After 1989.

Multilateralism and the challenges of the new world.

Anna Caffarena, University of Teramo, Italy

1. Creating order

To bring out a pattern that reveals the sense of the era in which we live from the multitude of events of differing tendencies that have occupied the international stage in recent years is an arduous enterprise. Still today, the label most frequently used to indicate the period after the Cold War is “post-bipolar”: a formula that reveals, in its vagueness, the limits of the efforts made in the attempt to interpret our times. The rhetoric of “disorder”, which has had many authoritative supporters, many variations and few alternatives since the early nineties, can be considered emblematic more of our difficulties than of the situation which decreed its success. Does the series of events we have witnessed strengthen the idea of an international political system “out of control” and, perhaps, becoming even more so (Brzezinski 1993)? It is difficult to deny that the euphoria which followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the expectation for the almost spontaneous expansion of the zone of “democratic peace” that this event unleashed were replaced first by the horror for the huge increase of civil wars, with their accompaniment of such violent violations of human rights as to become the distinctive trait of contemporary conflict (Kaldor 1999), and then the bewilderment when faced with the first manifestation, on 11 September 2001, of global “hyperterrorism” that seems to have deprived nation states of the exclusive prerogative to make war. However evocative, the image of disorder, which is a representation (more or less faithful, according to the point of view) of reality, is in any case something different from a key to interpretation.

In the attempt to give meaning *also* to disorder, which in itself has none, we will follow, instead, the hypothesis of order: in other words, the end of the Cold War triggered, as always happens when a “major war” finishes, a full-blown process of reconstruction of order through which the relations of power decreed by the outcome of the conflict are translated into roles, and the winner sets the new rules of the game (Clark 2001). All the members of the international community – including the winners – will then draw on these norms, legitimised by the consensus that they are able to attract, to tackle the tensions

that gradually materialise and manage them so as to ensure the stability of the system. It is no chance that the two principles that should inform peacemaking in particular are long-term thinking and moderation (Ikenberry 2003): their application fosters wide and convinced acceptance of the rules, guaranteeing the maximum effectiveness of international politics, understood above all as governance.

From this standpoint, disorder is not denied. Instead of recalling it to convey the idea of the incomprehensibility of the international context (which cannot but lead to de facto ungovernability), it is conceived as an indicator of the existence of stress, physiologically present in any case, below a certain threshold, in all domestic political systems. However, if this were not to be tackled, the international system would hit a crisis, opening the road – if we can draw a lesson from history – to a new major war doomed to change the relations of power and rules of the game.

This last observation is not mere whimsy: i.e., history might not indeed repeat itself. The genesis of the post-bipolar order – which is the product of a war "won" without having been fought – makes it different from all previous ones. It could therefore evolve in unexpected ways. Structurally unipolar since December 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved, the international system still seems in search of rules capable of ensuring its survival. After the end of the Cold War, the peacemaking process has in fact gone through three phases, the first beginning in 1989 and ending in 1991, dominated by the project of expansion of the old, liberal, multilateral order; the second, that began in 1992 and finished in 2001, in which the perception grew that multilateralism had to be reinterpreted in order to adapt to the problems posed by the post-bipolar world and the failure to universalise the principles of the liberal order (applied selectively even by those supposed to be their most convinced advocates, as shown by the schizophrenia of the West in deciding which humanitarian actions to back or ignore). The third phase is the one in which a clearer perception of the new global challenges to security led the United States, the true champions of the multilateral architecture of the order that emerged from World War Two, to opt for unilateralism. This choice, taken to its extreme consequences, could condemn the UN, the organisation that after 1945 has embodied the spirit of multilateralism, to irreversible irrelevance. From an operational point of view, the UN is today the centre of a complex system of specialised bodies on whose activities depend the international community's chances of reaching certain widely shared goals now at the top of the international agenda: from control of the HIV/AIDS epidemic to the liberalisation of trade, not to mention emergency operations such as the one launched in the Indian Ocean area

after the crisis produced by the *tsunami* in December 2004, which envisages the participation of as many as 16 UN agencies.

The “mutation” of international politics determined by the appearance of atomic weapons that made a major constituent war “impossible” (Bonanate 1991) represents such an extraordinary circumstance that the anomaly of a peace process lasting fifteen years can certainly be traced back to it. What is more difficult to explain with reference to this fact is why, given an absolutely stable configuration of power relations (unipolar, and more markedly so), the actor who has the task of setting the rules has switched from the strongest assertion of multilateralism to demanding the need for it to be replaced by its opposite.

