, more destructive weapons and dangers) and 4. Scientific (that is flourishing with new discoveries, opening fantastic opportunities for the future). These sub-systems are all interrelated and transcend each other. They are present in the many challenges that humanity will face in the years to come. I shall mention just three of them.

**The first challenge: How to provide reliable security to people, states and the world.**

We are witness to a powerful revival of the arms race. In 2004, the aggregate defence spending in the world overstepped the historical threshold of one trillion dollars. Technological breakthroughs have provided new weapons of increased precision and destructive power. This capability has had a strong impact on certain decision-makers, who, in their arrogance, started to reject negotiations

and treaties. The recent plans of the U.S. to install ABM systems in Europe and Asia would obviously prompt a response from Russia and other powers, with all the ensuing consequences for strategic stability. The current non-proliferation regime does not work well, although without it the situation would have been much worse. In today's atmosphere of threats and insecurity, some countries now hope to rely on nuclear weapons as an ultimate form of protection. The examples of North Korea and certain other suspected countries are troublesome. Recently, Washington has adopted a dangerous new doctrine of the militarisation of space, which insists upon rejecting any negotiations, discussions, or any multilateral controls of military space programmes and even on denying access to outer space to any nation considered unfriendly to U.S. interests. This unprecedented step would inevitably heighten the competition in a space arms race. To halt these trends, the international community should resolutely come back to the agenda of arms control and disarmament and consider again the possibility of a universal ban on and destruction of, nuclear weapons. Outer space should be de-weaponised. There should be established a new disarmament forum of nuclear and major non-nuclear states. It will be a difficult task. Nobody can say that the solutions are easily visible. But we have to try again.

**The second challenge: How to provide reintegration to an increasingly inconstant world.**

The world system is disintegrating. The global system that had previously existed was basically a combination of three structures: the Trans-Atlantic alliance, headed by the US; the Socialist alliance (Warsaw Pact + certain non-European countries) and the block of the Non-aligned nations. It was a highly competitive, but pretty stable, triangular system. A major part of that system disintegrated, in the nineties, into multiple units and the process of that disintegration is ongoing still. Even the US and its allies are drifting apart on major issues of policy, for instance on Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran and energy projects etc. Europe has started to think about a military force of its own and is now less willing to take orders from Washington. Some of the old quarrels, which have slept for centuries, undisturbed, have suddenly re-emerged. Little brutish wars have exploded on the brinks of Europe and Eurasia; where small ethnic groups are claiming sovereignty and self-identification. The fragmentation of global society complicates the stabilisation of the economic and social order. The troubled areas do not need a conductor but rather a common score – a new set of shared values uniting humanity to resolve the issues. It looks like we may soon see a new model of stability or semi-stability. On the ruins of the old world order there would appear a network of fresh coalitions, less strictly structured than the Cold War alliances; each coalition would dominate an important region. Within those blocs, economic integration will develop more intensively than political integration. One may foresee about half a dozen coalitions competing with each other. Would they make our world more stable? It is too early to say. In any case, much would depend on their ability to balance their interests.

**The third challenge: How to devise a new, practical and effective system of leadership in the modern world.**

One thing is clear: Leadership cannot be exercised by a single power, which cannot provide a global balance - a key factor for stability. Effective leadership can only be collective, which, in turn, becomes international security. All major states should participate, including the Group of Eight, as well as the leading members of the regional coalitions. The unilateral use of force should be considered unacceptable, since it would inevitably destabilise the world. Unilateralism contains a risk of self-isolation for the country which may exercise it and it destroys completely the concept of the freedom of choice, which was the backbone of the new thinking. The role of the United Nations is to be enhanced. Through the UN we shall introduce unified rules of international behaviour that will be applied to all actors in world affairs. These rules should be clear, transparent and acceptable to all. In return, all actors should be able to distinctly explain themselves and to try to understand the explanations given by others. Finally, I want to emphasise that, with all the troubles at hand, the current world is not hopeless. When we look beyond current international politics and economics, we see great achievements in science and technology promising impressive unifying potential. We see new leaders growing and new generations coming. They are more pragmatic, more open minded, less angry and less suspicious. Global civil society is taking shape and our Forum is an important part of it. It is eager and able to play a positive and enlightened role in making this world truly pleasant to live in.

**Mary Kaldor**, *Director of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance and Professor of Global Governance at the London School of Economics, UK*

I feel very privileged to be participating with such distinguished people as we have heard. Some of you may have seen the estimate in the British medical journal the Lancet, that 655,000 people are estimated to have died as a result of the war in Iraq. Now, this estimate was based on the best method of estimating casualties; it was based on interviews in clusters of households in Iraq. And in the vast majority of cases death certificates were actually produced, so it is a good estimate. And of those 655,000 people, 600,000 were killed as a result of violence, one third as a result of attacks by coalition forces. And the study also showed that violence has been increasing every single year since 2003, it has been accelerating. Moreover, the violence in Iraq is spreading. The techniques have been exported to Afghanistan. The violence in Iraq has contributed to the tension in Palestine and Lebanon. It is not well known but there have been attacks inside Iran. The PKK, the Kurdish insurgency, has been renewed partly as a result of support from inside Iraq. And of course there has been a spread of Al Qaeda cells in the rest of the world, especially in Western Europe, and especially in my own country, the United Kingdom. And I think what's unfolding in Iraq is in fact the worst of the scenarios that those of us who opposed the war dreamed up. I don't think we ever thought that the war would be quite as bad as it really is. And all of the things that we worried about, the violence inside Iraq, the spread to the whole of the Middle East, are coming true.

Now I apologise to President Gorbachev for being so specific when he asked us to talk about general issues. But I dwell on the dangerous situation in Iraq because I think it's massive, and indeed it is at the heart of what I would call the security gap in the world today. Even though our security arrangements are disintegrating, as our previous speaker just said, nevertheless they are still based on a kind of configuration that is drawn from what happened in the twentieth century, from two world wars. We imagine that security is based on military forces who will be involved in what I call old wars, the wars of the twentieth century, where conventional forces fight each other and the decisive encounter is battle. Our image of war is that of the two world wars in the twentieth century and the imagined Cold War, as I would call it.

Yet most of the wars in the world today are very different. They are fought by a combination of state and non-state actors. They are wars fought in the name of sectarian identities, ethnicity or religion, rather than for ideology or state interest. Above all they are wars where battles are actually very rare and the main victims are civilians. And usually this is deliberate; in a world where accurate destructive light weapons are widely available, battles are too destructive to be fought. The best way to control territory is to terrorise the population. So ethnic cleansing, genocide, and massive violations of human rights are today the deliberate tactics of war.

And it's also true that civilians are the main victims of attempts to counter ethnic and religious violence, whether we are talking about Chechnya, Palestine, Iraq or Afghanistan, because conventional forces like the Americans' or the Israelis' don't know how to distinguish civilians from combatants, and because they use long distance weapons to protect themselves. It results in large collateral damage, as it is known in the business, which means that they also kill civilians. All wars nowadays not only have very high civilian casualties but also have very high population displacement. And the number of refugees and displaced persons per conflict has steadily increased over the last two decades.

Finally, these wars are also characterised by criminalised economies. They very often take place in authoritarian states that have been liberalised as a result of globalisation. They don't have taxes any longer to finance their conflicts, so they finance them through loot, pillage, trade in illegal drugs, oil, diamonds, whatever. And it is often difficult to know the motivation – are the people fighting fanatic religious belligerents, or ethnic militants, or are they criminals who find ethnic and religious militancy a good cover for their economically motivated activities?

In this situation the use of military force in classic ways makes things worse. When the Americans invaded Iraq they used the imagery of World War Two. They treated it like a sort of technology-intense blitzkrieg. This was the swiftest advance in military history, said President Bush, we are entering a new era warfare. But actually what happened was that the Americans walked into Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi people, the Iraqi army took off and went home, and they didn't actually control anything except for the bases they built. What happened afterwards turned into a typical

new war. Attacks on insurgents took on a sectarian nature, because most of the insurgents were Sunnis. The dismantlement of institutions and the attacks on infrastructure promoted a criminalised economy. And indeed the Americans themselves, because they were short of manpower, took on many private security companies, so they too had become a combination of state and non-state actors.

So what do we do to close the security gap? Which is after all not just about Iraq – all over the world there are conflicts, major conflicts of this type, and where conventional military forces simply don't work in the way they used to. I am very much in favour of an approach based on human security, and by that I mean individuals and the communities in which they live, rather than national security. And my view is that human security may involve military forces but configured in completely different ways from in the past. There is a lot of talk now about the responsibility to protect, and in principle I am very much in favour of that, but there is much less talk about how you do it. I don't think you can use conventional military forces in a classic way to do it. What you have to have is something much more like law enforcement. We've seen the spread of human rights law, thanks to Mr. Hessel and others; we've seen the establishment of the International Criminal Court – more and more international and more and more about the rights of individuals, but what we lack is enforcement. And I think we have to think of this law enforcement not only of enforcing international law but in its methods. It has to focus on protecting people rather than killing the enemy. It has to focus on stabilising, stopping genocide and stopping violence, not on victory. It has to focus on creating conditions for the establishment of legitimate authorities (whether they're states, whether they're international organisations) capable of guaranteeing the rule of law.

I think the people who are here have been very pessimistic about the 1990s, and I think a lot of opportunities were missed. But there was a learning process. I think in Africa and the Balkans the international community did learn a little bit about how to stabilise conflicts, a little bit about reaching peace agreements and sustaining them, but not so much about respecting human rights and dealing with transnational crime. And of course this whole process was stopped, reversed by 9/11, by terror and by the response to the war on terror. And that brings us to an entirely new and dangerous situation, and so there is even more of an argument for a human security approach, particularly I would say by the European Union. I don't think the European Union should become a competitive superpower, but I do think the European Union has a huge responsibility to contribute to global security and that would be by adopting such an approach.

I want to finish by turning back to Iraq. The trouble with the debate about Iraq is that it's entirely about whether you should stay or leave. And I'm certainly in favour of leaving, but whereas a year ago I would have said that if we leave we'll make things a little bit better (because we are part of the problem, the insurgents are attacking British and American troops), today withdrawal is almost irrelevant, the violence will continue whether US or British troops are there or not. I think withdrawal is good because people are getting killed, but more importantly the British and American troops are an obstacle to any kind of solution. And what's really needed is some kind of international peace conference, a new international mandate, but it would require a kind of human security operation on a scale beyond which any of us can possibly imagine. Our friend from Italy mentioned the UN force in Lebanon, and I think that was a tremendously important step, a very important step by Italy towards strengthening the European Union, but nevertheless that's very small compared with what's required in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I'm very pessimistic about whether any of this can be achieved, but I really welcome the opportunity to be here in this Forum and to put forward some arguments about what we need to do, but it's on such a scale. And I would add as a very final point: as well as the actions of all the wonderful people who are here in ending the Cold War, civil society was also key, and we need civil society very much for this kind of approach.

**Vladimir Petrovsky**, *Former Director-General of the UN in Geneva and President of the Conference on Disarmament, Russia*

In my statement, I will deal with the action-oriented approach to a world in crisis on three issues: I. The challenges of a world in crisis and the new political architecture; II. What is to be done for action-oriented policy and III. How to achieve the tangible results.

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The process of globalisation that we are now facing reminds us of Damocles' sword, because it opens opportunities for some and leaves other people in dramatic conditions. Today, our world is really in crisis. The challenges are multiple. The gap between the rich and poor is growing and has become one of the most troublesome realities in our world. According to UN data, some 840 million people out of the seven billion inhabitants of our planet do not have enough to eat. The 2005 Summit made it clear that official state aid to poor countries should be 0.7% of GNP. Violence is another major threat, with new kinds of conflicts taking place. Out of the sixty current conflicts, only four are interstate: the others are domestic and dominated by national, cultural or religious issues. There has been a privatisation of violence and emerging asymmetries between the global actors, with states on the one side and mainly terrorism and transnational organised crime on the other. Terrorism is one of the major threats and states will have to define new ways to deal with this threat as the use of military force appears not to be enough.

There has been a spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and this increases the danger of the conflicts in the world. There are also well-known serious threats such as diseases, environmental degradation, the manipulation of information and the violation of human rights. To address all these threats, it is necessary to treat them interdependently and to make the process of globalisation more human-oriented, fairer and more equitable. This demands collective action at the institutional and civil society levels.

From this viewpoint, it is important to keep in mind that the present stage of globalisation, characterised by an unprecedented pace of change, coincides with deep changes in the political architecture. The authority of states, which remain the major actors at the global scene, is being challenged. Many governments are unable to control what transpires within their borders and are incapable of meeting their obligations to their citizens. To meet the new challenges, states need to develop a much wider definition of their national interest, both in scope and time. They need to learn how to network with different kinds of actors in order to produce global goods and services. Due to these multiple and interacting processes, a fundamental change in the nature and conception of sovereignty is taking place.

Global politics, in which states are the major units, is not just politics on a larger scale, but an entirely different kind of politics, that is fundamentally different from traditional domestic and international politics. The boundary that, in the past, used to divide domestic and international politics is fading away. The global character of the new challenges demands a universal response and concerted multilateral actions that transcend the national boundaries and stereotypes of traditional interstate relations. It represents a formidable challenge for the whole system of interstate and intergovernmental organisations.

There are four levels of interaction between states: the global, trans-continental, regional and local levels. At the highest global level, in addition to the UN, there are the G8, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and some other structures. The new trans-continental level is represented by organisations such as NATO, OSCE, APEC, ASEAN, the G77 and others. I would particularly like to stress the importance of the new regionalism, which represents not only the increasing number of traditional regional levels, but also the new sub-regional organisations. There is a clear trend nowadays to ensure that the regional structures retain a character of openness by encouraging interdependent participation. For the sake of harmony in the interaction of the governmental structures at all levels, a constructive parallel approach for these actions should be encouraged.

-II-

I deeply believe that the new geo-politics makes strategic security a major goal and that the new paradigm of mutual respect needs a clear message for action-oriented policy. Since the beginning of the XIX century and the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815, security has been considered a cornerstone of peace, stability and well-being for all international structures and alliances. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations were created with the purpose of ensuring security for all their members. As the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev once said, "Security will not bring us to paradise, but will close the doors to the Hell". Security, associated with the positive peace – meaning not only the absence of conflicts but also the presence of stability, well-being and normal relations between states – is supposed to be treated in a multifaceted, comprehensive manner. A major breakthrough to such an approach to security took place at the end of the Cold War. With the strong support of President Gorbachev, the USSR Foreign Ministry suggested to discuss in the UN, the new comprehensive approach to security. In autumn 1989, after three years of negotiations, Moscow and Washington jointly introduced to the Forty-fourth Session of the UN General Assembly, the draft resolution on security in all aspects, which was unanimously adopted as Resolution 44/21. According to this resolution, security should be treated not only in its traditional military dimension, but as security in all aspects: from violence as well as from hunger, disease, environmental degradation and any violation of human rights.

Security in all aspects implies the security of the state, of the society and of the human being. It incorporates the ideas of collective, common and cooperative security, which were advanced both by the UN and the NGO communities. In the post-September 11<sup>th</sup> situation, the importance of security in all aspects is even more prominent. The new security environment reinforces the need for states and international bodies to take every possible measure, consistent with the rule of law and with human values, in order to assure the safety of citizens and the security of societies and states. Furthermore, within the paradigm of strategic security, the traditional military-political issues should be tackled with the aim of the promotion of peace. Within this context, the five "P's" are becoming very important: preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peacekeeping, peace-building and peace enforcement as a last resort.

As for disarmament, we need now to make clear what we are striving for. In the Cold War, we spoke about disarmament and arms control because the major players could not accept the UN Charter's "arms regulation" terminology. I deeply believe that the time has come to revive this UN Charter concept. Arms regulation means less than general and complete disarmament, but more than arms control. The core of the existing arms regulation regime is directed at the non-proliferation of WMD and the control of the transfer of conventional weapons through rules-based norms that contain clear terms for the compliance, implementation and verification of their standards. They also underscore the principle of preventive action, which is the greatest assurance of security that we can have. Thus, they provide a strong foundation for practical action to fight terrorism.

-III-

Turning to the question of how to achieve tangible practical results, I can say from my political and diplomatic experience that we must acknowledge the many new actors in the global arena. To achieve tangible results in bringing together moderates from all over the world, we need to develop close partnerships between the governments, independent judiciaries, legislatures, religious bodies, civil society, academic institutions, businesses and the media. A cross-sectional partnership between politicians, religious leaders, intellectuals, media networks and representatives of NGOs, could promote new perceptions and new policies for international issues by enhancing their relevance for the domestic constituencies while confronting the most relevant issues on the global agenda in order to build an institutional base for politics in a healthy democracy.

The role of parliaments in mobilising political will is of paramount importance. From my own experience as Director-General of the UN Headquarters in Geneva, I highly appreciate how the UN

and the IPU, since 1995, have shared parliamentary diplomacy. In many cases, parliaments have helped multilateral diplomacy, putting into effect the international agreements through ratification. Of course, the role of the NGOs, which are the most obvious manifestation of civil society, is of no less importance in mobilising political will. NGOs hold different views from those of the governments and they serve as an effective proponent in elaborating governmental policies. NGOs should fulfil a role as the generators of international consensus. Within the context of peace promotion, there exists many opportunities for NGOs in early warning, preventive diplomacy, conflict management and coalition building. Of course, mass media is supposed to be actively involved in the action-oriented dialogue that aims to identify good and bad practices. Therefore, mass media can be especially helpful in reducing mutual or relational ignorance.

To develop a close partnership of the major actors, good governance is very much needed. It is very important to emphasize the meaning of good governance. For me, it denotes transparent, responsible, constitutional, democratic governance. Such governance is supposed to be guided by the primacy of the rule of law, based on common moral and ethical principles. This is the only way to live in accordance with the new humane standards and to express the solidarity of the whole of humanity towards those who have had the misfortune to have fallen prey to life's perils.

I strongly believe in the primacy of the legal approach. New negotiations concerning security in all aspects should be based on the existing norms of international law, with a special emphasis on legal, rather than military, deterrence. In other words, there should be a clear understanding that justice is best served before the bar and not by dropping bombs. The sovereignty of the state is not only its right, but a responsibility that makes it obligatory for the state to provide the security of territory, the society and the human being in all dimensions.