To explain this second anomaly it is reasonable to suggest that its origins lie in yet another new factor, i.e. in the interweaving of the process of peacemaking with another transformation of the international scene, even broader and deeper than the one that reflects the variation in power relations. Triggered by the end of bipolarism, this transformation is symbolised by two parallel developments: the internalisation of conflicts[1], which produces an unexpected spillover of anarchy from the international setting to the internal domain, and the definitive rise on the international scene of “private violence mongers”, such as private military companies and transnational organised crime, as well as terrorist networks. This is an innovation that cuts into the state monopoly of the exercise of force, a founding feature of our conception of the modern state, the true cornerstone of the system of international relations created in Westphalia.

While in the first phase of the remaking of the world order, in other words up until 1991, there was the belief that similar rules were required to those institutionalised in the previous post-war periods, the second reflects the awareness that not even the present post-war period would see the triumph of the principle of collective security. And this is not only due to the unwillingness of members of the international community to consider peace an indivisible asset and act consequently, making the defensive mechanism credible, where aggression against a member of the United Nations is the same as aggression against each member, making this principle the multilateral instrument par excellence in the field of security. Ensuring the stability of order in the new context means taking into account the profound change underway and shifting towards a full reinterpretation of the *founding rules* of the modern international system, so as to temper, for example, the principle of sovereignty with the need for humanitarian intervention. This last perception

was accentuated by the events of September 11. The old rules that states had adopted to govern a world of states are clearly no longer adequate to the challenges that threaten humanity. Together with the new rules, the very *meaning* of order needs to be rethought and, with it, the politics that should serve it.

2. 1989-1991: the new shape of the world

The immediate "post-war" period, that goes from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the dissolution of the Soviet Union[2], is the one in which the change in the power relations was most directly and visibly reflected across the planet. The restructuring of the international system passed through German reunification within NATO, the "velvet revolutions" that led to democratic transitions in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the end of the Warsaw Pact. The United States found itself dominating the system alone, freed from the worrying presence of its historical antagonist and the need to compete with it to maintain the "balance of terror", but also forced to reinvent a new role for itself. The legitimisation of the exercise of a power which, with the disappearance of the Soviet Union, knows only self-imposed limits, reassuring former enemies and friends (to avoid a tendency towards balancing), while moulding the international scenario to its own interests, is the primary objective of the United States, that finds its ideal frame in the project, formulated by the Bush administration, of a *New International Order*.

The "soft" end of the Cold War had given rise to the expectation that the post-bipolar international order would assert itself spontaneously. And this was exactly what happened, or at least this seemed the case immediately. It was actually the old liberal international order, which after 1945 had aided the consolidation of relations within the Western bloc, that expanded through the gradual inclusion of countries that were experiencing democratic and market transitions (in some areas thanks also to the conclusion of regional conflicts, such as in Mozambique and Guatemala, which could open the road to further democratisation).

The conviction was re-stated emphatically at the G7 meeting in London in July 1991 that the collective security model was to be fully realised through the UN, finally able to

---

[1] 109 civil wars and internationalised civil wars compared to 7 classical inter-state wars in the period 1989-2003 (Eriksson – Wallensteen 2004).

[2] This period, which is the subject of specific analysis by Svetlana Savranskaia, will be examined only through some extremely brief indications, useful to the overall presentation.

keep its promises after the Security Council had been paralysed for almost fifty years by the cross vetoes of its permanent members. The Gulf War, which many observers view as being the last of classical wars, 19th century-style in the reasons for the aggression (territorial conquest) seemed to confirm this expectation. It was in fact considered revealing of the effectiveness of the principle of collective security facing its first test in the post-bipolar world. International legality, which reflects the liberal principle of the rule of law, should and, what counts more, *could* be safeguarded by the international community as a whole, under the aegis of the UN and thanks to the material resources, as well as the leadership, of the United States.

The international climate of the period, of which the image of the "end of history" is emblematic, made it credible that even relations with non-democratic countries could be guided by the rationale of negotiation through the United Nations, conceived this time as the parliament of the international community. This is a form inspired by democracy understood as a non-violent means of resolving conflicts which could play an important educational function with respect to those countries not yet democratic. Indeed, the Soviet Union itself did not view the enlargement of the area of democratic peace and the institutions that governed it with any hostility, to the point of embracing privileged relations even with NATO from a perspective that can be held to be one of progressive integration.