The primacy of law needs constitutional democracy at all levels of interaction. As for democracy at the global level, we need to strengthen the United Nations, which is today no longer a conference-servicing organisation located in a few headquarters, but is now a highly diversified organisation, working world-wide to improve the lives of people who need help. The UN now has 80,000 peacekeepers in seventeen countries.

Of course, it is clear that reform of the UN is much needed. However, it is also clear that, due to existing procedures, it will take a long time to implement all the reform proposals. Nevertheless, much could be done now for the adjustment of the UN to reflect the changing situation if we were to take a fresh interpretation of the UN Charter. Nothing in the Charter prevents the Security Council from having regular meetings at the foreign minister level and holding meetings at different places. The Military Staff Committee, instead of being abolished, should be revived so that meetings of military leaders at different levels could be introduced to the international arena. Much could be done to improve the management of the conference services and some new agencies should be created.

The strengthening of the role of the UN as the centre of agreed action will require a responsible return to multilateralism. By this I mean, on the one hand, recognition by all member states of the role played by the key actors that is required for bilateral and multilateral policy formulation; and, on the other hand, a responsiveness by the same key actors to the views of all the members of the global community. On the national level, constitutional democracy does not entail the existence of a police state or military watchdog, but implies an obligatory observation of the laws that have been worked out by the elected representatives, as well as the adherence to the value systems. Democracy should be in the people's minds, a part of how they see the world and that is not something that can be achieved overnight.

Last, but not least, for an action-oriented approach it is necessary to develop the spirit and culture of dialogue at all levels of interaction. In other words, what is important today is not only the message that we wish to communicate, but how we communicate it. This affects how our message will be perceived and received. In our communication, we must be neutral and as devoid of double standards as possible. In the dialogue, we should demonstrate a genuine interest in the points of view of others and allow for constructive criticism. We should underline common values and cultural differences. We must also be understood correctly – not just through an understanding of our words but also of their deeper meaning.

We should speak less of generalities, concentrating more on practical undertakings and bringing to the attention of the listeners good examples, in order to demonstrate how peace, stability and well-being are able to replace hatred and conflict. Citing good examples does not imply the insistence on the adoption of a blueprint for all countries. We need to have a new outlook on diplomacy to create the conditions so that the power of diplomacy prevails over the diplomacy of power and, that the balance of interests prevails over the balance of powers. Of course, particular attention should be paid to the understanding of these goals by the younger generation, to whom the future of our planet belongs.

In conclusion, I would like to say that CDAC, of which I am the Chairman, is planning to launch its projects following the principles and approaches, elaborated in my statement. CDAC also seeks to cooperate closely with the World Political Forum.

## II PANEL

Chairman: **Riccardo Petrella**, *Professor of Globalization at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve*

We all agree that the problems are well-known, as well as many of the solutions.

What remains uncertain, even from an analytical, scientific and political point of view, are the dynamics by the means of which the actors will make their choices, and above all to know if the actors will do some common, cooperative choices.

I would like to propose to the speakers of this session to concentrate their analysis on the speakers more than on the actors or the problems. I would like them to tell us, on the basis of their experience, what are the problems of the main actors today, who are the actors that create problems and who are the actors who can offer solutions.

Finally, I would like them to answer to the question: can the actors who are part of the problem be the ideal actors to be part of the solution?

**Robert Skidelsky**, *Member of the House of Lords and Professor of Economic History at Warwick University, UK*

Mr. Chairman, I'm going to follow your advice and talk about the problems and actors rather than the challenges. And I want to talk about a particular class of actors, or a particular class of action, and that is the role of sanctions in international relations. What role do they play in the new world political architecture? As we know, the object of sanctions is to try to shift the behaviour of states, groups or individuals closer to generally accepted international norms. And they've become one of the favourite tools of foreign policy in today's world. And that's not surprising really, because sanctions are an effect of globalisation. The more contact countries have between each other, the more scope there is for economic and other kinds of sanctions. When there are no economic contacts between countries, there is no scope for economic sanctions, because they are not vulnerable to interruptions of economic relations. Conversely, another thing that we need to recognise is that sanctions interrupt economic contact between countries and therefore go against globalisation. They encourage a greater degree of self-sufficiency in the countries concerned, as the countries adapt their economies to reduce contact with the outside world. And whether it is desirable or not is something we have to consider.

Today, scarcely a day goes by without some country, some group or some political leader being sanctioned for some offence or other. These sanctions range all the way from the heavyweight trade and financial embargoes currently enforced or threatened against North Korea and Iran, to pin pricks like the travel restrictions imposed on Lukashenko or Mugabe. Somewhere between these extremes, Russia has recently cut transport and postal links with Georgia.

Now, let me say a bit about the history and purpose of sanctions, because I think these are very misunderstood. Historically, sanctions (or embargoes as they were called) were part of war. They were part of the apparatus of war. Great Britain banned the import of French wine during the Napoleonic wars, and therefore people had to drink Portuguese wine. Portuguese wine was considered undrinkable by the British, and this led the Portuguese to develop a mixture of wine and brandy to replace French wine, which is called port, and it is still very much enjoyed today. This was one of the unintended consequences of economic sanctions as part of war. But today America still regards sanctions as part of war, most recently as part of the war against terror, and earlier on as part of the war against communism. And the United States is the leading country that imposes the most unilateral sanctions on others. Unilateral sanctions by the United States pose a particular problem for the rest of the world, because the United States insists on applying its own sanctions extraterritorially. The American Patriot Act of 2001 allows American authorities to seize funds held by non-US banks. And currently the United States claims jurisdiction over any company in the world which invests in either Libya or Iraq. In other words, the way the United States applies its unilateral sanctions is to try to make the whole world an accomplice in the United States' foreign policy, whether they agree with that foreign policy or not.

Well, that was the original idea of sanctions as part of war. After the First World War, the idea developed that economic sanctions could be an alternative to war, a way of putting escalating pressure on states to modify their behaviour without going to war (although war would be the ultimate resort). And that is the philosophy of Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter. Under Article 41, the Security Council can impose wide-ranging sanctions whose sole object is to maintain or restore international peace and security. And an Article 41 resolution is binding on all the states concerned. But it is very important to remember that UN sanctions are limited to those two cases – where there is a breach of peace or a threat to peace. UN sanctions cannot be imposed for any other purpose, under the UN Charter. However, there are some groups of nations who now impose sanctions of their own, outside the United Nations, and not for any security reasons. The main one being the European Union. The European Union imposes what I might call 'sanctions of disapproval', mainly relating to violations of human rights and democracy. At present there are 12 autonomous EU sanction regimes in operation. And these sanctions, rather like smart bombs, are targeted chiefly on leaders, groups and individuals, rather than on states or populations.

Over the last ten years, the philosophy of sanctions has shifted from comprehensive sanctions to targeted sanctions, and there are two main reasons for this. The first is that comprehensive

sanctions were thought to impose too much humanitarian damage on populations. Iraq was the great case in point. Huge suffering was visited on the population of Iraq and apparently they didn't succeed in their object, which was to remove Saddam Hussein. They may have actually succeeded in another way, in stopping him acquiring weapons of mass destruction, but he was still there after eight years of UN sanctions and after the population had suffered huge hardship. And so, the usual rule now is that sanctions should never restrict the imports of food, medicine, clothes and other essential equipment.

Now, there's a dilemma there, there's a contradiction. If you devise your sanctions so as not to inflict any damage on the population, then they obviously don't have as much effect, because it was through the damage to the population that sanctions were supposed to have their effect, by encouraging the population to revolt against the regime that was in power. The suffering of the people would bring the pressure on the regime to change its policy, or even bring about a change of regime. So, if the sanctions regime is designed to protect people from suffering, then they will have no incentive to change the regime. Sanctions work through pain. If you remove the pain, sanctions are useless.

Well, you say, what about the pain on individuals, you can still bring pain on individuals? No doubt President Lukashenko suffers great pain from not being allowed to travel to Bonn. And maybe Mugabe suffers great pain from not being allowed to go to London. And financial freezes, travel limitations and so on are also ways of inflicting pain. But they don't really do very much damage. The effects of all these travel bans and bank freezes have been negligible in causing any of the regimes or people concerned to change their policies, even though 20,000 individuals in the European Union are subject to asset freezes at the present time.

One obvious way of causing pain to individuals, if you want to pursue that route, is to assassinate them. But only Israel has gone for this form of sanction, usually bringing condemnation from everywhere else in the world. Yet the assassination of a powerful rogue leader might do much more good than trying to trawl through his bank accounts. This is something that is just on the edge of discussion. There have been targeted assassinations in the past; America has used assassination as a weapon. Is that to be considered as part of an effective sanctions policy or not? So let's turn finally to the future. We must recognise that sanctions have a poor track record. Comprehensive sanctions rarely work. Everyone has to be part of them if they are to work, and this has never been achieved. As for sanctions of disapproval, they make us feel good, we feel better people because we have passed a resolution saying we don't approve of these regimes. They're symbolic, but they don't actually achieve any good. The other day I asked an EU official why Lukashenko was banned from travelling in the EU, and he said, "Well, it's the least we can do".

One last point. There will always be a role for sanctions, but let's think of something else, which is old-fashioned diplomacy. That's the traditional tool of international relations, which deserves wider use. It is sometimes called constructive engagement or positive incentives. One of these tools comes down to the old tradition of diplomacy, which is simply that, if you speak to people the whole time, you have a greater chance of avoiding misunderstandings. The second comes out of the tradition of free trade. The old idea was that, the more people trade with each other, the more economic contacts they have with each other, the more likely they are to converge and to grow together. And sanctions are the reverse of constructive engagement and giving people positive incentives. And so I believe that the more you can do to get people to find out about other societies, to trade with each other, the more you can get leaders to move around and find out about societies other than their own, then the better it will be. So let's give free trade more of a chance and restrict the role of sanctions to those places where they really have a chance of doing good.

**Gyula Horn**, *Former Prime Minister of Hungary*

An important question that we face today concerns the way in which the countries that have recently become democratic must seemingly face a period of social crisis. I believe that we are in a new global era. The period of development is finished for almost all the countries of Western Europe and the countries that have not yet concluded this phase have made much progress in this sense. For my country, the entrance into Western Europe was certainly useful, but I think that this brought advantages to all the countries of the European Union. We are grateful to all those who helped us, but we would like to recognise the necessity, also recognised by others, of solving the actual problems that remain. There are some situations that absolutely need to be answered, based on our experience and on the experience of all the other countries. We cannot waste time and must make these decisions, because the stakes are high.

Another point that I would raise is the reform of the United Nations. Personally, I believe a reform is necessary, but the Great Powers did not adequately face the problem of reform. What we really need is an organisation that is able to influence the political choices of the states. The important thing is not so much having a reformed organisation of the United Nations, but having a UN that is able to give answers. Today, the role of the UN is primarily to manage the situations of tension, but the problem is: Who creates the conditions for the development of the world? Why don't we consider what has been done for Europe? It would be a very important development if the UN had a structure that consented to the creation of a world as we want it, in peace. Obviously, in order to obtain this, an increase in the members of the Security Council would be necessary. Countries such as Brazil and others, which are crucial for future development, cannot be excluded. The future of everyone depends on this. Besides, it is necessary that the UN is equipped with the appropriate instruments in order to face the various situations as they arise. For example, the UN should be provided with its own army for peacekeeping.

Another consideration is the situation in the Balkans. Enormous changes took place over the last few years, eliminating the Balkan menace. However, the problem of Kosovo remains. A lot can be done for peace in the Balkans by solving the problem of Kosovo. The stabilisation of the situation in the Balkans will have a positive effect on the whole of Europe. For this reason and others, Europe must now be stronger than before. The fact that Europe has not yet become the centre of the convergence of interests and actions has caused a great loss.

Searching for new cultural answers is necessary as well. Culture is at the root of peace and, in Eastern Europe, we can examine the European Union experiences and examples of the past, which could be useful to our policies today. An especially good example of these troubles and their hopeful solutions is Hungary. The problems in Hungary are of a social nature: we cannot fight against social problems and poverty without reforms, but we must think about security as well. There is no country in Europe that does not have a close relationship with the foreign policies of all the other nations in Europe. We could gain a great deal from closer collaboration, especially with the new orientation of our country. But why can't we have a new level in the quality of relationships throughout the European Union? A new level of cooperation could be very useful, not only for Hungary, but for the European countries. I therefore believe that some reforms are necessary in this direction too.

We must be willing to realise reforms. This is the most serious problem for countries like ours. Big multinationals exist, which contribute to a third of global industrial production. However, the presence and industry of these multinationals notwithstanding, has seen poverty has double in Hungary in the last fifteen years. Democracy is not only linked to local politics; we must make basic reforms to have a new policy and a new, more inter-state democracy. Being pragmatic in our actions has never been so important. In Eastern European societies, we are already turning away from ideology. The formerly socialist countries have no experience in what to do, to solve the fundamental problems that grip us. However, we have good hopes for our future with Europe.

**Lakdar Brahimi**, *Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Algeria*

I'm going to try to speak of the actors that are going to shape the new architecture that this conference is discussing. And coming as I do from the field of conflict and post-conflict management, and having done that most of the time for the United Nations in particular, you will not be surprised that the actor I'm going to talk about is the United Nations, and especially the Security Council, seen from the narrow angle of their activities in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding areas.

Last year, a newly established academic centre created in the University of British Columbia in Canada published something called the Human Security Report 2005. In that report they addressed very essential questions that need discussing in various ways, including – since the end of the Cold War, has the security situation improved or worsened? Are things better because the Cold War is over, or have they become worse? And in particular, what is the role of the United Nations? Has the role of the United Nations been more effective in dealing with the problems that it has been created for – maintaining peace and security, or restoring peace and security, when things have happened against peace? I think that the authors of this report claim that they have discovered the following (to quote from the report itself): “Over the past dozen years, the global security climate has changed in dramatic, positive but largely unheralded ways. Civil wars, genocides and international crises have all declined sharply. International wars, now only a small minority of conflicts, have been in steady decline for a much longer period, as have military coups and the average number of people killed per conflict per year.” Archbishop Desmond Tutu, whose name is familiar to all of you, provided the foreword to this report, and he writes: “As the report shows, the big decline in warfare in the 1990s is due primarily to the dramatic UN-led post Cold War upsurge in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It turns out that cooperative multilateral security strategies are far more effective than the UN's critics allow.” This obviously is very welcome news; it is confirmed on the ground, and it is particularly flattering to the United Nations and all the hundreds of thousands of people all around the world who over the years have participated in the work of the United Nations, in particular peacekeepers.

The UN was also very flattered in 2004 and 2005 by the Rand Corporation, which commissioned two books that have been published on peacekeeping and peacemaking. In these two books a comparison was established between peacekeeping missions led by the United Nations and military interventions by the United States. The conclusion there was even more flattering to the United Nations, because the conclusion was that, all in all, the United Nations does much better than the United States when they intervene in a conflict. Their management of these conflicts is more effective, more lasting and of course vastly less expensive than military intervention done by the Americans.

Encouraging and welcome as both the Human Security Report and the Rand publications are, there certainly is no reason or room for complacency. The Human Security Report itself warns that the dramatic improvements in security documented in this report are real and important, but they are not cause for complacency. Some sixty wars are still being fought around the world, and the post Cold War years have also been marked by major humanitarian emergencies and even disasters, gross abuses of human rights, war victims, and even deadlier acts of terror. Nevertheless, for anyone who was tempted towards complacency, I think we only need to look around us to see that things are still very complicated and very dangerous.

Look at Somalia, for example, which has been left to fester in its problems for 15 years now. Or look at Côte d'Ivoire. Just less than ten years ago it was given as the shining example of development and success, and it is now really in danger of becoming one of the worst failed states of Africa. There is Haiti; time after time the United Nations goes there, establishes a mission, says that they have re-established peace and security; they leave, but one or two years later they have to come back because there is a new crisis; it has happened four or five times over the last ten years. Or look at Afghanistan. Five years after the supposedly successful implementation of the Bonn Process, the Taliban are back with a vengeance, keeping in check the mighty NATO, who three years ago were saying that failure is not an option in Afghanistan. I am now afraid that failure is looking at them in the face.

I'm very, very grateful to Mary Kaldor for talking here about the Iraq situation. What I'm going to add is that of course Iraq is, in the context of what I'm trying to say, in a league of its own, because it is the deadliest conflict we face at this particular time; because there is no clear perspective anywhere on how the multifaceted conflict in that poor country is going to be addressed at all; because the country is not coming out of conflict, it is sinking deeper into conflict; and because the alternative to a unified peaceful Iraq is not as some people say three different states in Iraq, but total chaos that will necessarily spread to all the neighbours of Iraq and probably much further a field.

So this is the half empty, half full glass that we see in the work of the United Nations' field of peace and security. Let me now speak a little bit about the direct role of the Security Council in this field. As there is very little time I will just mention two or three points about the Security Council. Just a moment ago we heard about sanctions. I think that sanctions have rarely been very successful when applied by the Security Council. Quite the contrary; very often they have done much more harm to the people. They are supposed to attack the leaders but they actually hurt the people. I think that since the end of the Cold War the Security Council has also from time to time produced resolutions that were not implemented or not necessary or not realistic. Just one recent example: they adopted a resolution on Darfur, after the peace agreement of sorts was signed in Abuja, that was not necessary at all; all the resolution did was provoke a harder and more hostile attitude from the government of Sudan. So one hopes that the Security Council will keep away from this. The other thing the Security Council is doing is showing more and more that it is dominated by one or two or three countries, and especially by one country. And this is not helping the United Nations to keep its credibility as the independent and impartial actor that is needed when we enter.

The last point I would like to make has also been mentioned earlier, which is Mary Kaldor's point about responsibility to protect. It is a beautiful formula brought in by Gareth Evans, but I'm not sure whether they cover the practical ways of addressing this problem. Somalia is the place where the people of Somalia, the people of Africa and everyone else would have been extremely happy if this principle had been implemented; it has not. And today the Security Council is adopting resolution after resolution about Darfur. No country is going to go to Darfur, no country is going to send one single soldier to Darfur. So these are the possibilities, the promises and the limits of the United Nations in the future.