While profound upheavals in the period 1989-91 were seen in the political geometries frozen by the Cold War, as a consequence of the structural transformation of the international system, from the point of view of the processes and rules that governed it, the real promise of the new world seemed to be represented by the full realisation of the order that had remained incomplete at the end of World War Two.

3. 1992-2001: rethinking multilateralism

Starting in mid 1991, some worrying signs had, in truth, begun to emerge, without however depressing the optimism of those days. The proclamations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, which were to be followed in March 1992 by that of Bosnia, indicated that history was on the move again. It was just a question of when war would reappear in Europe. The crisis that had opened up in Somalia following the flight of Siad Barre was the first case of a "collapsing state" that demanded intervention by the international community. The Restore Hope mission, decided by the UN Security Council

in December 1992, had nothing to do with traditional peacekeeping, interposing a force while awaiting diplomatic contacts to be rebuilt between two states at war. It aimed at avoiding a humanitarian disaster *within a single state* in which civil war and famine were reciprocally worsening in a spiral that could not fail to move the hearts of the pacified and prosperous world. In the meantime, in December 1991, the first round of the general election in Algeria was won by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a party of religious inspiration with a clear fundamentalist leaning that declared publicly that it held Islam and democracy to be incompatible. The spontaneous expansion of democracy could encounter some serious obstacles after all, and even regression was possible. The second round of the elections was cancelled to stop the FIS reaching a large enough majority to amend the constitution. The period of conflict that was to follow, with terrorist actions and counter-guerrilla measures, cost the lives of more than one hundred thousand people.

If one had been able to interpret them, certain events should have presaged a return of religious and cultural factors as significant – and war-fomenting – components of political action. The clash between Armenia and Azerbaigian for Nagorno Karabak, the enclave inhabited by Armenians in Azeri territory, goes back to 1988. And in the same area – which was to turn out to be highly turbulent – Chechnya's aspirations for independence opened a crisis in 1991 that has still not ended after ten years of death and destruction. With hindsight, these various hotbeds of tension, scattered and heterogeneous, that appeared in the space of a few months, were emblematic of the new world.

The universalism of human rights was destined to have as its antagonist the principle of self-determination demanded on the basis of particular identities defined increasingly emotionally and manipulated by élites anxious to confirm and perhaps even increase their own power by exploiting the ample margins of freedom of action that accompanied the end of bipolarism. The spread of the democratic model, on which expectations of an enlargement of the peace zone and its *irreversible* consolidation were hung, appeared – after the first spontaneous transitions had occurred – as a much less linear process and one that could not be taken for granted in the way that the initial enthusiasm for the failure of the socialist model had suggested. The expansion of the market economy that was also expected to contribute to "cooling" politics, making it more rational, when its promises of enrichment ended up instead by unleashing appetites in individuals that had no scruples about exploiting the identity issue to bend the populations to their own ends. In contexts in which political struggle assumes these connotations, the

socio-economic inequalities often became themselves a new source of clashes, especially when they strengthen certain "ethnically" homogeneous and identifiable groups to the detriment of others (Chua 2002).

It was in the wake of these developments that popularity grew for the images of the "clash of civilisations" (Huntington 1996), "new Middle Ages" (Minc 1994) and even a "back to the future" option (Mearsheimer 1991), i.e. a return to the era dominated by power politics and the balance of power, as if the Cold War, with its capacity to contain competition between the system's central powers and the centrifugal impetus in the more "external" zones, had been nothing but a parenthesis in a historical development that responds to never-changing rules: the striving for power, the security dilemma, the balance of power or conflict, according to what prudence advises.

If a bipolar system has no peripheries – as has been observed – they do exist in the post-bipolar world. In Africa, economically underdeveloped countries, weak from the institutional point of view and characterised by a mixed population, often made turbulent by the difficulties in fighting to survive, and for which the "neutral" idea of citizenship, in the absence of a functioning state, holds little appeal, suffer from the declining interest of the West and exclusion from the virtuous circuits of economic globalisation. Emblematic of this mixture, which quickly showed itself to be explosive, is the crisis that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, with its 800,000 deaths in 100 days. This crisis was also emblematic of the difficulties encountered by the international community after the substantial failure of the Restore Hope mission in Somalia. The United Nations withdrew most of its contingent of 2500 men deployed in 1993 (UNAMIR mission), leaving on the field the Canadian General Dallaire with 270 men, while the genocide continued[3], making the most explicit public admission of impotency.

On the one hand, therefore, it becomes evident that humanitarian intervention will become "selective", i.e. decided case by case on the basis of considerations of interest and expected effectiveness, thus denying the automatic mechanism typical of collective security, a mechanism unsuited, in fact, to maintaining peace in a situation in which conflicts are above all civil. This is confirmed by the more than three million "invisible" deaths in the internationalised civil war that has been taking place in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1998, after the fall the year before of the Mobutu regime. On the

[3] The resolution was voted unanimously by the Security Council on 21 April 1994, exactly at the time when violence was at its height. 80% of the victims dies, in fact, in just six weeks, recording "the highest average level of killing – excluding the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki– in the whole of the 20th century" (Flores 2002, 514). About 300,000 were children.

other hand, the intervention first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo demonstrate that, despite the presence of massive human rights violations, it is not always possible to obtain the support of the entire international community. Especially after 1993, when the relations between Russia and the United States became less easy because of reciprocal disillusionment and Russia's consequent determination to pursue with greater decision its own national interest, the need for more intrusive interventions – and let us not forget that the UN Charter recognises the reserved dominion of states and thus bars the organisation from any right/duty to intervene within the borders of member states, in the full respect of the principle of sovereignty – led the United States and European countries to draw up a variation on multilateralism "suited to the times". Legitimisation for "international policing" operations run by those who had the strength (and the will), above all the United States, in other words was found in the universality of the principles in defence of which intervention is made, i.e. their declared objective: the safeguard of a *presumed* general interest. The new peacekeeping operations for humanitarian purposes (which obviously do not exclude the simultaneous defence of national interests of various kinds) are thus managed through regional organisations – NATO essentially – and the legitimisation of the UN arrives only after the event. Humanitarian intervention, despite being in contrast with the founding principles of the modern international system, is nowadays demanded clearly and loudly by public opinion, especially in the West. The permeability of borders and the consequent, progressive fusion and confusion of the states' political spaces make the predominance of the concept of reserved dominion over the protection of human rights less and less tolerable to the majority.

With the passing of time, it became clear that this world integrated (yet anything but homogenised) by globalisation is populated by a great variety of different actors. Having abandoned the elegant geometries produced by the principle of sovereignty, the real picture becomes more and more complex. Statehood, to start with, assumed variegated features: alongside the established democratic states it is no longer enough to note those characterised by other forms of political regime – authoritarian, theocratic, sultanist, racist like South Africa (which celebrated its first democratic elections in 1994). This aspect, of the political regime, is judged to be totally irrelevant to the conduct of foreign policy (Mearsheimer 2003) by the "realistically" oriented internationalists, i.e. the majority amongst the most influential. On the international stage, "collapsing states" and failed states make their appearance, bringing with them all their weaknesses. As do "rogue

states", ones that do not respect the rule of international law, especially as regards nuclear non-proliferation[4].

If it is legitimate to expect that democracy roots itself easily in some countries that have maybe had a democratic experience in the past and whose level of political awareness, as well as their social and economic structure, favour this process, in others the transition appears much more problematic. Still today, there are geographical clusters of countries that are not free, such as in the Middle East[5], which induces reflection on the capacity of attraction of the democratic model or on the effectiveness of the brakes that could hinder it taking hold. The very clear, direct relationship that links low per capita income and the failure to enjoy political and civil rights[6] demonstrates that liberalisation policies, on which the model of globalisation of the market economy banked to ensure development, have not produced the expected effects and this has, in its turn, compromised and compromises the spread of democracy. On the one hand, with the passing of time, the problem therefore emerged more and more inescapably of how to support this process and, on the other, that of how to react towards not yet democratic countries which, naturally, in their turn, have extraordinarily diverse characteristics, ranging from China to Iran.

The American strategy under the Clinton presidency, expressed in the National Security Strategy of 1994, was still that of "engagement and enlargement": diplomatic involvement in the laborious transformation of the world triggered by the end of bipolarism and the progressive integration of countries that are still not part of the zone of democratic peace. This latter objective was to be achieved through their inclusion in the multilateral "world of institutions" that the United States undertook to strengthen through support for the enlargement process of the European Union, a redefinition of the tasks of NATO – starting with the recognition of the importance of social, economic and political factors for security – and its aperture to the countries of central and eastern Europe. This process was flanked by a second, parallel one of the construction of completely *new* institutions, such as OSCE and the WTO which became operative in 1995, in the wake respectively of CSCE and GATT, in the second case bringing to completion a project fostered since the end of World War Two. The idea that stabilisation depends on inclusion and is therefore

[4] India and Pakistan's nuclear tests – in reality demonstrations – date back to 1998. The two countries have never been labelled "rogue states", however.