**Pascal Boniface**, *Director of IRIS, France*

The actors playing roles on the international scene have widely changed in the last years. When I was a student in international relations, we studied books by Morgenthau or Raymond Aron that stated that international relations are relations among states, symbolized by the soldier making war and the diplomat making peace. Also these relations were limited to peace and war among nations. Nobody today would say that states are now the only actors in international relations. At the same time, it is not true that international relations are simple; as Bismarck stressed at the end of the XIX century, at a time when there were only five great powers “it was and is, not just a matter of three against two, with no thought given the rest of the world”. Today, nobody could say that three powers acting on the international scene is enough. Therefore, after the Raymond Aron and Morgenthau era, there has been not only a big differentiation, but, above all, an extreme multiplication of actors because along with the existing states, other actors appeared or became stronger. International organisations born in the XIX century, have a role today, although criticised, they are more useful and noticeable than ever. NGOs are becoming more and more powerful; they are the symbols of globalisation, constantly pursuing freedom from the frontiers of the states. But the states are still important actors and are becoming more and more numerous.

We often talk about the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction; one can easily imagine that another, even more dangerous proliferation exists: the proliferation of the states. Often states that are not stable appear on the global scene. Among these are especially states which are subject to cruel civil wars - we saw it not so long ago on the European continent. Very frequently, these civil wars result in a lack of sovereignty in these states, which exist but cannot play their proper role as actors and are suddenly left to the mercy, both of the more powerful states and of groups which are not moved by pacified intentions. We passed from some fifty states, when the UN was created, to some two hundred states today. I do not say these things in opposition to the people’s right to manage themselves, but I worry that there was a sort of economic secession or power secession which did not respect at all the will of the people.

Individuals also play a very important role, from the Dalai Lama to Bin Laden, from Ted Turner to Bill Gates –who has just given more money for the fight against HIV than the WHO– as well as other actors, who grow more and more disturbing, such as the mafias and the terrorist groups, who are globally organised too. We can easily see from these examples how globalisation acts in all the fields. Which are the good and which are the bad ones? Of course, it is easy to classify the mafias and the terrorist groups in the categories of the ones that bring no solutions, but rather problems. At the same time, for the other actors the answer is not so clear.

It would appear that everything is uncertain when it comes to the United States. We can say – and this is a widely shared opinion around the world – that George W. Bush’s United States administration brings more problems than solutions to global governance, but not that this is the case with the United States as such. When Jimmy Carter was the President, it was the opposite and we can hope that another power, more respectful of other nations, might still be established in the U.S.A.

Concerning NGOs: some have a positive role, but not all of them. There are some NGOs that are composed of sects which are hidden under the name of the NGO; there are NGOs which are covers for industrial organisations which have particular economic interests. It is a matter of deceiving the public and of course, NGOs do not necessarily represent the general interest. I believe that nowadays, however, the world is often made of great events and passions that arise rather suddenly when the source comes out of the mountain. These forces started perhaps on February 15<sup>th</sup>, 2003, when, like an immense wave, millions of people came out in the streets to say “no” to war, following a principle that did not defend any particular interest, but instead the public’s idea of how the world should be managed. I think that today, one of the most important new factors in international relations is the appearance of the global public opinion. As Marshall McLuhan prophesised some forty years ago, “the world is now a global village and the global media inform people; therefore, notwithstanding our differences, there is a world public opinion”. This is a

challenge, because, though we are better informed, we have perhaps fewer instruments than before to understand the others.

The great number of actors notwithstanding, I believe that the state –the nation state– remains the main actor. This happens because, in the end, all the other actors, from the NGOs to the multinationals, lean on it –in that they can only act after dialoguing with the state. As an example, though the international treaty on landmines was the product of the mobilisation of NGOs, the states are the ones that signed this treaty and, if the states do not sign the treaty is in danger. Therefore, the state still holds a central role and most surely today, we live in a situation in which there is a state that has a more important role than the others, which is more powerful than all the others. There has never been such a powerful state in the world; the world has never seen a state that alone supports 50% of the global military expenditure. Moreover, if this state does not really want to cooperate with the others, this creates a problem. Fortunately, the world is not unilateral, because, their power notwithstanding, the US cannot act alone: all of the other actors are important. This is a paradox, but we can see – starting from North Korea, to Iraq, etc. – that powerful actors can do nothing without the others. Therefore, in this global world, power does not exonerate even the most powerful from cooperation.

Nowadays, the power of nuisance is more important than the power to act. To damage is easier – we can see it well by looking at North Korea, at the terrorist groups – than producing solutions: an actor, even if weak, can cause nuisance to the international order much more than other actors, which may be strong and might try to fight. Above the states, there is the world organisation, the UN. Logically, this body should be the place of world governance, since we know that the challenges are too big to be solved by the states. It is thanks to the cooperation among the different nations that we will be able to act and no organisation is better than the UN to be the forum for this cooperation for the safeguarding of the environment, the question of collective security, the fight against pandemics, the fracture between North and South and the migratory flows. These challenges must be solved at a multilateral level.

Unfortunately, there is a crisis of world governance because a certain number of states believe that they can act alone. It will be good, in order to unblock the situation, to act by means of the public opinion in the different states; in this way, each one will realise that, if we have the right to be egotistical, we do not have the right not to be clever. It is not a matter of generosity, but simply a matter of intelligence, to realise that the global challenges must be solved in a global way.

## DEBATE

### Riccardo Petrella

This morning you confirmed that the challenge of the new world political architecture is: how to give power to cooperation. Therefore I now propose to have a debate. But before I would like to make a proposal - as this conference is a preparation to a bigger one that we will hold in 2008, and considering that in 2008 the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will be celebrated – why don't we think about a great contribution by the WPF in the form of some proposals on the world political architecture in the moment in which this anniversary will be celebrated?

Therefore, if today we are able to develop the capacity to establish this link in these two years, we could consider the idea of making the following proposal: starting an itinerary that we could call "sharing global knowledge for collective action". After all, this morning we shared our knowledge on challenges, on problems, and sharing knowledge is today a fundamental issue – I mean knowledge of situations, of potentialities, of solutions. It should be a globalized knowledge – that could use internet, for example – a kind of "collective intelligence". And then we should work on what "collective action" means.

Therefore we could say that this process of the new political architecture, within the WPF, could have the following objective, for the next two years: human rights, the new world political architecture, the sharing of knowledge for collective action.

Maybe this could be the path to follow together, by launching this concept of "global sharing knowledge".

### Troy Davis

I would like to comment on something that was said several times this morning, which I believe is a dangerous delusion when we speak about reforming the global political architecture. As we all know, the way to hell is paved with good intentions, and several times there's been a proposal that the UN or NATO should be a global enforcer. Now, to see the danger and the fallacy in this proposal, an apparently seductive proposal, I go back to a fundamental democratic principle that we all know, 'no taxation without representation'. Now, if you analyse this conceptually and philosophically, what it means is 'no enforcement without legitimacy', and this is what it means in the logical formal sense. So it's easy to see that if we start to promote enforcement through the UN or NATO without first having legitimacy (it's also valid militarily of course), we would actually provoke more problems and probably more terrorism than we would resolve. So to advocate a global enforcement without first creating global legitimacy and representation, is a very dangerous idea. In fact we see enforcement even under the name of humanitarian intervention. For example, right now in Darfur we see the best objective reasons for intervening, the best objective reasons, but we're not doing it because it is accused of being a neo-colonist, neo-imperialist endeavour. Why? Because there is no legitimate representation, a body which could decide enforcement. The proposal for the UN or NATO to intervene would inflame millions of people, even for the best of reasons.

So I believe the top priority for this Forum or for anyone who really wants to change in a positive fashion, is that we should think about how to establish a global institution with unparalleled legitimacy. Legitimacy is what will have a calming effect on geopolitical tensions. And as one of the ways of doing that, we should think about how to create, for instance, a democratic world parliament. This, I believe, is one of the easiest ways to create global legitimacy.

And I just want to finish by saying that one of the best proposals for a democratic world parliament, which is also the latest and newest proposal I know, was made by Mr. Giscard d'Estaing, who is with us today. He has proposed that a democratic world community be created, inspired from the European community, but uniquely at the beginning with a world parliament. And if we have a world parliament then, first of all, moral legitimacy would reduce the frequency and intensity of the need to intervene in the first place. And secondly, if there was intervention, the accusations of neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist attempts would be reduced and would have less chance of a

backlash. So really, enforcement without legitimacy is a very bad and very dangerous idea, and we should not think of the UN or NATO intervening at all before we establish some global legitimate body.

### **Amitai Etzioni**

Before I make my brief comment I'd like to correct one fact, which under most circumstances I would not trouble anybody about, but Europeans and Americans take such a serious concern for everything done in the world, that I'm going to rise to discuss who actually invented the duty to prevent. It was invented by Francis Deng, a Sudanese diplomat who was working in Africa, working for the United Nations. He was angry about the fact that when the United Nations tried to give food and humanitarian help to various states, the local governments prevented the United Nations from helping. And so in 1995 he wrote a book talking about what he called the duty to prevent, in which he built a whole theory about when a government does not protect its own people. So let's give credit to the African Francis Deng. I'm sure you don't mind.

The serious larger point I want to make goes back to Professor Kaldor's point and the questions about who the actors are. Where do the non-state actors come in? One other way of looking at the same situation is that we are still facing the end of the wars of national liberation. We had 200 years of various ethnic groups – who had in one way or another been collapsed into artificial states, called empires – demanding their own expression in a state, precisely because only once they had an expression in a state could they protect their identity, protect their culture, their economic interest, or even the lives of their citizens.

If you look at it that way, Iraq is an artificial concoction created by colonial powers in the 1920s throwing together people from very different backgrounds. It is true that since then there has been a modicum of Iraqi nationality; even the Kurds often say they are Iraqis. Nevertheless, if you look at what is going on – I don't believe in a three state solution, I hope they can have a confederation – but in the end the Shia, the Sunnis and the Kurds will want to have something like a state expression, for all those reasons. And let me say I'm all in favour of the Palestinians having a fully-fledged meaningful state. The conflict will never be settled without the Palestinians having a meaningful state. I can go on and on. Kosovo: the only way we will see a solution in Kosovo is when the Albanian Kosovars get a higher degree of autonomy. So before we call the end of the nation state, I think one solution would be – it's not magic, it's not everything – but recognising that what is often behind East Timor and many other places, is the end of the wars of nationalism.

### **Giulietto Chiesa**

Establishing a connection with the intervention by Prof. Davis, who spoke about “no enforcement without legitimacy”, I would like to tell you something that really impressed me: yesterday I read on only one Italian newspaper, only one, that on 16 October the State of Israel and NATO signed a pact for the beginning of the patrolling of the coasts of Lebanon and the surroundings. I am really astonished by the fact that nobody knows nothing about that.

Who took this decision? Where was it discussed? Nobody in Europe discussed this question (and I speak in my capacity of member of the European Parliament). No political body took this decision, and we find ourselves in a situation of pre-conflict, because the presence of Israeli and NATO ships patrolling Lebanon means the beginning of the war, or the potential beginning of the war.

I openly talk of “no legitimacy”, in this case there is no legitimacy, and still an extremely serious decision has been taken, while public opinion doesn't know nothing about it.

Second example: as a European Parliamentarian I discovered that the European Union financed the first elections in Iraq with 30 millions of Euros. Who took this decision? Notwithstanding my question to the Parliament and the European Commission, I did not receive a precise answer. In some office someone decided to finance the elections in Iraq.

Third example: I took part to the elections in Palestine as an observer. We were some 20 deputies of the European Parliament; we were there to observe and we discovered, on January of this year, that the Palestinian elections were perfectly regular. We went back to the European Parliament and the European Union decided to impose a sanction on the govern that emerged out of the regular elections.

This is the third example of a community where there is no political legitimacy, where true decisions are taken outside of the political debate. Naturally, in all these cases, international press and information remained completely silent.

In conclusion, if international public opinion is not aware of these things, it can not react and defend itself; therefore the problem of communication, of democratic information turns into one of the central issues for the new international, economic, political and social order.

### **Hall Gardner**

First, I want to agree with the point that we need some sort of world citizens' assembly to provide greater legitimacy. But I want to address the crucial point about NATO-UN interaction by point of fact.

If we go back to 1948 when the Vandenberg Resolution was framed by the US Senate, we find something very interesting. That not only was the Vandenberg Resolution framed to legitimise NATO, regional defence and collective self-defence, but, and I will quote you, it also meant to strengthen the UN as well. Let me just read from the document; this is the 1948 Vandenberg Resolution, one of the statements in the resolution about the UN: "Maximum efforts to obtain agreement to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the charter, and to obtain agreement among the member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments, under an adequate and dependable guarantee against violation."

Now that's 1948. We have to point out that we have gone far away from what NATO was supposed to be in 1948, by a resolution that was passed by majority, and show that we have to bring NATO back to the UN. And that way we can bring the United States on board in support of a stronger UN, a more effective UN. If we don't bring America back on board, the UN is not going to function.

### **Aung Tun Thet**

I would like to focus my intervention on the UN reform, because a lot has been said about the reform and I want to give a different perspective, a perspective of someone who comes from a developing country, and also someone who works for the UN. So I have certain perspectives which are slightly different from the ones we heard so far.

Perception I think is very critical. We did a study where we asked in the streets of Manhattan: "What does the UN mean?" And the answer we got was "corruption", the answer we got was "inefficiency" and all the negative views. We did the exact same so-called experiment in Jakarta and we got completely different results. For people in developing countries the UN means hope, it means food, it means health, it means education. So when you talk about the UN reform, please do not forget that it is not just in the corridors of New York or Geneva or Rome, but please look at us too. What does the reform mean for people in the developing countries? That will be my first point.

The second is that we do have a reform agenda, which has been accepted by the international community, enshrined in the declaration which was accepted in 2000. And what we are doing in all the UN activities, which is the Millennium Development Goals, just to remind everyone that it is not just poverty but also of human rights, and it is not just of human rights, it is of good governance, democracy and also peace and security. So I just want to make sure that these things have to be taken as a package, rather than separate items.

As we speak, for every three seconds one person is dying of poverty in the world. This is the challenge we have. 8,000 people die every day of HIV/AIDS. So we have to talk about UN reform not in an abstract formulation but in terms of life and death, so please when you deliberate look at these issues in light of these, rather than in very broad global terms.

Then when you talk about UN and reform you always hear about how the UN has failed. We recognise our failures, but please also acknowledge the successes. We talk about Rwanda, we talk about Darfur, but why don't we talk about the tsunami, where the UN did something very positive. This year Professor Yunus got the Nobel Peace Prize. This was done with the help of the UN, where the focus is on the woman, on micro credit and on human rights. So there are certain things I think we can do.

And so finally, we are talking about the new international architecture. Everything is so formalised. Can we not think of something less hierarchical? Less formal? In a form of networks for development; networks for peace and networks for greater peace and security in the world.

### **Empedocle Maffia**

Architects can be dreamers in spite of their structures. Everybody remembers that, at the beginning of 1944, when the Alliance still had not defeated the Nazi-Fascism, some brains and civil passions, led by John Keynes, gathered in Bretton Woods in order to understand how the international financial architecture could be organized. They were already convinced that promoting development was the best way to create the conditions for peace.

I want to tell you briefly – in the spirit of what President Gorbachev was saying this morning, that is to say the essentiality of the intervention of public opinion in the great movements, as well as Giulietto Chiesa was talking now about the importance of communication – that some times ago the World Bank made a research on the occasion of the 60 years since its foundation. The World Bank, which was the noblest institution of Bretton Woods, because it had the task to fight against poverty, made a study on the sense of Bretton Woods: moving capitals from the rich to the poor world, in order to promote development. Which was the result that we documented some months ago?

In 60 years the poor countries, that with an hypocrite euphemism we call “developing countries” accumulated a billion of billion dollars of aids, that they put in the financial international circuit to finance the economy of the rich countries, with an average return of 1,5 per cent.

I believe that this is a shame for the civil fascination that the idea of fighting against poverty and helping the developing countries has, and for the suffering that this difference in the use of capitals inflicts to hundred millions people. But above all because I think that, when an expectation of development is created, and then it is betrayed according to the distortion of that market – that someone considers the panacea of all the evils – we determine in those populations a fall of hope that inevitably reduces the rate of democracy in those countries.

### **Troy Davis**

Just very quickly, about what the gentleman said about Bretton Woods. I think this is extremely relevant. But I think we now need a global political Bretton Woods, and that this global political Bretton Woods be in Bosco di Marengo, so that Bosco di Marengo becomes the synonym for the new political architecture, which should be democratic. So we would go from Bosco di Bretton in 1945 to Bosco Marengo today.

### **Riccardo Petrella**

I would like to propose some final remarks: I think we can be happy because we have finished this morning by laying the stress on legitimacy, on world democracy, on Parliaments. And I believe that this is a tribute that this assembly has made to President Gorbachev, who is the father of Perestroika and Glasnost.

We also made a good work because we let three subjects emerge, that are rarely given the power of being subjects: the poor – in fact WPF dedicated a previous conference to analyse the problem of poverty as “the” problem of the world – and today many of you insisted on giving subjectivity to the poor, as subjects of a new world political architecture.

Then cooperation and public opinion, media, and here the importance of global knowledge and collective intelligence comes back. Let’s try to find a new way of acting as subject in order to change the actual world, that can not be accepted.

Two subjects were absent, first one: the trade unions. Is the world of work an actor of the new world political architecture or not? Don’t we believe anymore in the trade unions? Why didn’t we talk about them? Have they so weakened that they no more appear to us as possible subjects of the history of tomorrow?

Second element: the scientific world. These scientist who produce knowledge, where are they? I do not speak about academicians such as economists or historians, I talk about biologists, physicists, who today are among the more used by the powerful in order to justify their cruel world. Maybe this could be an element for reflection in the sessions of this afternoon.

# IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLITICAL ARCHITECTURE: PRINCIPLES, CONDITIONS, STAGES OF CONSTRUCTION

## I PANEL

Chairman: **Edoardo Greppi**, *Professor of International Law at Turin University, Italy*

Our theme today is “In search of a new political architecture: principles, conditions and stages of construction”. We will start from principles. International law already provides some core principles that belong to customary law and while some of them are peremptory norms, most are the result of the tragedy of World War II. Namely, the prohibition of the use of force by states; human rights protection; the focus on dignity and freedom; multilateralism and the institutionalisation of the un-organic international community. The institution became the United Nations, established to provide decision making with legitimacy. The basic feature of international law remains the traditional one: state sovereignty. The UN Charter places the principle of sovereign equality of states at the first place, in Article II, Paragraph I. In other words, the international community is basically a society of states and only states are accountable. But, they are no longer the only type of actor. The state’s sovereignty is facing quite a number of new actors: not only international organisations and NGOs, but also ethnic and religious entities, terrorist organisations and transnational crime organisations. The international community is confronted with new problems of global concern: terrorism, drugs trafficking, trafficking of human beings, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear proliferation, extended damage to the environment, threats to health, the drama of poverty and the growing needs of developing countries.

The UN was conceived as an institutional and legal framework for peace and security. Today, the notions of security and military capacity are at stake: conflicts are more and more intra-state wars rather than traditional, inter-state wars. Armed forces are often inadequate and besides internal armed conflicts, most of which have religious or ethnic origins, terrorism is today a security matter of paramount importance. It requires a re-thinking of traditional military power. The challenge of the gross violation of human rights and genocide has a great impact on state sovereignty as well: states are under the obligation to respect legally binding rules. In international humanitarian law they are under the obligation “*de respecter et de faire respecter*”.

A new world political architecture implies that some issues are effectively taken into account: the use of force, in the first place, whose features and limits are closely linked to the key issue of legitimacy. Law should govern and control the use of force, never forgetting that force is and remains an essential element of law. Law needs to be credible and force is one of the ways of making law credible. The point is how to combine the necessary authority of international law with the respect of state sovereignty. Since 1945 the UN and all the other relevant international institutions have enshrined state sovereignty and the basic principle of respecting the state’s jurisdiction. The principle of non-intervention protects states and their sovereignty, but the emerging norm – as it is now called in UN documents – of the *Responsibility to Protect* is an open challenge to sovereignty. In fact, sovereignty is linked to power; since some states are more powerful than others, they are thusly more sovereign than others. The international community cannot tolerate that the principle of non-intervention covers gross violations of human rights or acts of genocide; this is the cornerstone of the responsibility to protect. But the rule of law, the authority of international law, should not be limited to the level of enforcement, but also to that of jurisdiction. International justice should be promoted both as far as the relationship between and among states is concerned and *vis à vis* the individual.

Last, but not least: decision-making processes need legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. From time to time, the issue of reform returns to the agenda. Today, we can witness some important changes: new bodies have been established: the Human Rights Council and the Peace Building Commission, a new Secretary General has been appointed and a new wave of

multilateralism seems to be attracting some major powers. This could be the beginning of a fresh start for international institutions.

**Hubert Vedrine, *Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of France***

Up to now, the victors have created the big international organisations after the world wars and even though the victors wrote “We, the people”, this was a kind of pseudonym. In fact, with the total failure, at the time, of the League of Nations, the victors had the possibility to arbitrate and to decide things with particular success concerning the United Nations. We are still trying to use the UN system and trying to improve it, but a radical reform is difficult to imagine. We all know that a reform not only has to obtain a large majority in support at the General Assembly, but also the acceptance of the members that have the right of veto in the Security Council. It is therefore necessary to integrate the approach of the permanent members into our reasoning.

We know that lately, the United States in particular, is not only trying to avoid the constraints of multilateralism, but does not even accept its rules and is periodically tempted by a different grouping, which is called “the Community of Democracies”, which would create new things and would obviously cause a total regression and the death of the United Nations. I have been tasked by the French Socialist Party to reflect on UN reform, together with another former minister, Henri Nallet, who played a very important role in Socialist International, particularly in Europe. He and I said: “Can we imagine a reform which goes very far, as far as possible, but at the same time remains convincing and which is difficult to stop?” We reached the conclusion that the Security Council should be enlarged in order to be more representative and therefore more legitimate and more difficult to by-pass. This would include Japan, India, Germany, a Latin-American country – chosen by the Latin-Americans– and possibly, periodically, an African country. We also added an Arab country, because in the conventional geographical division, the Arab world is of no particular part, but if we do complicated reforms without any Arab country, the reform would be partially unsuccessful.

We know the counter-arguments, as there is opposition for each candidate, but this is an ongoing reform proposal that is logical. The difficulty is to know who could represent Africa and who could represent Latin America. There should be one permanent seat and every two years a country from these two areas should be represented on the Council.

Concerning the question of the right of veto, we resolved that the new permanent members must have this right, because the reform will never proceed if we deny them the veto. The old permanent members would prefer that the new ones would not have the right of veto, but this seems to us to be unrealistic. In a path that is already complicated, it could involve the risk of a paralysis. However, the suggestion of a future paralysis is rather hypocritical, as the Security Council has often been paralysed when there were only five permanent members: it was not the number which paralysed the Council, it was the disagreement on the principle.

We all know that in the current world structure states will never renounce the veto. We all know of the circumstances after the Second World War, at Yalta and afterwards, where the discussions showed that the great powers – the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain – would never have joined the UN without having the right of veto. But, had they not joined, the system would have been still born. Therefore, we have come up with a realistic approach to the question of the veto and we have considered the main disadvantage. What is the main problem with the veto today? It is the fact that, when the international community wants to give its help to a population which is threatened by a genocide or a cruel civil war, most surely it cannot, because there is always a Permanent Member which finds setting a precedent dangerous for the future, in order to protect its own interests. Therefore, we thought that it is unrealistic to ask for the end of the veto mechanism, as this will never be obtained. On the other hand, one could imagine a temporary procedure in which the right of veto and the right of sovereign non-interference of the concerned country – i.e. Sudan – could be suspended for a brief period. For example, three months and in that period the Charter could work without the interruption of a veto, in order to help a population in grave danger. Obviously, this proposal shifts the difficulty and the question then arises: who is going to declare that a population is in immediate danger? If it is the Security Council, we fall into the same impasse. So, we imagined a sort of World Assembly, composed of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, Secretaries-General of multilateral organisations, or Directors-General, or some ad-hoc personalities respected by all the world – twenty or thirty people who

could be given the task to give the alarm at a particular moment, that would initiate a special, temporary procedure. In so doing, we would respect the principle of state sovereignty and the right of veto.

We speak often of governance. Actually, there is no governance; the world has never been as ill governed as it is today. It is the object of unilateral initiatives by some big countries, but the world does not have a global government. Public opinion states that the world should be governed and that the public would like the world to be governed well. We have many organisations that belong to the system of the United Nations or of Bretton Woods, but coordination between the systems is totally lacking.

There are many options and for the time being, we have taken a pragmatic approach. The whole system must be better coordinated. Some connections must be created through some bridges among the systems. We could use the Economic and Social Council, completely changing its composition and its authority, by transforming it into an organ that would operate at the level of heads of state, in a special manner, in special sessions, where high-level managers, such as Pascal Lamy or Mr. Wolfowitz, could speak, answer questions and present programmes. This would not imply immediate juridical obligations, but it would create a sort of political obligation and systematically, the different organisations would be obliged to consider the concerns of the others. This is not a radical reform measure, as I start from the premise that radical reform is impossible. Therefore, this is the proposal: wake up the ECOSOC and metamorphose it.

Another proposal is to re-invent what we call the Trusteeship Council, which nowadays doesn't have any function because it was created for the colonised territories that gained independence. Instead of colonised territories, in our world today there are many countries that are not able to manage themselves, which have in fact, lost their sovereignty and need to be assisted, as happened in Timor. As there is not a precise juridical concept in international law or in the mechanism of the United Nations today, this assistance when needed, is given on a de facto basis. Resultantly, protectorates are being created again— we don't use this word, but they are protectorates; these are territories governed under mandate, like some colonial territories were after the First World War and until the Second World War. Our idea is that we must accept this reality of the actual world: some fifteen of the 192 countries of the world are not able to administer themselves at the present time. The situation must be clarified; the mechanisms and the calendars must be better explained, with a frequent review of the situation in order for it not to be eternal. We must address this situation frankly.

My last point is on the question of civil society. It is both a very important and an often discussed concept, because nobody knows what it means; or, better, one knows what it means, but we don't know where it starts and where it ends. The world of civil society is like the world of governments: there are praiseworthy people, but manipulators as well. There are some NGOs that are remarkable and others that are just fiction. Therefore, there is a problem of choice. This does not prevent the fact that today, a real need exists; there is such a thing as world opinion, even if it is a bit chaotic and disputed.

Our idea is to create a consultative assembly representing civil society at the General Assembly's side, though not within the General Assembly, as we would have an extraordinary confusion of roles. The principle of political responsibility must be protected; there are people who have a mandate, who have to explain to their voters or to the people who appointed them what they have done. The NGOs are in actual fact, associations so this enormous potential democratic force must be used and must be canalized into the mechanism. Therefore, a consultative assembly of global civil society should sit at the General Assembly's side. It should meet in advance of the General Assembly and would address solicitations, which could characterise the work of the General Assembly on a given problem.

How should we compose this consultative assembly? It is very complicated, but all the UN organisations have this problem: it is true for UNESCO, for ILO and I think it is true for the World Bank also. The European Union has developed its own consultative mechanisms; in this case, the criteria are simply not the exact same criteria. What is a serious, representative NGO? This changes from one organisation to the other. Moreover, in the NGO community there are many discussions: there are some of them that want to remain completely free, not to be engaged, not to

have subventions; and others that want to be integrated into the system, in a sort of co-managerial system, so there are many points of view on the NGO question.

Reform of the world architecture is a complex problem, I admit, but we must try to rise above the strictures of the belief in the impossibility of reform. Here, there is a collection of great experience. It is from here that this great task has begun.

**Amitai Etzioni**, *Professor of Sociology at the George Washington University, USA*

Let me just start by using very unusual statements, by saying that I'm sure that all of us here, as different as our backgrounds are, agree that we owe a great debt of gratitude to President Gorbachev, to Dr. Andrei Grachev and to the excellent staff for putting together another wonderful, very informative meeting. As to our subject, some of my colleagues in the United States credit an ideology, which basically argues that the United States and more in general, the West has found the light, and that all the other civilisations are backward, and the destiny of the United States and the West is to bring the light to the heathens, sometimes called the clash of civilisations. Or, in another format, the inevitable march of democracy, which the United States is destined to promote and rush along, but otherwise is still the design and will of history.

Now, we set up a couple of studies to question these assumptions, and we did so – you can find the report in detail in the Cambridge International Review – by looking at six belief systems, four religious and two secular: we looked at Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Islam, and we looked at socialist ideology and at the civil rights movement and various theories of social change. And we found that all of them, all of them have one common attribute, all those belief systems, and that is that in all of them there is a subgroup, an element which justifies violence as a matter of principle; and in all of them there are people who strongly object to the use of violence. So the fault line does not run between civilisations, it runs within civilisations. So you find in Judaism the line, a tooth for a tooth, an eye for an eye, but you also find the interpretation which means you are entitled to compensation, not an act of violence. You find in Christianity you can turn the other cheek and also the theory of positive violence. I can go on and on. Che Guevara can say that you cannot make an omelette without cracking any egg, which means you cannot have a revolution without cracking heads. And then you find the social democrats and the Fabians, which abhor violence. I don't need to take any more time, but you can see how the findings go.

But they have one other very important indication for the issues we're talking about, and that is, if you draw the line between those who subscribe to precise American or British forms of democracy, and the United Nations text on human rights, then you will find only minority support among the populations of the world. But if you draw the line the way I just did between those who are willing to use violence to force their views on others and those who only work in a peaceful manner, resolve their differences and move forward to new political systems, then you'll find the majority on the side of those who favour peaceful resolution. A very important distinction then, between what some people call liberal democrats, and moderate people. The majority of the people of the world are illiberal moderates. And to accent this with two examples, the majority of Muslims in Bangladesh, a huge country, the majority of Muslims in Indonesia, a huge country, it's true in both countries there is some increase now in radicalisation, but it's going from three to five per cent, so the press like to talk about a growing trend; the majority of people in both countries strongly object to the use of violence, but at the same time do not necessarily at all subscribe to the kind of form of government or the exact list of human rights. So the first step I believe the international order has to accept is that people who are willing to denounce violence are good citizens not violent by design, and are the first step on our preferred form of government. The next step is that all promotion of democracy and human rights should be done through non-lethal means. One of the problems in this discussion, if you go to Google and you put up "democratisation" you see that it sometimes refers to sending in the marines and missiles, and it sometimes refers to sending books and inviting people over to seminars. These are two radically different forms of political intervention. Nobody should object to the sending of books and inviting people to seminars, whatever theory you want to promote. Everybody should object to sending in the marines and missiles for regime change. So the second step is not only do we need to start embracing all those who oppose violence without putting initial additional demands, but secondly, to agree to promote the next item on the agenda, they should be non-lethal.

And finally and maybe in some ways the most important point. If you go back to the idea of human rights, let me make it very clear, for me personally human rights are semi-sacred. But if you make them your only agenda, then the implications again – it's true that human rights are universal, but in effect they are promoted by the West, they are used as a weapon by the West, to criticise other cultures – the implication is that other civilisations, other countries have nothing to bring to the

table. They either accept the light or do not see the light but have no original contribution to make to the rising international moral code. My answer is that to the good societies, the central communitarian concept has a careful balance between human rights and social responsibilities. Unfortunately, the United Nations Charter points only to rights, and all attempts to amend it and include a list of responsibilities have been rejected. But if you go beyond the text, and you go to the global dialogue, in all the civilisations mentioned, there is a sense that they have obligations to the poor, they have obligations to the environment, obligations to our families, obligations to our communities. So we don't have only rights – rights we do have, they have been bestowed on us, they cannot be denied – but we also have responsibilities to live up to. If you look at it that way, then you see that in the East – a terrible term, because there are so many different Easts, there is barely one West but surely there are many more Easts – but there is one thing which appears again and again, in East Asia, in Islam and in many other forms, which is the notion of responsibility. It not only makes for a better moral code, a more easily justified notion that rights need to be balanced with responsibilities, it also brings to the table all those other cultures as equals, with the emphasis on responsibilities, with the western emphasis on rights, and the combination of the two will make for the best possible approach.

One last point. We have talked a lot about soft power. I don't think any decent human being could not see the importance of objecting to the arbitrary use of force and call for the use of legitimate dialogue and peaceful resolutions. But we're coming now to a moment of test, it's Europe's moment. Europe is playing an increasing role in Lebanon, in the Middle East, it is playing a major role in Afghanistan, and the question we are now suddenly asking ourselves: is there a limit to soft power? What happens when soft power doesn't suffice? Do we say: well let's have some more soft power, or do we come to a point, as we did in East Timor, as we did in Sierra Leone, as we did in Liberia, as we should have done in Rwanda, and we say we use the soft power we can, but at the end of the day the international community must have other means precisely in order to interfere in places and nations which do not live up to the new important norms of the duty to prevent?

**Olivier Giscard d'Estaing, *Chairman of COPAM, France***

A new global world is emerging with new challenges. It is a world of new actors and new technologies. However, it is also a world of six billion inhabitants facing unacceptable disparities in their living conditions. Despite all this, our world political structure, conceived in 1945 by the victors of the Second World War, remains practically unchanged. Several world institutions were created before and later joined, the United Nations structure, like the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 1889, the Bank for International Settlements in 1930 and the progenitor of the World Intellectual Property Organisation in 1893 with a pedigree dating back to the Paris Convention of 1883. Others were created at the same time as the UN or in the early 1950's, like UNICEF, the World Health Organisation and a renewed UNESCO. Since that time, however, it has been practically impossible to modify the UN Charter due to the difficulties in achieving the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and in obtaining effective support of the USA.

I will not approach the global security problems, as dealt with by the Security Council and NATO; they should be approached, but there are many political experts who can deal with this matter better than I can. My concentration will address three groups of challenges that require global political decisions and actions, which are not properly approached and which threaten the survival of our economies, our ways of life, and, ultimately, the survival of humanity. They are: Environmental and climactic changes; Economic and social affairs (energy, trade, sustainable development, poverty and unemployment); and Education and health.

These challenges call for global action due to their intercontinental interdependence and the resultant implication that, to address them, will require a need for greater human solidarity. The new world political structure should apply the principle of subsidiarity in addressing these challenges. To deal only in national or regional actions is not sufficient to bring about the necessary solutions. The Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations offers a good chance to governments, corporations and NGOs to bring their own contributions to the table, but they lack the appropriate governance by the world public.

My proposition is based on the multilateral experience of the European Union, which is based on the Treaty of Paris (1951). The Treaty created the six-nation Coal and Steel Community. It was inspired by Jean Monnet, enacted by prominent European prime ministers and was completed primarily by the Treaty of Rome (1957). Its institutions have been praised by George H. W. Bush, former President of the United States, when he declared at the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 1st, 1990: "And I see a world building on the emerging new model of European unity, not just Europe, but the whole world, whole and free."

The permanent institutions of the world community, supported by an agreement on an international tax policy, should include a World Council, a World Parliament and a World Commission. The 192 members of the UN are not prepared to engage themselves in such new entities. A limited number of countries however, could, take the experimental initiative to prepare an international treaty creating the aforementioned institutions. This possibility has been analysed by COPAM. All multinational institutions started with a limited number of countries and were joined later on by many others. To be credible, this treaty could become effective when supported by fifteen to twenty-five countries (the number limited for at least five experimental years), coming from three continents and representing a population of at least one billion inhabitants. Countries like those belonging to the G8, the Shanghai Agreement, or the G77 could take such an initiative. I hope that among the distinguished participants of this seminar of the World Political Forum, some will share this vision and propose it to their national governments for due consideration.

**Jianmin Wu**, *Executive Vice-President of China National Association for International Studies, President of BIE (International Bureau of Exhibitions), China*

A new world political architecture is not an end in itself. We do not want to have a new world political architecture simply for the sake of having it. What we really want is a world better able to meet the daunting challenges of today. Therefore, it is advisable first, to make full use of the existing political architecture. I do not think that the existing political architecture is totally useless. On the contrary, it still works, although perhaps not to our satisfaction. Though it surely can be improved, it is not wise simply to get rid of it. If the existing world political architecture moves forward in the direction we all desire, its transformation will be progress indeed.

In our search for a new world political architecture, we have to bear in mind that a major trend is emerging at the dawn of this century. Everywhere, people are talking about China's rise. To be sure, China is rising. Looking around the world, however, we will see that not only is China rising, but, quite a few developing countries are rising too. In Asia, there are India and the ASEAN countries. In Latin America, there are Brazil, Mexico and Chile. In Africa, there are South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. If you add up these countries' populations, that is 3.3 billion people. Tell me, has there ever been a time in the history of mankind when 3.3 billion people were rising? No, this is the first time. This is an historic trend that will change the world for the better. Consequently, in this new world political architecture, the developing world should have more say.