[5] Where 66% of countries are not free (source: Freedom House).

[6] 41% of countries are not free where citizens have a per capita income of less than 1500 dollars per year, while only 13% of countries come into this category where income is between 1500 and 6000 dollars. In the

the result of a political strategy – not the mere concentration of power, whose effect on the international political system seems to be strongly conditioned by the institutions in which the distribution of power is "nested" – is thus clearly at the centre of this project. The involvement of Russia in the G7 – which then became the G8 – and the admission of China to the WTO are emblematic facts from this point of view. The antagonist of the times of the Cold War and the potential "balancer" of the future are integrated as if to encourage history not to repeat itself.

4. After September 11.

That history may not repeat itself is actually one of the observations that September 11 suggests. Yet it is difficult to find this fact reassuring. The event of which we were direct, and stunned, witnesses constitutes, in fact, a poisonous distillation of all those phenomena that, after 1989, seemed to threaten not only our security but our very ability to understand the world we live in. Private violence mongers, such as terrorists, presenting themselves as advocates of an extreme variant of "identity politics", exploit "failed states" to hide and, perhaps, "rogue states" (but certainly illegal "private" channels, such as organised crime) to arm themselves, set themselves outside the canons of inter-state politics of all eras, however unedifying that too is. The perverse synergy that bonds together these typical aspects of the post-bipolar world and the asymmetry that today characterises the relations between states and their antagonists – and which seems to play decidedly against the former – make the situation more and more worrying, as well as being totally new. The ubiquity of the danger, symbolised by the choice for the attacks after the Twin Towers and the Pentagon of completely anonymous places, the surprise effect that acts as a multiplier of risk and the awareness that the decisions taken by the new actors ignore the (instrumental) rationality typical of states, pose a problem above all in terms of the effectiveness of the response.

On this, the world divided. On the one hand, there are those who believe that a multilateral approach is adequate, indeed inevitable, to tackle an enemy that acts on the international scene, but lives hidden in states, the vast majority of which are not conniving with it. This is why the struggle against terrorism cannot but be entrusted above all to investigative and intelligence operations conducted by national bodies, which must

---

first group, the number of free countries reaches only 16% while in the second it is a notable 66% (source: Freedom House).

however be co-ordinated with those of other countries in order to face what is truly a transnational phenomenon. This therefore entails closer international co-operation of the traditional kind, even if in a particularly delicate area. On the other, there is the United States and its allies in the “global war against terror”. They are convinced that, to tackle the new security challenges, the maximum freedom of action is required as is rapidity in decision-making, both guaranteed better by Americanism unilateralism, in other words, policy unshackled by the respect of international norms and institutions.

This choice by the US, the target of the first “hyperterrorist” attack, but also the source of the rules that must oversee the international political game in this third post-war setting, reflects the belief that the stability of the system – i.e. its capacity to cope with tensions – is a function of the concentration of power and not of the institutions that have the purpose of guiding and legitimising the exercise of that power. While in the period of the Cold War the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union stopped the UN Security Council from functioning, blocked as it was by the cross vetoes of its permanent members, the new configuration of power makes the organisation – and the multilateralism that it embodies – irrelevant (Glennon 2003). And what is worse, an obstacle to the pursuit by the United States of its own primary national interest.

September 11 could therefore perhaps be remembered also as the moment when the structural and regulatory dimensions of the international political system came to coincide: unipolarism was translated into unilateralism, in other words, marking the beginning of the new post-bipolar international order a dozen or so years after the fall of the Wall (Krauthammer 2001). The process of peacemaking, having made the attempt to extend the sphere of application of the old rules (1989-1991), and then to adapt them to the challenges that emerged step by step (1992-2001), entered a genuinely dynamic phase, which should lead to unilateralism replacing multilateralism as the fundamental institution of the international order. If this project is successful, then the real turning point in the international order will be fixed not in 1989 but in 2001.

However, two factors play in favour of the persistence of multilateralism, at least for this first stretch of the 21st century. Multilateralism is the transposition onto the international stage of the elementary principles of procedural democracy. Its progressive rise starting in the mid 19th century, fully two centuries after the modern inter-state system had taken shape in Westphalia, has been traced back to a sort of “contamination” of the international environment by the principles that at the time were putting down roots within the states. Those who follow the rules of democracy in their own nation tend to respect

them, and demand respect of them by others also in international relations. The increase in the number of democratic political regimes[7], even if not fully fledged in many cases, thus leads us to believe that the "demand" for multilateralism will be increasingly strong.