We should try to maximize the common interests of mankind. Though there are many issues which divide the world, humanity is facing many common challenges, including global warming, environmental degradation, pandemics, climate change, natural disasters and AIDS. No single country in the world, no matter how powerful, is able to meet all these challenges alone. This constitutes a persuasive argument for unity, solidarity and joint efforts among all the nations. There is an old Chinese saying that goes: "A thousand-mile journey starts with the first step". A new world political architecture cannot be completed overnight; it will be built up brick by brick. If we focus on common challenges, it will maximise humanity's common interests. That may have a snowballing effect, growing bigger and bigger. These common interests will serve as the foundation of the new world political architecture.

A new world political architecture should not be confined to the political area. In today's world, politics, economics and culture are all mixed up. You cannot talk about political architecture in isolation from the other factors. There are quite a few international organisations that are contributing to the solution of the global problems. In this regard, I would like to mention the Bureau of International Exhibitions (BIE), of which I am the president and which is one of the oldest inter-governmental organisations. BIE is in charge of promoting, regulating and organising the World Exposition, the largest event in the world, not only of governments, but also of people. Last year, we had the Aichi Expo in Japan. The theme of that expo was "Nature's Wisdom". There were twenty-two million visitors. In 2010, we will have the Shanghai Expo. It is expected that there will be seventy million visitors. What other event can attract such a big crowd? The first expo was held in London in 1851, making the expo movement 155 years old. Its greatest advantage is that it brings people together regardless of faith, race or nationality in the common endeavour to improve lives. That is wonderful. We should maximise mankind's common interests; BIE is doing just that. When people across the world find more common interests, we will have better conditions for the new world political architecture.

## **DEBATE**

### **Pascal Boniface**

I would like to make some reflections on the UN, that has been at the centre of our discussion this morning, and on its possible reform. I think that everybody agrees that the UN must be able to play more an effective role, and that for this reason it must be reformed, and particularly the Security Council must be enlarged. But we also agree that this reform failed, we were trying to reach an accord, but the enlargement of the security council principally failed because of the refusal of the United States to take part to it and to accept it. We are facing a block since many years, if the most powerful country in the world does not want to reform the UN there is a block.

Is this block eternal? No, we can think that the principle of reality will take it away, and that depending on necessities the US will be forced one day - certainly with another President - to come back. The United States have not always had this distrust or hostility towards multilateral institutions. There has also been a period in history, within 1945 and 1949, when the US were already very powerful if confronted with other countries and they had a benevolent and participating approach to the creation and life of international organisms.

In the period in which the US were at the maximum of their power, they created the UN, the World Bank, and many multilateral institutions, even if today they turn to multilateral institutions when their unilateral action fails, therefore it is "unilateral if we can and multilateral if we have to", but their first choice is a unilateral one. But lately they asked for multilateral help when they had no more alternatives left, therefore it's up to the whole of other actors not to accept their unilateralism and to obtain that one day they will be more multilateral.

Finally, I would like to say something on veto, Hubert Vedrine and Olivier Giscard d'Estaing talked about it, in the sense that it must be maintained. We can not enlarge the Security Council and maintain the right of veto at the same time – I think that this proposal will be welcomed with satisfaction in Italy – but as a French I think that we must abandon the right of veto and concretely look at what it was used for. We can see that often the United States used the veto in order to stop the adoption of a resolution that condemned Israel, a resolution that did not demand a particular action, but that was only a moral condemnation.

When we look at what concretely the right of veto has been used for, we see that it does not protect states anymore, there are other means, and I think that if we really want an efficacious Security Council not only its enlargement is necessary, but we must also keep the rule of majority of two thirds and suppress the right of veto.

### **Stephane Hessel**

I am a little bit deceived because in the discussion of this morning we gave proof of great optimism, and this is very nice, but maybe we underestimated the seriousness of the actual situation of the world. We have no time to waste. The urgency is there, and if we go on with the actual architecture, which has got its potential but its extraordinary limits too – and I agree with Mr Boniface that the maintaining of the right of veto stops the progression – we risk to go towards a degradation of the world economy. We risk to go towards a deepening of the gap between the rich and the poor and towards a serious risk, from the nuclear point of view, with the nuclear waste, and from the point of view of the evolution of energy, we are in serious danger.

I believe that we must start again the debate and say: we must do something and we must hurry up.

I pay homage to Mr Gorbachev for having gathered us in order to go on, and I think that this is not impossible, I think that the block of the United States is only a provisory effect, and that in the mean time we must really reflect on the realization of more performing instances and architectures, with implemented means.

### **Josep Xercavins**

Well, after the intervention of Mr. Wu, which I appreciate in many aspects, we have on the floor the economic growth paradigm, and I think that this is relevant to the issues we are talking about

today. The economic growth paradigm means more consumption, means more waste, and more environmental problems. And this is one of the challenges of our world, this is one of the challenges of the new architecture that we want to build. Because one of the challenges that we have is to preserve our planet for future generations. And at this moment, in another way, the economic growth paradigm is putting on the floor one of the most inequitable realities in the world. So we don't have the necessary distribution of wealth in the world. And in my view, and here I am talking from the perspective of a man who works in the civil society agenda, these are the two big challenges that we have: to preserve the planet for future generations, and to satisfy the needs of the majority of the population of the world.

In my view, if these are the challenges, there is also a dispute on the floor over what the principle of the political institutions should be at this moment. One of the principles of course, is to put the economy at the service of this challenge – the planet and the needs of the population. So, if we would like to work in this direction, we need to put one main thing in the architecture of the institutions at the international level. I think that the financial, economic and trade institutions should come back within the remit of the United Nations, because then, when we put the social goals, the environmental goals, the political goals, we don't have, as we have now with the current structure of the UN, the very important gap of implementation. We have goals, but these goals are not achieved, because the economic goals and financial interests are predominant at this moment. So we propose to reform the system so that financial, economic and trade institutions be at the service of the social and environmental goals, not the opposite, which has been happening these last few years in the world.

### **Robert Skidelsky**

I've got a comment to make on what Mr. Vedrine said, and also a question to ask Mr. Wu, both of whose presentations I enjoyed very much. For Mr. Vedrine, talking about the reform of the United Nations: it seems to me there is a conflict between the representative principle and the power principle. I mean: many people want to make the United Nations more legitimate by making it more representative, making the Security Council more representative in particular. But that isn't necessarily going to increase the power to act. In fact it may make agreement on action more difficult. The fact that there is more legitimacy in a decision doesn't mean that it will be carried out, because the people who have to carry out the decision have to agree with it, and there are only a very few people or countries in the world that can act, that actually have the military capacity, the administrative capacity, the logistical capacity to mount any kind of humanitarian operation. And we have seen that in Darfur, where the African Union, though legitimate maybe in terms of its operations in that continent, have actually not been able to act at all with any effect. So the tension between representation and power I think was left unresolved in your remarks as I understood them.

My question for Mr. Wu is this: it's often alleged that the real blockage to humanitarian efforts, in particular in Africa and others, is that China would veto them. This is often used by our government when we ask questions in our Parliament about why we don't get the Security Council to take some action here or there, or where there is a humanitarian issue of some importance? The invariable answer is that China would veto it. It sometimes comes with Russia. Now, is that a misrepresentation, and, if so, what is the Chinese attitude to these kinds of efforts to alleviate humanitarian disasters?

### **Troy Davis**

I would like to answer to the appeal of Mr Wu, who talked about focusing more on common interests than on differences, and to the appeal of Mr Hessel as well, who talked about urgency. I believe that one of the great challenges, something we did not talk about, is how to realize it – we can reconcile on one hand the urgency and on the other the deep reforms; in fact, it is often said that if we make a deep reform, it will take a lot of time, but at the same time we have an urgency. In the urgency, we are tempted to act in a more autocratic, elitist way, therefore there is the great risk that the citizens of the planet are not able to follow the reforms. So we would finally appeal to a state of urgency that will not work. Therefore we must do reforms in a more democratic manner, but this takes time.

How can we reconcile these two things? I propose to focus on two ideas. I think that the world must negotiate a world social contract, a social contract in the classic sense of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It should be composed of two parts, one written document, that should put the basis, the fundamental principles of the world political architecture.

I believe that the real fundamental principle, if we want to be brief, is the principle of human dignity that is the same for all the human beings. Then we can elaborate on this principle. I think that we will very easily agree on the fundamental principles.

And why should this world social contract be generalised? It should be generalised in the sense that there are a lot of international treaties that deal in a vertical way with functions, such as commerce, or health, or pandemics or for the environment, etc...

The problem is how this is done at WTO – you know that at WTO the method of negotiation is that of saying “we do not treat different economic problems in separate ways, we treat them altogether to make a sort of deal” – therefore it will be easier to make a general accord if we treat all the fields together.

I believe that this method, which is fair - even if unfortunately it does not work very well for commerce – must be extended to all the problems of the world, such as security, health, culture, human rights, commerce, because they are all interdependent. We can not separately or vertically negotiate anymore, therefore there is the necessity of a general world social contract.

Secondly, how to do it? And here we must find the way to reconcile urgency and deep reforms. I think that we must totally change the way of traditional negotiating on a world scale. The traditional way is the inter-governmental one, etc..., but if we do it in a more participative way, this will certainly take some time, maybe many years, it could take five years to negotiate a sort of generalised world social contract.

But if we make it in a participative way, and if before starting we agree that we are going to make it generally all over the world, in that moment the only fact that we say that we are going to make it and prepare it will have a relaxing effect on the geopolitical tensions, because the citizens of the world will say: “We will participate, we will solve the problems, there is a light at the end of the tunnel”.

So, the World Political Forum could launch a world negotiation initiative; there is a very concrete example that has been made: why South Africa was able to avoid civil war? Thanks to the personality of Nelson Mandela, but this wouldn't have been enough. It is because South Africa launched a participative constitutional process since two years. They literally had five million comments on their Constitution, and the very fact of the participation of the citizens calmed the tensions, there have been dead, but there could have been many more, there could have been a civil war. And then on a world scale, if this will be made on a world scale, this is a manner of beginning something which is urgent, but at the same time of calming tensions and of deeply managing things.

## **Giulietto Chiesa**

I agree with ambassador Hessel, who put the stress on the problem of haste. A time factor exists: the world crisis goes on so fast, that we have to face the problem of re-organizing the political institutions, which are not able to face it. The problem of time is a key one. This is my first consideration.

Secondly, for this reason, according to me we must concentrate our efforts on the points of acute crisis, where we already know that conflicts will explode.

These points are: energy, carbon dioxide emission, water. I think that we must reflect on the model of the international agencies, that have power of decision and enforcing. In fact, it is a proposal of transfer of sovereignty on limited, precise and well defined questions. On these questions consensus can be found, and I want to add that a model exists that proved to function and can face the emergency: the model of the International Criminal Court.

What does it mean? It means that some bodies are created thanks to successive adhesions and they become valid when they reach a determined number of participants. That is to say that the unanimity of all the world is not foreseen, but the voluntary participation. As Olivier Giscard d'Estaing was saying, it is clear that this is a problem of consensus, of hegemony, of crisis, therefore this is a model that must be faced, I believe.

In these procedure, we have to consider the voice of the only Chinese who seats at this table: Mr Wu, because this part of the world is a crucial one. The World Political Forum wants to become a world association, here we are too much European and Western, and this causes us the lack of a piece of planet, a part of culture. It is essential that we become a world association in order to make this discourse.

Finally, my last point: I think we must not forget the reform of the UN. I believe that the proposals made by Giscard d'Estaing and Vedrine are interesting. We have to consider, for example, this Council of the Wise: the problem of the elimination of the right of veto is a big one, I see it, and convincing the ones who have it to renounce to it will be very difficult.

But I believe that the idea of supporting a proposal that puts at the side of the Security Council something like a Council of the Wise, an instrument of aid and ethical address, would be of great value. We do not need people who can only decide being bound by states' interests, which are very powerful. We must reintroduce ethics in politics and we must be able to rely on outstanding personalities, who are above the states' interests, and therefore capable of taking decision for the common interest. I would use this term: common good as a great instrument of the world political management. No Security Council can do this, then why don't we ask that a Council of the Wise is created, which could be able to formulate impartial judgements?

This is a precise question to Minister Vedrine.

### **Michel Rocard**

Apparently, I should be incredibly happy, because I really long to say yes, to approve, vote and sign all the resolutions that are being proposed here. I do agree with all these things, that look very generous to me. Therefore I cannot express a deep pessimism and anxiety. I am not a big specialist of the UN mechanisms, but still I have been an observer of the international scene in the last fourteen years.

It seems to me that the world situation is worsening fast. It is much more serious than it was when we first met, and I would like to say here that within these reflections we should have one that could be feasible, if developed. We have to work on the UN architecture, everyone with his disposition. I am not a jurist.

I believe that we must not forget that the first task is the reevaluation of multilateralism, we must obtain some success, we must start by something that can be done. And I will illustrate this proposal in two ways. On the first one I will be rather impolite, because I will pass the yellow line of our agenda of today. On the second one I will return again on the UN headquarters.

Concerning the first one, I think that the great conflicts or problems that we all know did not have a linear evolution, and two of them got so serious that the humanity collective consciousness is going to change; maybe here there is an occasion.

I would like to comment on Middle East.

After 60 years the international community – that allowed itself to complicate things by bringing oil and strategic interests that were completely extraneous to the Israel-Palestine conflict – was able to limit the conflict to the region, avoiding its further expansion. It is 60 years since the situation is going on, it is going to break down. Actually, Middle East is a tangle of five conflicts: Iran and the problem of nuclear diplomacy, Iraq and its internal explosion, Lebanon, the growth of a terrorism that does not absolutely care about Palestine since its birth: it declared war to the Jews and the crusaders, and the conflict Israel-Palestine, of course.

Regulating, ending, calming this situation before it spreads all over is essential for humanity. All the world knows it. The US, that due to their continuous unilateralism are now delegitimised to talk about peace, are now humble in the quartet diplomacy.

The quartet failed; the new event that we have not completely used is that the Arab League made a declaration that goes the same way, two or three years ago. We still have not managed the conjunction of the diplomacy of the quartet with the Arab League.

The urgency is so strong that I feel that a solution could be found if all the international energies of peace get together and take consciousness of it and act. I would very much like the Forum to mention this international rehabilitation in an eventual document.

I would say the same thing on climate. We have been delayed for everything that nourished this anxiety by the non-consensus of the scientific community. On the problem of the greenhouse effect and of climate there is now the emergency of a wide consensus.

There is more than one bizarre French, my friend Claude Allègre, who denies this consensus, but it's not a problem, the consensus is very strong and I would say two times strong, in its width of scientific consensus among many people, and as well for the statement of the seriousness of the problem and of its fast aggravation. The more we wait, the more we guarantee our children that they will roast on a frying pan.

Maybe there can be a possibility here, and our mental energies of international peacekeepers could bring a contribution here, too.

This could be one of the messages that maybe we could bring as World Political Forum, together with the explication of what we are and what we do, to the new Secretary General of the United Nations. He has just been appointed, and, contrarily to what it is said, he has a good knowledge of the mechanisms of the UN. The importance of the personalities who are part of this Forum could give authority to a document, a letter that we could address to the Secretary General. We could say many things, maybe suggest, if you agree, the possible new ways to face the two problems that I just mentioned, but above all we could make four proposals, maybe more humble than many others that were made here, because we have to start in the right way.

The first one is a recover of what Hubert Vedrine just said. For the UN, one of the urgencies is the problem of the "failed States", the place where the State exists no more, and everything is confusion, where people are starving, and nothing works well.

So, the problem of the transformation of the Trusteeship Council. I would like to propose to go back to the concept of mandate, but something different from the Society of Nations of the period after the First World War, that was entrusted to the nations. We must go for an international mandate, entrusted to the UN. It is not easy, but who will say no? There are fifteen countries in difficulty. This is my first proposal.

My second proposal is that of suggesting to the Secretary General to propose to the council the opening of a reflection, in the framework of the UN, on the morality and the stability of the world financial system. We talk about an infection, but the fact that its evident demoralisation, its deterioration makes it contemptible and disqualifies eventual efforts of stabilisation would be a good start. The problem is too difficult to go beyond: opening the reflection would already be something important.

The third idea, that slowly rises and on which I suggest the Forum takes a very strong position, it's the creation of a real UN Agency for the Environment. Among the big international instruments that are missing, this is one of those that we need the most. The disaccord on this subject is now disappearing.

My fourth and last idea is the following: the International Ethical, Scientific and Political Collegium that has recently been founded under the Presidency of my friend Milan Kucan, former President of Slovenia, and mine, made this proposal: "to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations, before then a dream of reform, a project for a declaration of interdependence". In 1946 we adopted the UN Charter, that declares sovereignty and that organizes a cooperation of sovereignties. If we succeed in recognising that all the 192 nations are living the same situation, that the pollution of terrorism has no frontiers, that we have to manage the same resources that are going to finish, and that, in fact, we are interdependent, maybe we could unblock the bolt. This bolt makes me sceptical towards all the imagination and generosity that I listened to around this table.

Finally, this is the proposal that I make: a letter to the UN Secretary General.

## **Riccardo Petrella**

I would like to make some reflections on the question of the conditions that have to be respected in order to work for a new world political architecture. Michel Rocard's proposal to send a letter on behalf of the World Political Forum seems excellent to me and I think we have to welcome it and to structure it in order to be efficacious.

The first condition is that of declaring humanity a political subject. Today humanity exists, but it is not recognized. The cultural paradox is this: we all talk about globalization of problems, of human existence, of enterprises, of finance, of communication, of the global village and of interdependence among populations. But when we have to make the decisive step: recognising

humanity as the only, true subject that is capable of representing all the populations of the world and then to have the power to act, we stop and we remain within the logics of the traditional subjects (states, enterprises, national trade unions, and all the realities which are not globalized).

The first question I would ask to the World Political Forum and, in particular to the speakers of this conference is: according to you, why do we have all these difficulties in recognising humanity as a legal political subject? Where are the obstacles? Who prevents us from doing it? Why should we go on saying that the only real subjects are national states, multinational enterprises, world consumers, people who go to the clubs, who belong to the elites, who travel and possess credit cards....and where is the humanity?

My proposal is this: let us make something in order to recognize humanity as a legal political subject.

Therefore the importance of the second condition; Mr Wu made a very interesting intervention, he said: "we are together, we are all on this planet". My question to Mr Wu and to all the other speakers is: we are together, but what do we have together? What do we share? Do we share water, that is a global common good? Do we share knowledge, that we define as something that belongs to everyone? Does knowledge belong to Monsanto, to Cisco, to Fiat? To who does knowledge belong, to the best ones? To who does water belong? To Nestlè, to Danone, to Suez? Why should we make on water and knowledge the same error we made by giving the property of oil, of forests, etc.. to the states or to the big private enterprises?

Therefore my second proposal for the conditions is: let's give ourselves the instruments to live together.

What do we have in common on this planet? Here it comes that we must create the agencies Giulietto Chiesa talked about.

### **Hubert Vedrine**

First of all, I totally agree with Mr Skidelsky, there is some kind of contradiction between legitimacy of representation and efficaciousness of action, this is evident. In all the political bodies we find this problem and the total representativeness maybe leads to paralysis, just like for example in the electoral systems of integral proportional representation; therefore it is a question of balance, and in the question of the Security Council there is a problem of balance.

Second point : the question by Mr Chiesa on the Council of the Wise. In my proposal, it is not a global Council of the Wise, it will not have the impossible mission to present itself as more legitimate than the whole of governments, this is not at all my philosophy. It should be created in order to solve a precise problem, that is to know how to overcome the problem of the block when a decision on the intervention for a population in danger must be taken, notwithstanding the veto. On this particular point I imagined a Council of the Wise.

On the veto: I think that no American, Russian or Chinese President will ever abandon the veto.

So, we can make plans on the abandonment of the veto, but I believe that this will not work, and that we would waste time. Therefore, I think that those who dream with this perspective should concentrate their energies on other proposals; we heard many propositions here, for example: the one on the specific Agencies with precise missions, subject by subject. I totally agree with the one mentioned by Michel Rocard on climate.

I agree with what he said on the international mandate, that is to say a modern form of tutelage; just like Mr Giscard d'Estaing said, it is a sort of Treaty of volunteers and maybe a tactical trick, very useful to by-pass the block of institutions. There are many things to do. It is substantially a body that hasn't got any power, we can simply spread ideas.

I do not believe that we should concentrate on unachievable things, but here I listened to ideas that are not completely utopian, there are some utopias and some other ideas that are not completely utopian, and that could work as well.

I mentioned four or five of them, and this is my spirit: realistic analysis, in order not to waste time, and then we could use all the fractures of the system to progress, subject by subject.

### **Jianmin Wu**

To the question from Lord Skidelsky. First, I need to tell you that China is among the five permanent members of the Security Council. China is the country that uses the least veto power. Thirty five years ago, China returned to the United Nations thanks to your support. You can check

the record. China has used the veto power only a few times, nothing advantageous by the way. Secondly, you mentioned – maybe you didn't mention precisely – the Sudanese issue of Darfur. We Chinese believe that there are more effective means to deal with that issue. We do not share the view of sanctions. So in the private discussions we've expressed our views. We believe that if we imposed a list of sanctions upon this African country, the result will be that the people will suffer a lot more. But, when we deal with our Sudanese colleagues, we express our concerns and we think that we have to cooperate with the African Union to deal with the problem.

The other question, of who owns this wealth. I think professor you have asked a very fundamental question: the distribution of wealth today in the world – what to do? Shall we have a revolution to have this wealth better distributed? My perception is that the time of the revolution – maybe - is over. We need evolution. I'm of the view that we have to act urgently. I share a sense of purpose. At the same time I believe we have to adopt a gradual approach. Big progress is fine, but small progress, if everybody agrees, let's go for it. Bit by bit we can make our world better.

### **Olivier Giscard d'Estaing**

I simply would like to tell two things: the first one is about the interdependence of the sectors we care about. You can not talk about energy without speaking of economic growth, of environment or of injustice. Therefore, I do not think that you can divide these problems in sectors, and for this reason a world governance is necessary to lead the whole and this is linked to the education to health. People must be aware that we consider the totality of these problems. The second thing is on the role that we can play: we have to find some great political leaders that want to start acting.

## II PANEL

Chairman: Andrei Grachev, *Researcher, former spokesman of Pres. Gorbachev, Chairman of WPF's Scientific Committee, Russia*

We still have an important part of our agenda to be addressed. We have an impressive panel, and we already have a list of speakers that didn't have time to speak in the previous part of the plenary, and who are certainly going to be the first on my list this time. Except that my proposal would be – maybe you will agree with me also, those who were on the list of speakers – that maybe we proceed first with the panel, and I'm also sure that once you have listened to the panellists, you may also add some valuable ideas and thoughts to the remarks that you already have in mind. So, with your permission, I would like to start this second part of our final plenary session; I will just remind you the title of it: 'In Search of a New Political Architecture: Principles, Conditions and Stages of Construction'.

In a way I'm tempted to profit from the introduction that has been made to the first part of this plenary by my friend Edoardo Greppi, because he actually introduced the whole of this subject. And so I think that without losing much time now with another introduction, we can proceed with this. I would just maybe suggest that in this second part of the debate I may ask the panellists that are announced to try to concentrate on some of the subjects that came out of the first part of the discussion and that from my point of view would be interesting to debate and reflect upon in the second. So, from my point of view these are the following points. I think that during this one and a half days of debate, which has been extremely rich in the plenary and the workshops, we have certainly heard a lot of ideas and suggestions and proposals, a lot of them converging, some of them slightly conflicting but anyway going in the same direction.

So, if we could in this conclusive part of the debate concentrate not on 'what' but on 'how': how to proceed, by what stages, at what pace, how to merge or converge the two obvious necessities, both to proceed by steps in the way of gradual reformation, that wouldn't be in a revolutionary but an evolutionary way – though we know from history (our history, Russian history, but also Chinese history) that even if you suggest or think in terms of revolution, if you have too much evolution then you might end by a revolution. That means how to converge both the evolutionary pace, conception and referenced approach, with a sense of urgency. It seems necessary to have unanimity of opinions at this table, because we are facing the extremely dramatic and rapid deterioration of the present situation, stressed right away by Michel Rocard, Giulietto Chiesa and President Gorbachev in his opening speech when he qualified the present situation in terms of crisis.

Now, among two or three other subjects, I think it would be extremely interesting from my point of view, taking into account the authority and the quality in the level of the panellists, to hear them address the question of sovereignty. I mean what image, what way, where do we help with this term? Whether it's a retreat of sovereignty by some nations that are following the formula of Professor Etzioni, perhaps representing the final stage of liberation from the end of the colonial system, that are happy to retrieve sovereignty and to move along the way of constitutionally independent states. Or whether we are witnessing the contrary stage, let us say the voluntary sacrifice of sovereignty, the integration process, the superior form of association of the sovereign states. Or maybe we are witnessing both, which means the trends are going both ways and in opposite directions.

And my last point. In the way of a devil's advocate, I would like to suggest to provoke the debates for this morning's session, which is, once again, how to marry the various, sometimes very new ideas of legitimate intervention, of the legitimacy of intervention, of the necessity of intervention, which may sometimes be contrary to the principle of sovereignty. On which occasions, under which conditions and in what forms? This leads us also to a very delicate and sensitive matter (but which is also part of this general term of intervention of sanctions, which was another particular case raised by Lord Skidelsky), the use of force – what way, what form, under which conditions, and with what mandate?

And so more or less with these wishes in mind I would like to start this last panel. I'm very pleased to be able to give the floor now to Mr. Fausto Pocar, who is the president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

**Fausto Pocar**, *President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Italy*

It is a great pleasure for me to take part in this seminar and to engage with distinguished colleagues in this timely debate on new ways of thinking about global governance in light of the challenges posed in this century affecting the world as a whole. Given the limited time that we have, instead of going through the paper I have prepared, which will be distributed and made available later on, I will try to take only some issues from that, and will also try to link my observations to the previous session. I will not attempt to deal with all the problems that have been considered here yesterday and today, but I would like nevertheless, as an international judge and scholar in international law, to focus my intervention on one principle, one condition that I consider fundamental in establishing any new world architecture. That element is accountability. In other words, it is my view that in any new world architecture we cannot do without building mechanisms requiring accountability for respect of human rights norms at all levels and by all actors.

I will not say much on existing courts and tribunals. However, I wish to remark that the establishment of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals was crucial in this respect, because they were the catalysts for an emerging trend of holding individuals accountable, at the international level, for respect for human rights, alongside of states. Traditionally, under recent treaties, states are responsible for the protection of human rights. The two ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were based on the principle that an individual acting on behalf of states should also be regarded individually as accountable for violations of international law, for crimes committed against civilians, against other individuals or people; and that impunity could not be tolerated in international relations. And thus the international community intervened and assumed the traditional role of the state by asserting criminal jurisdiction over them. And there is no doubt that the establishment of these two tribunals by the Security Council at the beginning of the 1990s accelerated the elaboration of universal (if you can use the word) agency, in the sense of an institution that is mandated with fighting impunity and dealing with accountability of individuals, which is the International Criminal Court that was mentioned during the first session.

But it is also undeniable that the proliferation of judicial bodies supported by the international community did not end with the ICC, as demonstrated by the mixed panels that the UN administration established in Kosovo, the special court there, the East Timor Special Panels, the courts for Cambodia in 2003. And I wish also to note that this trend is now moving towards holding individuals accountable not only for international crimes but also for domestic crimes, where the domestic crimes reach a certain level of seriousness or are trans-national in character. This is evidenced by the recent steps taken by the United Nations to establish a commission for trying individuals responsible for the political assassination of a head of state in Lebanon, following the work of the United Nations Independent Investigation Commission, a real investigation. When this tribunal is established it will be quite different from the other one because it will apply Lebanese law, it will not apply international law. It is an international court to try a domestic crime, because clearly a political assassination cannot be regarded as a crime in international law. But there is an intervention from the international community also in this case.

In addition to holding individuals accountable, the establishment of international courts and mixed courts also shows the trend of holding states accountable for prosecuting individuals under their domestic law. Because all tribunals, especially the ICC, have come to the conclusion that they have to share jurisdiction with domestic courts and cooperate with domestic courts. It is clear that the international community cannot totally replace local jurisdiction; instead there needs to be cooperation between international and domestic courts in order to implement states' accountability for making prosecutions.

Looking to the future, jurisdiction by the international community over individuals for international crimes may well develop and should develop beyond war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. If you look at the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect, that was largely disputed, crimes that are trans-national in nature and have a global impact may be cause for intervention by the international community, to hold individuals to account. So, for example, under the broad category of crimes against humanity, international crimes such as terrorism and economic and environmental crimes may be prosecuted in the future at the international level. But of course this first requires that the scope of the responsibility to protect be defined under

international law and practice, and in particular that the implementation of the principle of the responsibility to protect is based on sufficient practice, in order that it may be integrated into the UN system as defined in the charter. In the charter there is tension between the goals of the organisation, including human rights protection, and the basic principle of state sovereignty. This tension requires further attention and the establishment of procedures that may allow it to achieve a satisfactory balance between the sovereignty of states. And here we come to the principle of interdependence, because in a way this balance is the interdependence of states, it is something which goes to that interdependence.

But let me outline one issue. My presentation has focused on criminal responsibility, but ways should be explored and developed for holding actors in the international community accountable for upholding human rights norms beyond just criminal prosecutions. The modalities for ensuring stability remain to be termed, but this broadening of the international community's jurisdiction to enforce respect for norms of general interest must be strengthened in order to lead to a more just world order. This requires the establishment of procedures based on shared sovereignty among states. Jurisdiction is an essential expression of sovereignty, perhaps the most essential expression of sovereignty. There are now strengths for sharing jurisdiction, to transfer to common entities, to common bodies, the exercise of jurisdiction and so the exercise of an expression of sovereignty. It is to me indispensable to proceed in this way, for exercising sufficient control over the individuals acting internally in international relations, or for matters of crucial interest for the international community. And here I join what has been said this morning by Giulietto Chiesa on agency. In a way again this is a sort of agency too that would be entrusted with monitoring the accountability and implementing the accountability principles, both for the states that are concerned and individuals, multinational corporations and other institutions.

**Frédéric Gros**, Philosopher, *Professor at the University of Paris XII, France*

In a previous work, I had tried to analyse the concept of traditional war, in the classic sense, as Western philosophy from Plato to Nietzsche, had envisaged it. This led me to the idea that, for Western philosophy, war is a configuration of violence. Just as painting is a configuration of colours and music a configuration of sounds. One could say that war is a historical configuration of violence, along ethical, political and legal lines.

In ethical terms, war traditionally implied the confrontation of two armies on a battlefield. There was an exchange of death (soldiers on both sides killed and were killed), and this reciprocity was essential in developing values like courage, a sense of honour, and sacrifice and thus somehow turned war into an ethical experience. But nowadays, there is no such reciprocity, in terrorist acts or in the launching of intelligent missiles.

In political terms, according to Rousseau, war is not a relationship between individuals but between states. War is not just the result of the states' policy: it also contributes in shaping them. And, this is how political philosophers like Machiavelli, Spinoza, Hobbes or Weber looked upon war: as the element giving consistency to a state. Hence the omnipresence of war in the past centuries, in a context where nations were in competition and the power of a state could be measured by crossing swords with another state.

In legal terms, war used to be thought of as a form of violence structured by the law. And this idea shaped three great conceptions: First, the mythical conception of war as the origin of the law; Second, the theological conception of war as a just cause; and Third, the legal conception of war being waged in the strict observance of rules.

In short, war used to be defined as a "public and just armed conflict". This definition is no longer valid in our modern world. However, if we consider for example, terrorist acts against Western cities or the endemic conflicts in countries devastated by armed factions (collapsed states), the theatres of operation, actors, logics, all have changed. Violence nowadays seems to have shifted from the public to the private; to have been disseminated; to have become closely associated with criminality and media coverage — none of which fit the traditional patterns of war. As a result, notions like "conventional enemy", "decisive battle", "regular army", "victory" or "defeat", which once belonged to the culture of war, are no longer relevant frameworks of discourse with which to interpret contemporary conflicts.

The reasons for this gradual disappearance of war are numerous: I could mention the development of nuclear weapons, the changes in the definition of power, or the weakening of the nation-states. At the same time, a new definition of security emerges, which I would call the fourth age of security. Actually, I am referring to four ages of security, but I don't mean four separate historical periods; rather, I mean four cultural constructions that have formed over the centuries and still exist today.

Security, in the first sense, is a spiritual notion. In Greek philosophy (namely among the Stoics, the Epicureans and the Sceptics), security referred to the mental state of the sage, who, by means of spiritual techniques, reaches an inner stability which nothing can disturb. Though the wise man may be ill, be ruined, or he may lose someone he loves, he remains calm in the middle of the storm: his security is preserved.

But then, when Christianity appeared, security took another sense. It still referred to a mental state of serenity, but it was God's blessing, God's sign of peace and no longer the product of man's wisdom. In the Middle Ages, Augustinian theology applied this new sense of the word 'security' to the political field, with the project of one single human community ruled by the same law and driven by the same hope. Significantly enough, it is this type of construction, combining theology and politics, built through political and cultural unification, that is involved whenever a new world order — here I'm thinking of such ideas as a universal republic, world democracy, global governance — is called for.

The third age of security, then, arose in the Classical Age, with political philosophers like Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. At that time, security became the element giving consistency to a

sovereign state. The sovereign state, in its modern definition as a political unit, is based on two types of security. On the one hand, internal security, in the sense of a civil peace guaranteed by the police and the law. On the other hand, external security, implying a permanent state of war that ensured peace by means of deterrence and threat of force. In other words, security is a double-edged process of preservation: by maintaining civil peace, the state protects the people's lives and possessions. However, this internal security relies on a system of external security that protects the national territory by maintaining the threat of war against other countries. Indeed, it is the type of cultural construct involved whenever the nuclear issue is discussed.

Finally, the gradual disappearance of the traditional patterns of war marks the beginning of the fourth age of security where security is no longer related to the mental state of the sage (that was the spiritual definition), nor to a universal community (that was the theological definition), nor again to the state's consistency (that was the definition of sovereignty). It has now come to be related to the protection of the living being — which introduces a new definition of security in bio-political terms.

This new age of security focuses on the individual and takes him as a reference point. Security is now expected to ensure man's well-being and personal development. The individual is to be protected from all kinds of risks, be they biological, armed or environmental. Security is no longer simply a matter in the hands of militaries or police officers. Indeed, the point is no longer to protect a territory or possessions, but to make sure the individual lives in a safe environment, safe from any aggression or threat. This is why there is so much reference to road security, social security, food security or human security. Security is expected to neutralise whatever may endanger or harm man. This new definition is in keeping with our democratic feeling, which gives the individual the central place. However, this new definition is not without risk, as it implies that man's suffering is turned into a sacred space and that all collective logic has to be kept in the background. Consequently, the media coverage of victims takes on a major importance and becomes part of what is at stake in today's conflicts

To conclude, I will simply summarise what is, to me, the task of political philosophy in the coming years: it is to reflect on this new concept of security, taking into account hopes as well as risks, the perspectives it opens up, as well as the dangers that it carries along with it.

**Federico Mayor**, *Former Director General of UNESCO, Spain*

In this new political architecture, new principles, conditions, stages of construction. First I would like to talk about principles, because there can be no new political architecture without principles. Roosevelt made the design of the United Nations system, and as Mr. Hessel emphasised yesterday, three years later there was a Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as the guiding principles for this new global architecture. Now, after these guiding principles, we must also remember that at the beginning of the 1950s it was instituted to share the UNDP, the United Nations Development Programme. And as you know, before long there was no aid but loans, no indigenous development but exploitation, no principles but market laws, no more “we the peoples” (that is at the start of the UN Charter) but “we the powerful”, no more democracy but the plutocracy. And then the net result has been that the social disparities led to desperation, radicalisation and eventually to violence. It has been a weakening process of the UN system and of the state, of the nation state; and yesterday there were very important comments about what the trans-national companies mean today, and the trafficking, the tax havens, and all this is done with complete impunity at the supranational level.