This first factor is accompanied by a second one. If the United States today believes that the reinforcement of its security depends on the spread of democracy, so much so as to put this at the centre of its agenda for the coming years, this means that it recognises the specific nature of democratic foreign policies. But this specific nature consists precisely in the acceptance of the principles of multilateralism[8]. Encouragement of democratisation and rejection of multilateralism are therefore two contradictory strategies. Furthermore, the second ends up by making the first futile. Surely nobody is interested in this happening. Multilateralism does not in fact reflect just the democratic style in international relations, it is the only way to produce governance in a world of states with problems bigger than themselves[9]. It is difficult today to maintain that there is another way of putting order into things.

---

[7] The 69 democracies in 1989 had become 117 in 2003 (source: Freedom House).

[8] Mearsheimer (2003), for example, maintains that the political regime is totally uninfluential with regard to foreign policy decisions in that democracies are as keen to safeguard their security as authoritarian regimes and therefore all states have *equal* ambitions to a position of hegemony capable of dissuading any potential challenger. From this standpoint, fostering democratic transition is not enough, as such a development in itself does not improve the prospects for peace. To this end, it is necessary to integrate the new democracies into the "security community" which, in the course of the last fifty years, has enabled western countries to exclude war from the range of instruments to which it is *possible* (and not only legitimate) to turn to solve the conflicts that arise between them.

[9] Of which, terrorism appears to be the most serious today, but certainly not the only one or even the main one. So many questions occupy the international agenda nowadays that it is unreasonable to attempt to produce a list with any claim to being comprehensive. To cite only those mentioned because they appear linked to terrorism, these range from the fight against poverty to support for education and development in vast, troubled areas. As has been said, economic and financial globalisation (a process that itself needs to be governed so that the search for profit by economic actors is not conducted in a totally lawless environment) has not delivered its promises so far and the growing socio-economic marginalisation experienced in various regions of the planet end up fuelling the new forms of conflict both internally and on the global scale. Other problems on the table are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and that of the model that the relations between the United States and the emerging powers (Europe, China, India), or re-emerging ones, as Russia could be defined, should follow in order to guarantee humanity a lasting peace: this is the pre-requisite for tackling with any effectiveness the challenges on which the life of all of us depend in the years to come.

Bibliography

L. Bonanate, *La rivoluzione internazionale*, Teoria Politica, VII, n. 2, 1991.

Z. Brzezinski, *Out of Control. Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century,* Charles Scribner's Son's, North Carolina 1993; It. ed. *Il mondo fuori controllo. Gli sconvolgimenti planetari all'alba del XXI secolo*, Longanesi, Milano 1993

A. Chua, *World on Fire. How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability,* Anchor Books, New York 2002; It. ed. *L'età dell'odio. Esportare democrazia e libero mercato genera conflitti etnici?*, Carocci, Roma 2004.

I. Clark, *The Post-Cold War Order. The Spoils of Peace*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001.

M. Eriksson – P. Wallensteen, *Armed Conflict, 1989-2003*, Journal of Peace Research, 41, no. 5, 2004.

M. Flores, *Il secolo-mondo. Storia del Novecento*, il Mulino, Bologna 2002.

M.J. Glennon, *Why the Security Council Failed*, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2003.

S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, New York 1996; ed. It. *Lo scontro delle civiltà e il nuovo ordine internazionale*, Garzanti, Milano 1997..

G.J. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2001; It. ed. *Dopo la vittoria. Istituzioni, strategie della moderazione e ricostruzione dell'ordine internazionale dopo le grandi guerre*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2003.

M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1999; It. ed. *Le nuove guerre. La violenza organizzata nell'età globale*, Carocci, Roma 1999.

C. Krauthammer, *The New Unilateralism*, Washington Post, 8 June 2001, p.29.

J. Mearsheimer, *Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War*, International Security, 15, no. 1, 1990.

J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Norton, New York 2001; It. ed. *La logica di potenza. L'America, le guerre e il controllo del mondo*, Università Bocconi Editore, Milano 2003.

A. Minc, *Le nouveau Moyen Age*, Gallimard, Paris 1993; It. ed. *Il nuovo Medioevo*, Sperling &Kupfer, Milano 1994.