At present we have one security policy at the worldwide level that overshadows violations of human rights, as in Guantánamo or in the secret flights, or more recently the elimination – and I think this is very important – of Habeas Corpus, which is one of the most important pillars of democracy at the worldwide level. Therefore I think that in this area of principles, human rights must inspire the actions of all the architecture at the worldwide level that we want to implement. It would give empowerment, moral authority, and the capacity for justice. And at the same time we must not forget that the United Nations was created for the International Court of Justice. Therefore one of the first capacities of all architecture at the worldwide level must be the capacity for justice and punishing transgressions, but it is not the case now. And then it must also emphasise the role of multilateralism, as the only viable framework for mobilisation. For example, this morning there was a declaration of the need for interdependence in this direction: multilateralism, interdependence and guiding principles, not the market laws; guiding principles of justice, solidarity, equality (which is essential) and freedom.

Now some words about architecture. As a summary of what I think has been said: improving, including and transforming. First: ‘improving’. It has been said that we must do better at the bilateral level on the United Nations, I think they are right. Mr Hessel has suggested a permanent summit to deal with the greatest world challenges like nutrition, climate change, energy, health, then also to find the solution to the Middle East. I think that this is one of the improvements that again reflects the image we need about the UN system. And Michel Rocard also talked very well about the possibilities of establishing, perhaps improving the UNEP, to have a very clear agency on climate change.

Secondly: ‘including’. For example, including the World Trade Organisation. It is a shame that today, because of the United States in the 1990s, this is out of the UN system. Including the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development (don’t forget that this is the name). And also the International Monetary Fund.

And finally: in depth ‘transformation’, which as you know has been studied thoroughly by UBUNTU in the last four years, so that we now have some quite concrete proposals in this respect. And we must remind ourselves that the United States were the founders of this, and that they will change before long I am sure. They have already lost some crucial issues in international agencies. And therefore, as it has been said, we cannot always say it is impossible to have transformation at this moment because the United States administration is against it. There are very important in depth transformations. My view is (as it is the case in the International Labour Organisation), that in this transformation we could have a General Assembly, which comes from the League of Nations; for example, 50% of states, but then 25% elected people and 25% representatives of civil society. This is in depth transformation, this it is reachable. We do not have it now because very often the peoples are not represented at all. Hubert Vedrine suggested this morning that this consultative assembly would be in relation with the General Assembly; and it has also been suggested that the Security Council would intervene with this wise group of people. Well, what I mean is that, within the transformation, we must establish the way in which it will be put into practice.

And finally, it is my view, as well as Andrei Grachev's that for this transformation it is not advisable to have another war, I agree that evolution is much better than revolution, I agree. And then finally what we need is the political will. The political will depends on visionary leaders. Now we have a new Secretary General, and we must approach him, I agree. We have also electoral interests that can be exploited in this respect, and we have also very important social pressures. Yesterday Flavio Lotti was talking about this kind of mobilisation of public opinion through the new communication instruments, starting with mobile telephones or the internet etc. And then there are also alternative proposals, which have already been mentioned.

I would like to conclude by saying to you, as I said yesterday, that we must dare. And we must dare because here we have one example. We are here around the figure of Mikhail Gorbachev. And Mikhail Gorbachev did not say no, "I must follow the inertia of the solution, and if we cannot find it then it will be difficult to find the solution". We have another example that I think is very important, which is Nelson Mandela. Nelson Mandela as we know was in prison for twenty-seven years, and instead of living in prison with vengeance and hatred, he left in agreement with President de Clerk to find an imaginative solution. A solution with imagination, this is what I think is important. And being around Mikhail Gorbachev we must try to dare, we must try to mobilise public opinion, and we must try to behave like these two historical leaders. Concerning this mobilisation, I think that we must not remain silent. We remain silent too often, and this is not good. For example, I must say that I am very surprised that the European Union did not react to the last decisions of the Bush administration on Habeas Corpus. We must not remain silent. We have a very friendly relationship, we are alike, and so we must speak out more frequently, must say what we think.

**Richard Falk**, *Professor of International Law and Practise, Princeton University, USA*

I'm reassured that you didn't expect me to represent my country, at least my government. I want to thank the World Political Forum for including me in this exceptional gathering of extraordinary personalities. It's been a real pleasure to benefit from the stimulating discussions we've had. My own sense of how to think about a new political architecture for the world depends a little bit on understanding what went wrong with the old political architecture, and also understanding why what went wrong contributed to this global political crisis that President Gorbachev called our attention to at the beginning of our meeting. It seems to me very important to recognise that the old political architecture depended on a double logic of what one might call world order. That it had a weak dimension of law; premised on equality of states, the notion that equals should be treated equally; the idea of the sovereignty of territorial states, a notion that remains subordinate to the stronger domain of power; that the premise of geopolitics has been based on the inequality of states, and this inequality of states has been the dominant driving force of modern history. And that geopolitical dominant force has been contained by two elements, both of which are missing in the present global situation.

The first has been countervailing power. In other words, restraint has been built into the old political architecture because of countervailing political power that encouraged prudence, prudent diplomacy and moderation in the use of force, in the pursuit of national interests. But it also depended heavily on the generally benevolent leadership of the dominant political actors; in other words, one could live with this old political architecture to the extent that leadership was provided in a way that contributed to the protection of the global public interest. And I think Professor Gardner among others called our attention, through his reference to the Vandenberg Resolution, to the fact that there was a moment after World War Two where the US leadership was motivated by seeking a multilateral system in which a robust United Nations would contribute to the evolution and strengthening of international law, which would thereby make the domain of law much more able to contain the domain of power. The greatest struggle in the old political architecture was to eliminate aggressive war as an accepted part of legitimate geopolitics.

And I think the UN was framed around that premise, that the powerful states, the victorious countries in World War Two, accepted the notion that they would no longer have the option to wage war as a way of extending their wealth, influence and power in the world. That the use of force would either be for self-defence or under the authority of the Security Council. And that this was an enormous breakthrough in the old political architecture, connecting with the primacy of states as the organising foundation of this old political architecture. This dual logic that I tried to emphasise, one also finds it in the UN Charter itself; on the one side it affirms sovereignty and sovereign equality of all its members, but at the same time it establishes the permanent members of the Security Council and gives them a veto, which is in a sense creating a structural exception to the authority of the charter itself. So it is a kind of contradiction that exists between the domain of law and the domain of power. And I think that is a useful way of thinking about this kind of normative incoherence that is within the charter.

Another example of this dual logic is the non-proliferation regime. The treaty is set up as a set of relationships among sovereign states, in other words fitting within the domain of law. But the implementation of the treaty has been in the domain of power. It has been selectively implemented, it has relied on double standards. The obligations of the nuclear weapons states to seek nuclear disarmament in good faith has been abandoned.

So, one sees that the deterioration of this dual logic through the absence of countervailing power after the Cold War and the decline of leadership contributes to this emerging global political crisis.

This global political crisis was preceded in the 1990s by what I would call the golden age of the old political architecture, because this was the period where human rights really did begin to emerge. The concept of human security emerged and the ideas of accountability that have been referred to by Judge Pocar took on real vitality for the first time since World War Two. Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect vulnerable people became real instruments of global policy. UN global conferences on the environment, on human rights, on the status of women and other issues, were the first experiments in global democracy, experiments that were so successful that they led to a statist backlash from the old political architecture.

Because what the golden age of the old architecture was seeking to do in part was to transform itself into the protection of individuals, a type of person-based security that Professor Gros called our attention to.

So we are now confronting this loss of legitimacy, the double standards in the domain of law, the lack of respect for the basic global norms, a dangerous upsurge of unilateralist geopolitics, in a global setting where there is no countervailing force to balance the predominant military political actor. This has destabilised the governments of the world and the civil society actors who are addressing the crucial problems that we have been discussing: problems of the suffering of the poor, problems of dealing with the future of energy, problems of protecting the environment, and problems of protecting vulnerable people confronting the prospect of catastrophe.

So I would conclude by saying that the priorities for a new political architecture depend on two sets of developments. The first is to revive the golden age of the 1990s, which was completely diverted by the response to the 9/11 attacks. In other words, we need to restore the best of the old architecture. And at the same time I think, in accordance with what Ambassador Wu said earlier today, that we need to take account of the extraordinary achievement of the European Union in establishing a peaceful community where previously there had existed continuous cycles of violence. This example of what international cooperation can achieve despite all its problems, seems to me to represent a crucial basis for hope.

Finally, I think we need to work towards democratising regional and global spaces, so that if democracy for the peoples of the world is to be meaningful, it has to exist within our institutions, beyond the state as well as at the level of the state. This means that we have to be courageous enough to think in a utopian way, as well as in a sensible evolutionary way. If we think back to the great changes that occurred towards the end of the twentieth century – the end of the Cold War and the peaceful overcoming of apartheid in South Africa – both of these changes were jumps in history and they represent the politics of impossibility. No-one anticipated it, and they couldn't have been anticipated, but they give us faith to hope that we can achieve the kind of world that we need, to live in justice and peace in the twenty-first century.

**Michel Rocard**, *Former Prime Minister of France*

The diagnosis is certain: the current world architecture does not work well. Conflicts remain unsolved; failed states are without help or treatment; worldwide negotiations concerning climate, trade, reform of the United Nations or any number of other urgent concepts, fail repeatedly.

We citizens of the world have without doubt a duty to think in terms of a new world architecture and to prepare it intellectually and politically. However, something else is certain, as well: the complete obfuscation of the situation due to the short-term perspectives on these matters. I therefore feel incapable of thinking in terms of such a global project, finished and coherent, which might be implemented.

Several global problems from the past seem to me to pose the possibility of rehabilitating the concept of a new and better political architecture; multilateralism, the principle of negotiations and the restoration of confidence in these ideas by some punctual successes in these problem areas.

I must say that I do not believe in any chance, in the decade to come, for the reform of the UN Security Council as it presently exists, for the creation of an Economic and Social Security Council, or for the reorganisation, in the hope of better coordination and efficiency, of the economic and financial agencies of the UN: the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, and the ILO. But, I do think that there are two problems on which the persistent absence of a solution, the growing damages created thereby and the shared knowledge of the increasing threat linked to the proliferation of collateral havoc, are creating a growing consensus on the urgency of a solution.

This concerns first, the Israel-Palestine conflict. Born in 1947, this conflict has been until now, successfully limited by the international community to the area within the borders of the former Palestine mandate, except during the five wars between Israel and the Arab states. After every one of these wars, the belligerents have more or less returned to their starting positions. This is no longer the case and there is a great risk of an enmeshment between the Palestinian cause, the terrorist clamours, the Islamic identification of the various Iraqi factions and the Iranian discourse. To progress from all this becomes an urgent task and can only be done through a negotiated peace. The principal actor is the United States. However, they cannot publicly admit that their regression to partisan policy has disqualified them for this task. They know it very well, of course. The road map and, with it, the Quartet, have temporarily failed. But the 2002 Declaration of the Arab League opens a very new and promising path. A conjunction between the Quartet and the Arab League would probably be the most powerful coalition that the international community could create in order to put pressure on both communities for the sake of peace, with the US a natural ally. It is a difficult task, but necessary and possible.

The second problem is the greenhouse effect and, more generally, the threat of a change in the climate. In this matter, the new element is the consensus that is quickly and consistently growing in the scientific community. Thereby, the world public opinion is increasingly convinced that the problem is of first and gravest priority and that the danger is rapidly increasing. The preparation of measures to be taken, including some constraining ones, is now within the reach of the international community. In the United States, the most reluctant country, now their local authorities as opposed to the central government show a very clear consciousness of the emergency and the need to treat that problem.

A third idea approaches a bit more, the theme of the world architecture. A new Secretary General of the United Nations has just been appointed. Such a body as ours is within its rights to present to him some suggestions for his mandate. In a letter that the World Political Forum could undertake to write and beyond the two problems above mentioned, we could evoke:

The urgent necessity of the creation of a United Nations Environment Agency;

The proposal presented to the General Assembly to adopt a "Declaration of Interdependence", that, recognising that our nations are all in the same boat and depend more and more on one-another, would be the legislative basis of a new age of global cooperation;

The urgent need to improve the quality and the power of the United Nations instruments to tackle the problem of failed states. It is probably necessary now to create the concept of United Nations mandate to face these situations. A reform of the Trusteeship Council or of the Decolonisation Committee can be a step in this direction;

The preparation of a conference on the morality and stability of the world financial system, which seems presently to suffer under some difficulties related to these two factors.

## DEBATE

### Hall Gardner

I would like to address your opening remarks about evolution versus urgency, how to proceed with imagination, as Mr. Mayor put it, and also to address what I call the urgency of the Vandenberg Resolution that Professor Falk mentioned. In 1989 we were told we were at the end of history. As President Gorbachev has pointed out, we are in danger of retreating back into history. September 11 led to the global war on terrorism, led to the US intervention in Afghanistan and unilateral intervention in Iraq. We need to look for new ways to transcend the crisis with Iran potentially developing nuclear weapons, North Korea likewise. Both these countries risk a wider regional war, a wider regional arms race, weapons build up, weapons of mass destruction piled upon even more weapons of conventional construction. However, as Mr. Wu pointed out, in crisis there is both danger and opportunity. And what I want to suggest here – and this is the relevance of the Vandenberg Resolution – is that we need to develop what is called regional security communities. We must transcend anarchy region by region. The European Union was the first step in creating a peaceful community, one region at a time.

Now, in terms of Iran and North Korea, we have one example of a regional community that was set up to prevent the Ukraine from maintaining nuclear weapons capability. Ukraine was pressured by multilateral dissuasion and persuasion to eliminate its nuclear weapons capability. It was given UN security guarantees; the permanent five gave Ukraine security guarantees in order to get it to eliminate its nuclear capability. We need to move the same way, in my view, in regard to Iran and North Korea, creating new regional security communities which give security to these countries. Notice that, despite the unilateralism in American policy in Bush's first term, we have moved into a new multilateralism. The EU three first dealt with Iran; now it's the permanent UN five plus Germany. In regard to North Korea, it's the permanent five now, plus Japan and partly South Korea. They are working together as a regional security community in order to put on pressure for multilateral dissuasion and persuasion, to get both North Korea and Iran to stop their potential nuclear programmes.

What I'm simply proposing here is a step by step creation of these regional security communities, region by region. So we had one for the Ukraine and we have potential communities for North Korea and Iran. Once you begin to build these communities everything else works in place. You can begin to resolve the conflict between North and South Korea, you can begin to reduce tensions in the Middle East, at least in regard to Iran. We need to look forward to other regions too: peacekeeping in Palestine; you go round the world developing regional security for Darfur, ultimately. There are ways we can move step by step.

### Roberto Savio

I think that we cannot make analysis of the political crisis that President Gorbachev referred to yesterday in his opening remarks, like ultimately assigning responsibility for the blocking of the intergovernmental system only to Mr. Bush. I think there are two points that we have to note. One point, which I find strange that it has not come out, is that the intergovernmental system is still based on the Westphalian concept of states. And this concept of states has been going through serious crisis. We have ninety members of the United Nations who have suffered conflicts of minorities or ethnic regions. I do not talk of artificial states, artificially created, as Lord Skidelsky talked about yesterday like that created in Iraq. The Westphalian system is today in a serious crisis, and this is something which we have not yet taken a decision about, but we have to look at it.

Then there is a second problem we face. Like it or not, we have a crisis of political institutions and nationalism. That is extremely strong. If you read the last Euro barometer and you look at the percentage of European citizens' trust in political institutions, we find that it went down by 27% over the last ten years. And the number of people who take part in political activities is sinking worldwide more and more. I'm not going to give any debate here, but I just want to stress that

citizens look to political parties more and more as machinery and less and less as a pursuit of participation and expression. I'm addressing this point because, while at the local level there is still much wider participation by citizens in political institutions, at the national level things become even more distant. And the intergovernmental system is made up of representatives of national states, not of local citizens.

Now, this brings us to the point, my central point that the average citizen looks to the United Nations as something with which he has nothing to do. It is totally out of his world, totally out of his daily concerns. There was a time in which the United Nations made an effort in that direction, the Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. One of the closing points was to state the principle of human security as the key basis for building up the implementation of the agenda of the conference. Then in 1995 the General Assembly approved the concept of global human security. This now has gone. Security now is states' security. We have totally lost the concept of the relationship between security and citizens, security and humans. This is why I think that we must be careful, because, if by a magic moment we could change the United Nations today, in the present intergovernmental machinery, I'm sure that the United Nations that would come out would be worse and not better than the one before. Why?

Well, I want to finish by saying that the generation of idealism, the generation of President Gorbachev, in which politicians went into politics for changing the world, has gone; and this is the period Professor Falk identified as the highest moment of the United Nations; and not by chance, because it was a different politics. Then this moment of idealism went to moments of pragmatism, everyone starts to bicker and argue. I'm afraid that in fact we have passed through the period of multilateralism. There has been a collection of adopted initiatives without a general framework, without any system of values, where, because of this, every act creates other problems, not contributing to a long term solution. The result of this is that Mr. Bush is an example of unilateralism, but the President of Sudan is also an example of unilateralism.

Today, in a system where we have no common values to which to refer, we have entered an age which is not sustainable in environment, in water, in social equity, in women and minorities. And we have globalisation which is coming up, which is based on unilateralism. This is the crisis I think we face. And I'm not talking about political institutions; I believe in political institutions. But I'm talking about the people in the street. I'm talking about the fact that I want to support them, as Mr. Mayor said, that we should be doing as much as possible in support of citizen movements, some of which are real like UBUNTU which Mr. Mayor chairs, some of which are not here, and are acting to create awareness and participation of people in the United Nations. As they say: "let us work for our United Nations". I think this is something we must do; keep account and give them a way of linking to our intellectual and political world, and citizens' participation in a new architecture of the United Nations.

## **Lakdar Brahimi**

I'm afraid I'm going to take you back to some very simple considerations, of realities. In the previous session, one or two speakers went back to speak about Darfur. Darfur is now definitely one of the worst, most scandalous crises that we are facing, where the international community is not doing very well. But I think Darfur is also one place where we see what is wrong with the international system. The government of Sudan has a lot to answer for. They are responsible for displacing or allowing the displacement of two million of their citizens. By any standards this is not acceptable, even if that was the only thing they are blamed for. But the international community likes good guys and bad guys. So, if the government of Sudan is the bad guy, then the rebels have to be the good guys. I'm sorry to say, the rebels are not the good guys. They are just as bad as the government of Sudan. And there are many cases documented by the United Nations and the African Union where the rebels have killed their nationals as much as the government. The victims are the civilians there and the perpetrators are both the government and the rebels. That is my first point.

Secondly, the international community is speaking loudly that the UN has to go to Darfur, the UN has to do this. And President Bush was saying: "We have asked the United Nations to go in and they are not going in". The reality is that, if this bad government of Sudan doesn't say: "Yes please come in", Kofi Annan or his successor are not going to find one single soldier from any one of the 192 countries, to go to Darfur. So, what are we talking about? Lord Skidelsky was talking about the

fact that their government is telling them that China is preventing the resolution that would solve the problem of Darfur. The British government will not give one soldier as long as the bad government of Sudan doesn't allow it. The American government will not give one soldier. Bangladesh will not give one soldier. So the United Nations can not go to Darfur, unless the government of Sudan says yes. This is a fact.

I think Judge Pocar has spoken about accountability and about the fact that impunity in the world today should not be acceptable. I think this is one of the great advances that has been made at the level of ideas. But from the few remaining memories I have from the little law I studied in my youth, I think that law has to be universal. If it is not applicable to everybody then you have a problem. Federico Mayor was quite right in saying that it's a pity that the European Union is not saying anything about the destroying of Habeas Corpus in the United States. If anything like that had happened in Burundi, the European Union would be up in arms today. And if they were talking to Mr. Wu they would be giving him lessons and acting like teachers. But because it is the United States, nobody says anything. So we have no law in the community yet. It is very good that we are talking about it, and we have got to continue to talk about it, but I don't think we have an international system that is capable of really implementing this accountability.

The same thing applies with regard to the International Criminal Court. When the United States managed to force the hand of 100 of the 192 states, to sign with it arrangements whereby American citizens are not under any circumstances to be subjected to this court, we have a problem. And some of the countries that have signed are West European countries (I think Britain has signed it). So I think this is part of the elements you have to consider when you are talking about that.

The same thing about the responsibility to protect. The responsibility to protect is something that we talk about; you are all very happy it is there. But there is one place that is begging for this principle to be implemented, has been begging for it – nobody would oppose an intervention – that's Somalia. Who is ready to go and implement this there? And we are talking about Darfur; until the government of Sudan says: "Please come, you are welcome" we are not going to have one soldier going there. So I think, as we are talking about the new architecture, these are the realities. And we haven't talked about Iraq. We haven't talked about accountability. Who is at fault? Nobody is to blame for what is happening to the people of Iraq? Nobody? Thirty-four days of war in Lebanon, and the Security Council for the first time in its history didn't even make an appeal for a ceasefire. Is that nobody's fault? So these are the questions I would like to pose.

## **François Trémeaud**

It is natural that the international and multilateral architecture that exists today reflects the conditions in which this system appeared: namely to face the challenge of the war. Today we can say that it is deeply transformed and that the new important challenges that humanity and the planet must face are different. But I believe that we must recognize that the UN system had the capability of convoking world conferences on everyone of these subjects, in the Nineties, and to obtain an agreement both on the seriousness of the problem and on what should be done on the subject in the following years and decades, and to be able to obtain quite the totality of the agreement of the Chiefs of State.

There were 110 heads of state at the European social summit, who ratified its conclusions; there were all the heads of state of the world when the programme of the new millennium was approved. Now, we already know that that programme will be largely unattended, and we are evidently late in the execution that had been foreseen.

I think that, if we talk about illegitimacy and this concerns not only the system of representation, but more the fact that there is a series of engagements, declarations, etc.. that are taken or made by the highest leaders in the world and are left totally without effect, and I don't think that public opinion could consider this as something very serious.

This clearly presupposes the reinforcement of the action and the reinforcement of the instruments to put in practice the texts that have been ratified and that are a good diagnosis and a good programme of action. But here we come again to the structure of the multilateral system of today: from one side there is the UN system, that does the work about which I've just talked, and on the other side there are the economic and financial organisations. This causes the existence of two

parallel languages on the multilateral plan, that unfortunately quite often diverge: the one of reason, lucidity and generosity, and on the other side the one of interest.

And finally, if this exists, it is because it suits a lot of people, and many do not have any interest or desire to change it, and I believe that this is a crucial point, and this has been said by many speakers here, and it deserves an attentive analysis and some proposals should be made that could try and overcome this problem.

Mr Rocard very appropriately mentioned the fact that the states do not apply in all the institutions the conventions that they have ratified. I could mention, because I know it, the case of some institutions of the economic financial sector that demanded to the political authorities to denounce a convention of the BIT, by making of the denouncement of that convention the condition for the concession of loan and financial facilities. This is really extraordinary and it gave the General Director of BIT the chance to write a letter to the Secretary General and say: "But these are the same member States, what is happening in the system?"

So, I believe that this is something that should be reminded, and communicated to the public, in order to show the contradictions and urge the institutions and their leaders to face the problem and draw some conclusions.

The second thing is obviously to find the means to make the institutions of Bretton Woods and the WTO work for the realization of the Millennium Goals, approved by the international community. This could be obtained by a reinforcement of the ECOSOC, by an high level authority, at the level of Heads of State, etc... it could also be obtained by a more pragmatic dialogue, that should try and understand where we could reach an agreement to reconcile the points of view and make the economic and financial institutions more active and functioning on some of these essential points.

But I think that whatever the methods could be, they deserve to be explored, and I believe that this point should be among the subjects to follow after this interesting debate of the Forum. In taking care of this question, in developing it, in mobilizing public opinion and some leaders, the Forum would make an extremely useful work, that is essential in order to obtain that the international engagements on the challenges of humanity could be seriously considered and really followed by concrete actions.

## **Mary Kaldor**

I just want to return to Iraq again, as a metaphor. Many of you will know that in Iraq the government and the international community are inside the green zone, a protected green zone, which is very nice, with palm trees and palaces; and the rest of Iraq is the red zone, with bombs, discussions, arguments and fights. And I think it's quite a good metaphor for the world at the moment. The political class lives in guarded green zones, and the rest of the world is a lively, unequal, violence-ridden red zone. I think that's the critical problem that we face at the moment, how to create a bridge between the red zone and the green zone.

There has been an enormous amount of discussion about democracy. But I think there is a difference between formal representative democracy and substantive democracy. Substantive democracy is about whether you are able to influence the decisions that affect your lives, whereas formal democracy is about representation. And we've seen the spread of formal democracy in recent years since the end of the Cold War, but what we have not seen is the spread of substantive democracy and the closing of the gap. That has to be at the heart of any world political architecture.

Richard Falk said it was wonderful but that no-one could have predicted the end of the Cold War or the end of apartheid. Actually I think the political class didn't, but I think those people engaged in civil society efforts, opposing the Cold War, opposing apartheid, did predict it. And I think if we really want to create a new political architecture, we really have to think about those key issues in which civil society is engaged, whether it is a new set of financial arrangements, as Michel Rocard suggested, or whether we're talking about, as so many people here have talked about, the responsibility to protect and human security.

I think as a European I completely take on board what Mr. Brahimi has said. I feel the key, central problem is lack of political will, particularly on the part of the European Union, which could act as a kind of countervailing power in the way that Richard Falk suggested, which could actually make capabilities available for situations like Darfur. But it does not have the political will, which could prevent human rights violations with fewer double standards. So I think there is a real need for

political will. And that political will has to be related to very specific issues, whether it's about Darfur, whether it's about Iraq – the proposal for an international peace conference.

And finally an issue which President Gorbachev himself raised, which I would like to see us raise again, which is nuclear weapons – there we have the most incredible double standards, and I'd like to propose once again that we go back to the proposals of the 1980s, for a European nuclear-free zone, and for a Middle East nuclear-free zone.

### **Josep Xercavins**

Professor Falk proposed to revive the golden age of the United Nations, and I absolutely agree. But the problem is how. When we were in the golden age, and in the following years, we had a very important problem, the gap of implementation. One thing was the plan of action that the United Nations approved in the summits of the 1990s. And another aspect was the reality. And why? In my view, and I think that you can share it with me, because in parallel the powerful of the world, including the United States, Europe also, were applying the neo-liberal policies that we know perfectly and that are implemented by the big three, the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation.

So in my view, the answer to how to revive the golden age of the United Nations needs clearly, as has been said by Federico Mayor, to have the re-foundation of these financial, economical and trade organisations within the UN, really within the UN; and then the social agenda, the women's agenda, the environmental agenda, could possibly be applied, because we can put finance, economics and trade at this level. I think that this is one of the most schizophrenic realities that we have in the system of international institutions, and I suggest that this could be one of the proposals we can put on the table at the end of this meeting, or in the next meeting.

I also think that this is the only way to put the leadership at the same side as the civil society, because now in Latin America, in Africa, in Asia, many people are in the streets against the policies of the International Monetary Fund, against the policies of the World Bank, against the policies of the World Trade Organisation; but there is a very important danger, if the United Nations does nothing in this direction it may be in some years we can have people in the street against the United Nations, and this is the worst thing that could happen in my view.

### **Empedocle Maffia**

Changing institutions, I think we are facing a historic problem today. Shall the institutions push for change? Or shall the new institutions *frame* the ongoing change? If we look at the history of the last thirty to forty years, we can see two different examples. The example of Europe: we in Europe started from the economic side, then we scaled up to the financial side, and then we tried the big challenge, the political institutional side, with a constitution. But at that point the people said no. What went wrong in that process?

The second example is the United States. They started and finished on the economic level, first with NAFTA, and then with CAFTA, the same kind of agreement with Central America. Well, while NAFTA has produced an increase in migration to the United States, which so much scares our American friends, CAFTA has been de facto rejected by the people, and it has been one of the main factors that has swayed public opinion in recent elections towards the left all over Latin America and Central America.

So how can we get out from this situation? My suggestion is that the only way to start this time is from the real issue, to have the capacity to identify politically which are the main issues, and in my view they are: human rights number one, peace number two, sustainable development number three. And when I say sustainable development I don't intend only the classical environment, although the environment has a portion of political value that is unbelievable. I can give you just one example, water management, which seems to be a technical issue, but look at what water management means for the Israeli Palestinian problem, it means the core of that problem, because water management by the Israelis was the main tool (much more than invasion, much more than war) to refrain Palestinians from their rights.

Where is the missing link between the means and the situation as it is? In my view, in the age of communication the missing link we must restore, we must accept, is the public opinion of civil

society. I take an example of the Millennium Development Goals. Here you have a classic example – clear goals of clear real means by the people, subscribed to by all the governments in the world, made law by the United Nations and the IBRD; still the prospects of solving all those problems by 2015 is just none, zero. As Mr. Savio was saying, unfortunately, the role of national governments is still overwhelming in this problem. The action of civil society is the push that can oblige national governments to apply this wider concept that will make humanity owner of itself in the new age.

## CONCLUSIONS

**Mikhail Gorbachev**, *President of The World Political Forum*

Today, we have a world political crisis. The world is even more dangerous now than it was in the mid-1980s. The questions are: what are we supposed to do? And, generally, what kind of world do we need?

We will not achieve anything unless there is a sea change in the attitudes of politicians, who neglect common human interests and do not put them at the top of their agendas. One common problem is that we politicians emphasise our national interests because we have another election ahead of us and that is our greatest concern.

Today, our problems are global, and they can be addressed only by pooling our efforts. Think-tank recommendations and pressure from non-governmental organisations should be the basis for a new politics.

The conference has fulfilled its task: productive brainstorming about the issues has revealed the scope of the endeavour and laid a strong foundation for our continued efforts to build a new world order. We need to deepen our understanding of the realities of today's world and identify developing trends based on those realities. We should take an evolutionary approach to building the new political architecture. This means reforming existing organisations, adapting them to the challenges of the 21st century global world and eliminating outdated organisations and methods.

I want to illustrate this idea through the example of organisations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization. We have just had a meeting with the press, who asked: "Is it time to get rid of the United Nations?" That question usually floats around when someone wants to get rid of international law, international institutions and the UN Security Council, and start acting without taking anyone else into account. I think that everyone is aware of such ideas, so we will not dwell on them.

We need a United Nations Economic Security Council. There are defects in the UN structure, and a very serious defect is the structure of the Security Council, which does not reflect the new realities. The UN is not effective in the social and economic spheres, and many problems are rooted there, including the problems of security, stability and democracy.

For example, political scientists are attempting to provide convincing explanations for the roll-back that we are witnessing in about 100 countries where big democratic changes took place in the late 20th century. Several dictators and authoritarian regimes left the world stage back then, but now we see a roll-back of those processes, and authoritarian-minded politicians are again popular. We see it even here, in Europe. At the most recent congress of political scientists in Cape Town, South Africa, its participants—particularly those representing developing countries—clearly said that people were unhappy with the fact that their hopes for democracy had proved unwarranted. They are ready to support anyone who proposes an effective social and economic program.

Some people argue that the most important thing is freedom and political rights. Others try to prove that it is important to create social and economic pre-conditions for a normal life that is worthy of a human being. In fact, both are important, and both need one another to function successfully.

All our efforts and projects will not be worth a single penny if we do not recognise that the number of poor people is increasing and the gap between the rich and poor is growing. Today, half the world's population lives on \$1 or \$2 a day, while well-off people engage in lengthy discussions and seem not to care about the fate of those who are less fortunate than them. We must pay attention to this issue, because it is a potential time bomb.

What were the origins of the Porto Alegre protest movement? At first, they simply wanted to portray their movement as a variety of quasi-rioting forces. Now, these same forces are engaged in dialogue. We can no longer avoid addressing these urgent issues, and I would probably put the establishment of a new organisation for social and economic concerns at centre stage in the new world order.

Mr. Stéphane Hessel, the French Ambassador, was talking about the dangers within the global financial system. Today, any country can be brought to its knees. You remember how Indonesia

was praised and how its experience was extolled. However, the country was bogged down in short loans. At the time, it was enough to push a button or two, and within 24 hours Indonesia had turned from a prosperous country into a backward one. The value of the national currency decreased three times.

When issues like that are not addressed, a vacuum develops and the G-8 and other organisations try to fill it. However, these organisations are like clubs: they are geared to the interests of their own members. For sure, they sometimes alleviate burning problems and raise billions; however, they do not operate as a system for the common good. Who authorised them to take up functions that were irrelevant to their missions?

G-8 members feel the absence of their legitimacy, which is why they recently invited China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico to their meetings. Life itself is forcing the G-8 to extend its representation. However, it is still a club with invited guests. The danger is that it becomes an alternative to the United Nations, and when it agrees a decision that conflicts with the interests of the entire global community, there is a problem. The UN is the only legitimate universal international organisation, which is why, in my view, an Economic Security Council is needed.

As for the World Trade Organization, people often ask: Can the organisation, which was created to achieve a narrow objective of liberalising global trade, meet the demands of today's world? I think history has shown that the WTO can adapt to new objectives and to the inclusion of new countries such as China and Brazil. If we adopt such an approach, we will be able to adapt these organisations, not get rid of them. Adaptation is possible, and it may be the main route that we take in moving towards a new world architecture.

I shall turn to the second important idea that was voiced here. We are witnessing the formation of a global civil society. Most notably, its influence on politics will grow, and it should have a major impact on the architecture of the new world order. Analysis shows that the main theme of protest movements, which have already become international in nature, is dissatisfaction with the social and economic situation and the state of the environment.

Furthermore, civil society and the global civil society are already taking to the streets and airing their demands. Co-operation between the UN, international organisations and civil society is not perfect, and it does not meet the requirement to address new tasks; but a world architecture built solely on sovereign states is not adequate to meet the needs of a modern world.

Our task is to think about how to legitimatise new international organisations and integrate them with the global process. I fully support the idea voiced by Giulietto Chiesa, the Italian member of the European Parliament, who said that we should not only assess the situation and develop a vision, but move towards a strategy and create effective mechanisms through which the new world order can function. Otherwise, we may slip into a utopian approach.

Our theme is the creation of a realistic structure for the new world order, which would ensure effective governance in a global world. There are some important points to consider: global processes should not be controlled from the centre. There can be no global Government, nor can there be claims by one or several states to govern the world.

Our proposals should be developed by examining real trends. In my view, a realistic new world order is a complex, multi-level system based on democratic principles. Nation states will still be needed. I attended one conference at which a Japanese delegate called for doing away with borders and states. He said that multinational companies and banks should decide everything. However, they proved to be unprepared and unable to shoulder the task. The role of nation states will not diminish, because this complex world requires responsible and balanced action. However, authority will be shared, and nation states will have to cede part of their sovereignty, as they have in the European Union.

It is important to find a proper balance between the common interests of humanity and national interests. On this particular matter, even the most prominent leaders are simply engaged in apologetics rather than analysis. Addressing issues of security, creating safeguards against nuclear or biological war and addressing the environmental crisis—these are common national interests. However, if we do not address them globally either, all countries will be hit hard. Today, the absence of such understanding is the cause of many serious political mistakes.

We should welcome the formation and strengthening of regional systems in world politics. They are sweeping across almost all continents. They are an inherent part of the new world order, the outline of which is just beginning to emerge. Many are not operating at full capacity yet. Nevertheless, they are of great importance.

One should not forget about methods. I like the idea that a structure in itself is not yet a decision; you have to add to it political will and methods of addressing problems. Indeed, we live in a global world that is constantly changing. However, we still see the prevalence of old methods: force, sanctions, coercion, pressure and so on. As Lord Skidelsky from the United Kingdom House of Lords reminded us yesterday, countries are all too willing to resort to instruments of force such as sanctions, although we are convinced that they should be an instrument of last resort.

The question of preventive politics, preventive diplomacy, dialogue and the search for consensus has never been more important. The United States floated an idea that stirred discord in the European Union: the old and decrepit Europe should not be dealt with; it is the new Europe that we should do business with. The new Europe differs in that it very quickly bends to US demands. It dances not to the tune of its own Polish mazurka, but to the tune of American jazz.

We should be looking for new and effective organisational forms, including peoples' diplomacy. If civil society is set up under the United Nations, or even under a regional organisation, it will be able to settle crises when they emerge, and many potential crises will be eliminated or minimised.

Everything that we have discussed will operate efficiently only when it is based solely on international law. Recently, we have seen how a departure from international law, even under the most noble of pretexts, such as the war on terror, the spread of democracy and the prevention of ethnic cleansing, leads to even bigger problems and sometimes to stalemate, such as that which we now see in Iraq.

So, we have lots of interesting, important and necessary work ahead of us.

I once again thank you all for participating in this conference.